

with it a fundamental transformation of the focus of education. With it, students are not conceived to be mere objects anymore, but are considered to be subjects. And education is not the mere “gaining of knowledge” anymore, but rather, it is “life in all of its manifestations” (AE 7). With this fundamental change of viewpoint, the mechanism of educational realization ceases to be the accumulation of a quantity of information, but rather, the quality of educational growth. The focus of education is also shifted from the product, or the result of the attainment of objectives imposed onto students, to the process of learning itself. With these radical changes of focus, the field of educational vision similarly widens from the mere subject-matter to a holistic emphasis on the student’s life-experience, and from the limited domain of schooling to the individual in the wider society. Furthermore, from this perspective, the roles educators play may shift from instructors to facilitators, and from “blue collars,” who merely impart information, to “white collars,” who inspire and support learning. In these many ways, the process perspective on education, with its holistic vision, radically transforms modern education.

In sum, many scholars forecast the 21st century as being one of global harmony. This can realistically be accomplished if we can detach ourselves from modern ways of thinking and, with the help of process philosophy, adopt postmodern ways of thinking of the constructive variety. At this historic turning-point, the book *Process Studies in China (I)* must be a milestone.

MICHEL WEBER. *Whitehead’s Pancreativism: The Basics. Process Thought. Volume 7.* Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006: 255 pages. [Reviewed by **ROLAND FABER**, Claremont School of Theology, Claremont, CA 91711]

This is an important and exciting new book on the interpretation of Whitehead’s philosophy as a whole, mainly from the perspective of his magnum opus *Process and Reality*, but also radiating to the earliest and latest instantiations of the development of Whitehead’s thought. On the other hand, it is a very enigmatic and idiosyncratic book, full of wonderful excursions through sidelines of branches of historical knowledge and argumentative struggles, but also filled with personal preferences based on battles in which the author seemingly finds himself enmeshed in his “pancreativistic” interpretation of Whitehead’s work. This book is consciously written from a European perspective to further the unique milieu in which Whitehead can be discovered anew in Europe today, but also in order to engage a new future of Whitehead research and to be an exemplification of it.

It fits this perspective that the book begins with the “Historico-Conceptual Context” of Whitehead’s thought, shortly glancing over the life and works of Whitehead, but heavily engaging the legacy in its American and European branches. While it highlights the work of Dorothy Emmet and Wolfe Mays, it also exhibits its first cancerous battle with Nicholas Rescher in order to dismiss his criticism of Whitehead and to strategically stage one of the major theses of the book: that the epochal theory of becoming is at the heart of Whitehead’s metaphysics from its beginning, and rightly so, because of an inherent necessity for the possibility to think together novelty and freedom with a causal universe. While the legacy, as laid out, exhibits deep historical knowledge, it also lacks certain names (I. Stengers) and graciously reduces the importance of new developments (e.g., the Deleuze-related reception). Nevertheless, this first part sets the stage for the desire to offer a new direction for Whitehead scholarship in which the author wants to engage in the coming chapters.

“The Intertwining of Science, Philosophy and Religion” leads us into the land of Whitehead’s thought-production, the field of science, philosophy, and religion in which Whitehead wanted to set his metaphysics as its well and area of unification, and also the groundbreaking departures from the dualism-ridden conditions under which these fields are discussed in their modern incarnations. In all of this, the basic thesis is one in which the author sees Whitehead following William James: namely, that everything (every field and all knowledge) is based on, and has to lead back to, *pure experience*, i.e., nothing can be, and should be, part of theory that is not an element extracted from immediate (human) experience. Interwoven in his discussion of the basic interplay of these fields in Whitehead’s speculative philosophy is the interesting thesis that all fields exhibit a “Tryptichalization” of their account of acquiring knowledge. Scientific, philosophical, and religious knowledge has two edges, one is pre-rational, immediate and infinite; the other is post-rational and reflecting back on the immediate origin from which it sprang and to which it tries to recur. It is in these non-rational areas that all the fields are connected and slip into one another, while in their rational part they remain separated, following their own *logos*. Metaphysics, in Whitehead’s understanding, therefore, stems out of the mystery of immediate experience and must end in wonder. The rationalization in between, if it is done rightly, is the way in which this is achieved.

