

we will share the same worldview by striving meanwhile to increase our mutual appreciation of one another's different worlds and by working together to fashion ways of life that resacralize nature and revitalize our commitment to its good.

Ferré insists that hope is not the same as wishful thinking. In offering us the hope of a viable postmodern religion, he offers only what he can realistically offer: a possibility but not a probability. The chances are slim for the sort of repentance required. The old world is falling into darkness, but it very well may not be a better world that will greet us at the dawn. "In sum, then," says Ferré, "our need is for a miracle. If the institutional religions of our world are to offer us much ground for hope, something will have to happen within them that we can neither predict nor control." All we can hope for is that what cannot be predicted or promised will miraculously happen nonetheless. And for Ferré that seems to be enough: "even moribund myths have a strange capacity for resurrection."

Michael Hampe, *Die Wahrnehmungen der Organismen: Über die Voraussetzungen einer naturalistischen Theorie der Erfahrung in der Metaphysik Whiteheads*. Neue Studien zur Philosophie 1 Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990. 294 pp. [Reviewed by Roland Faber, University of Vienna, Institute of Dogmatic Theology, Austria.]

Once in a while, when a really challenging book appears, one may secretly wish it had been written by oneself. This certainly is such a book. Its accomplishments consist primarily in the ability of its author to convey the most complex elements of Whitehead's philosophy of experience in a no less complex way, allowing for intense rereading and rethinking.

Hampe's methodological intentions are quite intricate. He performs his investigation into Whitehead according to at least two aims. First, Whitehead's theory of experience serves as an approach to the plausibility of Whitehead's metaphysics — if not to all metaphysics. Second, in the course of Hampe's arguments, Whitehead's metaphysics is rendered intelligible as a naturalistic view of the world and of human beings. The overall question of this book concerns experience. Whitehead's philosophy of organism is considered exclusively within the context of the place of human experience *within* nature (13). According to Hampe, Whitehead's problems are the contemporary problems of naturalism, but his distinguished account was able to undermine exactly the tensions which seemed to render former positions within a theory of perception unintelligible. Two elements, above all, have to be combined to attain success: (i) the relation between universals (qualities, traits) and their instantiation in unrepeatable particulars (actualities); and (ii) — which *is* signifying their sought relation — a theory of causality. Altogether, the conception of the book is understood as a delineation of the *conditions* for a naturalistic theory of experience according to Whitehead (16).

In "Naturalism" (18-34), Hampe argues that Whitehead did not try to seek to find an Archimedian pivotal point outside the circle of experience and nature. Rather, he looks at experience as a nature-*altering* factor within nature (22). "Secondary Qualities and the Bifurcation of Nature" (35-71) elaborates the crucial question of this study: namely, how do we have to interpret the difference between primary and secondary traits of material bodies? After "The Critics of Subjectivism" (72-95) and "Events" (96-115), I would prefer to see the fifth chapter, "Causality — Private and Public" (116-167) as the core-piece of this book. In this chapter, he offers an analysis of Whitehead's new theory of experience *as* a theory of causation. The three following chapters "Organism and Matter" (168-202), "The Theory of the Living Bodies" (203-242), and "Naturalism of the Private" (243-280), conclude Hampe's study with an exploration of the consequences of Whitehead's new approach to experience, causation, and nature in terms of a philosophy of organism, matter, biological phenomena, and human personality. The main title of the book, namely "The Perceptions of Organisms," conveys the notion that the universe is a complex system of organisms that are "organically" related by perceiving. This may be considered as a general denominator.