“*Process and Reality’s* Goal and Method” demonstrates Whitehead’s “pancreativistic” method by exploring his systematic criteria. The most

interesting feature in relating coherence, logical consistency, adequacy, applicability, and necessity, is that the author correlates them in such a manner that he can demonstrate consistently how Whitehead escapes any accusation of creating a static system. On the contrary, all the criteria lead to a “categorical democracy” by categorical interdependence *and* independence: the criteria are not independent, but nevertheless not definable in terms of the other, allowing for “contributiveness.”

Based on this insight, a hermeneutical set of tools is put forward to secure the systemic openness of Whitehead’s speculative endeavor. Imaginative Generalization and Polysemiality, Circumambulance and Constructive Discrimination—all of these hermeneutical terms indicate a process of interpretation that needs ambivalence as much as identity. The basic insight, however, rests with the alleged universality of the Reformed Subjectivist Principle, which the author, in its urge to touch the cosmic tissue, interprets as universalization of subjectivity to all realms by reconstructing human subjectivity as one of its natural modes.

On this methodological basis, “Creative Advance and Categorical Scheme,” explores the basic concepts in which the “Creative Advance” that expresses Whitehead’s most basic intuition manifests itself as ontological truth of the universe, namely the triptych Gift of Creativity, Power of Efficiency, and Bliss of Vision. Through the Gift, novelty is possible and unexplainably appearing as occasions of becoming; Causal Efficacy secures the differentiating, ordering, and selecting ways of inheritance of the composition of occasions; Vision, finally, introduces the eschatological and teleological dimension, and, yes, God. The author is undoubtedly correct, thereby, that God does not close the system teleologically (as one may assume it did in Hegel), but is eschatologically opening it insofar as the Divine vision aims at infinitely ongoing processes of intensity and not final perfection.

Further, in his introduction of the basic concept of the Category of the Ultimate and the three principles to be found in the Categories of Explanation (that of Relativity, Process, and the Ontological Principle), the author lays a finger on three essential sub-streams of their functioning together: the (somehow paradoxical) togetherness of atomism and continuity, liberty and determinism, and duration and time; the most intricate insight being that Whitehead seeks the balance between two counter-movements: “novation” (the force of change) and “innovation” (the introduction of pure novelty). This antagonism, or better, “contrast,” is so fundamental that everything follows from their contact:

the universal, i.e., cosmically thoroughgoing, dynamic togetherness of subjectivity and objectivity; freedom and causal necessity; mentality and physicality.

In what may be his most intricate, but also most problematic move, the author, now, claims—on this basis—that: (1) Whitehead never changed his mind on the epochal theory of time, as is widely held to have appeared between *Concept of Nature* and *Science and the Modern World*; and (2) that in order to allow for genuine novelty, God cannot comprise all eternal objects (statically); rather, eternal objects have to be created along the creative process of the cosmos. The first move secures genuine freedom in the constitution of the process of becoming; the second leads the author to reject Whitehead's decision to drop the Category of Conceptual Reversion in order to make space for the intervention of God by granting initial aims. As a theological fallout, God (1) must not be understood as an actual entity, but rather as a society; and (2) God must be brought into a most strict symmetry with the World—thereby rejecting panentheism—with both being the “two lungs” of creativity. While I agree with the *intention* of both moves, unfortunately, I do not see any strong argument being put forward to substantiate these claims. And, unfortunately, I cannot see that the author has included work that has been done to follow such lines of thought more thoroughly.

The chapter on “Pancreativism” now, very late, maybe too late, in the text, explores the historical emergence and systematic polysemiality of the basic concept of Creativity out of which—that is the author's conviction—everything in Whitehead's thought, intention and system, springs forth. Radical enough, it leads back to the “dipneumonousness” (the two lungs) of creativity, God and the World, of which strict symmetry is enforced. To waste no compliments on God, in the author's eyes, really means to restructure Whitehead's thought in a way that would allow for a strong theory of co-symmetry of God and the World. God, then, as is true for the World, must be able to receive genuine novelty from the World (hence cannot be an entity nor comprise a perfect system of eternal objects), because otherwise the World would only be a world of Change (as with the Greeks), of trans-formation (*morphogenesis*), but not of genuine novelty (as for Judeo-Christianity), of trans-materialization (*hylogenesis*). The World, on the other hand, as is true for God, would be ever part of the initial aim that introduces genuine novelty into the process, not of Change, but of Becoming.