The introductory theme that exemplifies the structure of the book is an investigation of the traditional and contemporary theories of universals, qualities, and traits, insofar as they are forcibly differentiated into primary and secondary qualities of substances. The traditional, inherently materialistic view of the modern philosophical and physical idea of substances and qualities seeks to distinguish primary (essential) qualities of material realities, like specific weight, temperature, or the durability of material bodies, from the unmeasurable secondary qualities, which are dismissable traits like redness. The difference between these kinds of qualities is seen in the "objectivity" of the first and the perceptual conditionedness of the second. Secondary qualities are interpreted as only "real" within (human) sensual perceptions of material bodies, which otherwise are in (the allegedly real) reality bare of these secondary qualities (red, e.g., is nothing more than a perceptual experience of certain patterns of wavelengths of light). Accordingly, the difference between primary and secondary qualities is that between unconditioned qualities, on the one hand, and those conditioned by natural or perceptual causes, on the other (61). Whitehead, quite to the contrary, held that this materialistic view is itself secondary. He did not deny that secondary qualities are causally-conditioned, causally-related, or dispositional. But he maintained that primary qualities are *also* dispositional, relative, and causally-conditioned. *All* qualities, whatsoever, are dispositional, i.e. related to and con-ditioned by causal contexts. Therefore, all qualities are pure potentials; all traits are possibilities — *per definitionem* they are conditioned by the particular actual entities in which they are realized (64). What Whitehead deconstructed here was the ideological belief that only change needs a reason, and constancy does not. But the durability of things is no less in need of an explanation than are the change and becoming of things. However, for

Whitehead, qualities are not constant traits of durable things but constantly reinstated patterns of fragile and perishable actualities (65). Actualities, by the same token, are not to be considered substances entertaining attributes, but events maintaining causal relations by means of qualities (105). Constancy is the repetition of a pattern in a temporal chain of causally-related actualities. Change is the lack of, or the decline of, such patterns of actualities in the course of time. There are no primary and secondary qualities of substances. There are no substances at all on a basic level of analysis. Rather, there are repetitions of patterns or the lack of their reinstatement within causally and temporally-related actualities.

A main effort of this book is to consider the proposal of Whitehead's theory of the perceptual relationship between organisms, which binds together three theories, namely the theories about time, causality, and memory (125). While a theory of causality is not compatible with any kind of indeterminism, interpreted in terms of (natural) laws, Whitehead could construe causality in terms of "concrete facts of relatedness" (prehenions) or the perception of organisms (116). And this process of perception is, at the same time, a process of building a memory. "Causal feelings" or "perceptions in the mode of causal efficacy" are a remembrance of past events within the presence of an actual occasion (125, 127). Perception is perception of a past within a presence, and it aims at a certain future. Both cause and effect are experientially related and temporally extended (126). The stubborn difference, responsible for causality as something objective, memory as something subjective, and time as a rhythm of something both subjective and objective, is that of privacy and the public domain (128). And the interplay of all features needs the further differentiation between events (particulars) — which *are* causally related — and eternal objects (universals) — *by which* events are related (104).

In the interplay of all these elements of organic communication, a central thesis arises, and it has to formulate precisely the interplay of privacy, publicity, events, and eternal objects. Since Whitehead's elementary events are not substances having qualities or attributes, and since Whitehead's eternal objects are not attributes of singular events as their substances, the only way to combine these elements coherently was to assert two theses at the same time. First, the organic, *public* relations between events are to be brought about by patterns of qualities, ingressing in the causal occurrence of organisms (126). Second, when the same pattern is understood as ingression into *different* causal histories, then it will be necessary to have something in addition to, and distinct from, these public patterns to accomplish that difference. And this something generating the different ingression of (the same) public patterns has to be a *private structure* of the causally connected events (132). This structure is not dissolvable into public patterns but rather describes their private, subjective, unobjectifiable, individual essence; i.e. their *haecceitas*. The ingenious novelty of Whitehead's conception of this private sphere now has to be seen precisely in the fact that this sphere is itself *causally* determined. The internally-conditioned privacy "is" only a

process of becoming which is the integration of the causes of its own generation. Thus, the description of "causal connectedness" as basis and condition for public patterns of attributes and qualities *and* as condition for the private and internal structure of cause and effect, i.e. the consequent application of the "ontological principle," allows Whitehead to develop a causal theory of experience (including a theory of perception, memory, and time), which can solve the problems of other trials without following their faults (132).