With all sympathy to this move, I am skeptical with regard to its argumentative power: First, the author, meticulously concerned with symmetry, exempts it in the heart of his argumentation by detecting a non-reversible difference between God and the World, namely, that of God being primordially One while the World is primordially multiple. Second, the whole concept of freedom that grounds this move is problematic by introducing a difference between a “novative” and an “innovative” freedom borrowed from Bergson. While the first one circumscribes the transformation of given elements (change), Bergson, and the author with him, claims that genuine, innovative freedom (of becoming) introduces not just a choice between given possibilities, but creates its own possibilities. Rightly, the author asks himself whether this could have slipped Whitehead’s mind, since, in fact, we seem to find that Whitehead expresses genuine freedom with the introduction of new possibilities harbored by God, the *ens novissimum*, *alone!* This debate is important and should be entertained by ongoing Whitehead research beyond this book, but is short-circuited in it. We could, e.g., with Jean Baudrillard, ask whether it is, indeed, genuine freedom to be responsible for your own objective conditions of freedom or whether this would just mean a burden of solipsistic dreams. Maybe Whitehead’s cautious detection of novelty in the introduction of novel potentials (indicating God’s essential activity) has the great advantage of “circumambulating” activity as truly not-possessed, as “appropriation” in which the subject really is *created*, thereby owning nothing, neither executing nor desiring substantial self-identity.

While “Epochal Actuality and the Types of Potentiality” goes on to balance the subjectivity of becoming with the various modes of objectivity of being, especially the extensive continuum, without further exploring the implications of the claim of freedom as creation of novel eternal objects, the last chapter “Conclusion,” besides repeating the grand theme of pancreativity, makes the important claim that Whitehead’s philosophy has to be *lived* in being thought—with all the consequences for philosophy, society, and psychology.

In a final assessment, I have to admit that I have thoroughly enjoyed the scholarship, wide knowledge, and deep insights of this book. I would only be hesitant to understand it—as this author does—as “basic introduction” into Whitehead because, if the introduction is more complex than the text on which it is crafted, (and this is, unfortunately, still the problem of all introductions available), it is in danger of becoming part

of a tradition of scholarship the author was up to challenge. Nevertheless, its genuine insights make it an important contribution to a new landscape of Whitehead research and “thinking with Whitehead” (Stengers, Latour, Deleuze . . .) that is desperately needed for the renewal of the act of thinking *as such* today.

MICHEL WEBER and PIERFRANCESCO BASILE, eds. *Subjectivity, Process, and Rationality*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2007. [Reviewed by LEWIS S. FORD, 245-7900 Creedmoor Road, Raleigh, NC 27613. E-mail: <LewisSFord@earthlink.net>]

This is a Festschrift for Reiner Wiehl, one of the great pioneers in the study of Whitehead in Germany. Unfortunately this tribute by his colleagues and students has no unifying theme other than the study of Whitehead. Even this does not hold for the last four essays. Let me comment on four or five selected essays.

Wiehl's own essay on “Process and Universals” is a serviceable account of this issue. By choosing to describe eternal objects as “universals,” it gains accessibility, but at the expense of Whitehead's notion of the universality of particulars (*PR* 50). There are some remarkable particular features, for example, an account of concrescence which blurs the lines between causal transition and subjective activity, bypassing any role for subjective aim (22). There is a creative treatment of qualitative width and depth in a nonmetric extensive continuum (19, 34f). See also its account of possibility (26).

The title of Weekes's essay on “Abstraction and Individuation in Whitehead and Wiehl” is somewhat misleading. Although it takes off from an observation of Wiehl's, it is by no means a detailed commentary on his essay. Rather it is an examination of Whitehead's theory of individuation, prefaced by an extensive (and lengthy—80-some pages!) taxonomy of theories of individuation. Weekes finds two basic theories multiplied to four by their epistemological and metaphysical versions. The two basic theories are infinite conceptual specification and the insistence that there is some additional factor, such as *haecceitas*. Is the individual known by concepts or by direct acquaintance (intuition)? Apart from how known, what constitutes its individuality? In a most impressive survey, he uses this taxonomy to place the various theories of individuation from Plato, Aristotle, and Stoics, to Schelling and Husserl. All this is a preface to an examination of Whitehead's theory.

Epistemologically, Weekes classifies his as an intuitionist theory, since it is based on physical rather than conceptual feelings. Metaphysically