If there is one point in which the reviewer is not consonant with the author, even if he sympathizes with his intention, it is Hampe's perspective on the relation of Whitehead's theory of organism with two other major aspects of his thought, namely his theory of process and his integration of theology. While the reviewer would affirm the internal relationship of this triangle of themes, Hampe limits the first relation (organism — process), denies the second (process — God), and neglects the third (organism — God). To describe the relation between organism and process, Hampe relies correctly on a central passage of *Process and Reality* (PR 214 f), in which Whitehead states that (i) the community of all within the universe is named "organism," but that (ii) the steady expansion of this organism is its "process." Hampe (178-179), now, wants to *limit* this relationship, thereby excluding two extremely important elements from the application of the term "organism," namely the universe (as a whole) and actual entities (as singular actualities). Shortly summarized, the reasons are: (a) that, since every organism demands an environment, the universe as a whole has no environment except its own past, and (b) that a single actuality is indestructible by a "bad" environment, contrary to every other organism. Further, Hampe *denies* the idea of God because the whole universe is to be understood as a causally-closed process, i.e. not demanding any Absolute or any God as a power from "outside" (135). Finally, Hampe silently *neglects* any explanatory relationship between the terms "organism" and "God" in Whitehead's thought (178).

But this is quite an unsatisfying situation, given the intense intertwining of Whitehead's theology within the *gestalt* and the development of his thought. Not only, as Hampe proposes, are "process," "organism," and "extension" ultimate concepts in Whitehead's philosophy (172), but so is the notion of "God." Thus, in Whitehead's thought, there are certain "transcendental concepts," as I would name them, which are not dissolvable into, or definable within, any of his categories. It may be that the neglect or denial of one of these "transcendental concepts" is basically *possible*, but such a basic decision will form the discourse as a condition, which cannot be justified further in this discourse. It would be possible, for instance, to accept "organism" as a basic transcendental concept, but to deny "process"; then we earn a holistic conception of the world that is rather static. Also, denying "organism" but accepting "process," we would end up, e.g., in a kind of Democritian universe of the void and particles, interwoven in a pure external process. And again, we *can* deny the transcendental notion of "God." But then, we reduce our instruments necessary for a comprehensive

interpretation of “process” and “organism.” On the contrary, the expanding process of the universe is precisely understandable as a *process* when we allow for possibilities, which are not explainable from any past state (or environment) of the universe. God, then, is envisioned as “environment” of the universe, generating and offering novelty. Therefore, the universe would be understood as an organism, but not as a closed one, rather expanding into and by novelty, originating in an ultimately twofold and converse process of the World and God (PR 348, AI 168, MT 93-94, [Imm.] ESP 83). Indeed, there is no Absolute in Whitehead’s philosophy, except maybe the absoluteness of relationship, but this thesis is expressed precisely in Whitehead’s *theology*.

Jay B. McDaniel, *With Roots and Wings: Christianity in an Age of Ecology and Dialogue*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995. viii + 243 pp. [Reviewed by John Quiring, Center for Process Studies, 1325 N. College Avenue, Claremont, California 91711.]

A variety of books are now available that document or discuss *resources* of world religions for ecological understanding and activism.¹ *With Roots and Wings: Christianity in an Age of Ecology and Dialogue*, by process ecotheologian Jay B. McDaniel, translates selected elements of this material into the genre of Christian spiritual theology. This recent title in the Orbis Books Ecology and Justice Series portrays and recommends “a Christianity,” a vision of Christian spiritual life transformed by an increased sensitivity to nature learned from other religions. The book is addressed not only to self-identified Christians, but also to inquirers into Christianity who are fearful of its exclusivism and to non-Christians wishing to learn from Christianity without intending to become Christians. The title metaphors indicate deep connection to spiritual traditions and natural environments (“roots”) and freedom for cultural exploration (“wings”). “Roots” and “wings” are what we need to provide our children, a Rabbi told McDaniel’s world religions class, responding to a question about family life.

This is a book of big and little stories about experiences of macro-vision, wholeness and healing, dialogue, centering and imagination, undergirded by spiritual practices and lessons from spiritual communities. It discusses sources of inner wholeness and serenity that can motivate and sustain action. Part One develops a planetary and cosmic context for Christian self-understanding with

¹ E. Roberts and E. Amidon, ed., *Earth Prayers* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); R. Gottlieb, ed., *This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment* (New York: Routledge, 1996); S. Rockefeller and J. Elder, ed., *Spirit and Nature* (Boston: Beacon, 1992); D. Kinsley, *Ecology and Religion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995); M. Tucker and J. Grim, ed., *Worldviews and Ecology* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1994); C. Spretnak, *States of Grace* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); T. Hayden *The Lost Gospel of the Earth* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1996).