

# Secrets of Becoming

NEGOTIATING WHITEHEAD,  
DELEUZE, AND BUTLER

*Edited by*

ROLAND FABER AND ANDREA M. STEPHENSON

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## CONTENTS

<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	vii
<i>Foreword</i>	xi
ANDREA M. STEPHENSON	
Introduction: Negotiating Becoming	I
ROLAND FABER	
<i>Part One</i> NEGOTIATING EVENTS AND MULTIPLICITIES	
1. Whitehead, Post-Structuralism, and Realism	53
KEITH ROBINSON	
2. Nomad Thought: Deleuze, Whitehead, and the Adventure of Thinking	70
JEFF BELL	
3. Transcendental Empiricism in Deleuze and Whitehead	82
STEVEN SHAVIRO	
4. Can We Be Wolves? Intersections between Deleuze's Difference and Repetition and Butler's Performativity	92
ANDREA M. STEPHENSON	
<i>Part Two</i> NEGOTIATING BODIES AND SOCIETIES	
5. Butler and Whitehead on the (Social) Body	107
MICHAEL HALEWOOD	
6. Conflict	127
ISABELLA PALIN	
7. Becoming through Multiplicity: Staying in the Middle of Whitehead's and Deleuze-Guattari's Philosophies of Life	142
LUKE B. HIGGINS	
<i>Part Three</i> NEGOTIATING IMMANENCE AND DIVINITY	
8. Surrationality and Chaosmos: For a More Deleuzian Whitehead (with a Butlerian Intervention)	157
ROLAND FABER	

9.	Divine Possibilities: Becoming an Order without Law ALAN R. VAN WYK	178
10.	“God Is a Lobster”: Whitehead’s Receptacle Meets the Deleuzian Sieve SIGRIDUR GUDMARSDOTTIR	191
11.	Uninteresting Truth? Tedium and Event in Postmodernity CATHERINE KELLER	201
	<i>Notes</i>	215
	<i>Bibliography</i>	265
	<i>List of Contributors</i>	275

Surrationality and Chaosmos:  
For a More Deleuzian Whitehead  
(with a Butlerian Intervention)

*Roland Faber*

*Hybrid Exchange*

With Jacques Derrida's *différance* we face the problem of "the representation of a presence," which has "been constituted in a system (thought or language) governed by and moving toward presence."<sup>1</sup> It is the gesture of such a "metaphysics of presence"—or is it metaphysics as such?—to substantiate the ego, or even the male ego (the logo/phallogocentric ego) that is in its thought-movements presupposed to encompass the world in a presence that pleases *him* by the illusion of being *his* "creation of the world"—"presence" as autoerotic game in which all objects of enjoyment are playmates *ex nihilo*.<sup>2</sup>

What *seem* to be "reason" and "freedom" are staged on the "presentation" of an autoerotic unification that, in reality, exercises the power of self-love, *this* kind of self-love (which some found so obvious in Hegel) that loves everything only because of *himself*, "everything" being only the medium of *his* self-enjoyment, being a mere "construct" of his power to *act* (but not acted upon) on behalf of himself. The freedom gained by this "rationality" only allows for *the self-assurance of the self-presence of an immortal ego*, one is tempted to say, the "*transcendental ego*." In this form (Kant may excuse) it is not just a subjective exertion of self-erecting power

but the petrification of this power in being the *essence* of being substantial, *being* a “subject.”<sup>3</sup>

In being the *hypokeimenon*, the subjective act generalizes itself into a self-same substrate that erases otherness, strangeness, the foolishness to wander outside. The “transcendental self,” the stronghold of rationality and its imperative equation with freedom, is the secular form of the creator *ex nihilo*, who, if we believe the biblical reconstruction, had his career of “reconstructing the world as self-construct” by convincing us (and himself) that he never had to erase the chaos of the beginnings in the first place in order to become the sole king of nothingness.<sup>4</sup> The world is *his* presence and obviously his *accomplice*—but not ours.<sup>5</sup>

Consider the alternative: For Whitehead and Deleuze, in a way, we are all “multiplicities”—“neither a One nor a Many.”<sup>6</sup> We are all hybrids, shifting identities, combinations, complexities, multiples; or *infinite* contrasts of indissoluble opposites<sup>7</sup> “select[ing] the whispering voices” and “gather[ing] the tribes and secret idioms” from which is extracted what we call “my Self (*Moi*).”<sup>8</sup> We are “entirely living nexūs,” not defined by structure and persistence, but by originality and life.<sup>10</sup> We are the “Pink Panther,” a “rhizome [that] doesn’t begin and doesn’t end, but is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo*.”<sup>11</sup>

In being in-between, we live the world as “Chaosmos”; not as a world of “*accomplicement*” (as creation of our interests), but of “bifurcations, divergences, impossibilities, and discord.”<sup>12</sup> There is no *final* unification, there is only unification as multiplication when the “many become one and are increased by one.”<sup>13</sup> The world is not a stratosphere of unifications from the small to the large, from the microorganism to God; it is always bound back into infinite divergences whereby unity is always a “virtual gift” for a multiplicity of paths of diversifications. In such a view, even God becomes “a process that . . . affirms impossibilities and passes through them,”<sup>14</sup> always “seeking physical multiplicity.”<sup>15</sup>

In this alternative world, unity, the I (Self), and identity are only gifts of *un-forming virtuality*: not of systems, rather of *khora*, the dispersed “medium of intercommunication”<sup>16</sup> without pre-given structure, the unlimited “Omnitudo,”<sup>17</sup> the open movement of wholeness that cannot be united by any rational account. We find ourselves in a “motley world that can no longer be included in expressive units, but only made or undone according to prehensive units.”<sup>18</sup> *Prehension!* Like Derrida’s *différance*, this is Whitehead’s anti-concept of unification *as* multiplication; and it calls upon us: “Be . . . multiplicities!”

There is no *one* reason, no *one* structure, no *one* system of thought, no *one* unity that could possibly “represent” this world of multiplication. Only in the view of the big brother’s “presence,” the “Phall/Logos” reigns, preaching (and demanding) self-satisfying identity and erecting a power-structure of universal applicability, seducing us to seek an Archimedean kingdom of clarity, simplicity, and precision. But of course, although we are thought to believe the contrary, this desire is not reigned over by the Logos, but by the Eros. And when Whitehead and Deleuze deconstruct this world, it is seen as not being a representation of a logical kingdom, but as a thrust for the erotic of intensity, a culturally disguised (auto)erotic self-justification of power, persuading us to seek the underlying *orgiastic* as *objective* condition of its perverse exclusion. Be multiplicities! Mistrust the longing for logical exemplification! Strive for Life beyond reason! There is no logic, only an erotic of existence.

Few have gone further than Judith Butler to explore the erotic intricacies of the hybrid fluency of identities and their phallogocentric suppressions. In deconstructing the substantialist paradigm of fixed “personal identities” as complicated exclusions of raw multiplicity of erotic powers guarded by regulative mechanisms of a phallogocentric Law (its own matrix of intelligibility), which then advertises itself as eternal Logos,<sup>19</sup> she leads us to understand the “universal capacity of reason”<sup>20</sup> as precisely this substitution of Eros by Logos. The fluent persona, on the other hand, although always in peril of substantializing itself as utopian aim, is rather the hybrid exchange of an infinite process of becoming. As she notes—very much in sync with Deleuze and almost in repetition of Whitehead—in relation to Nietzsche: Identity is “performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its result.”<sup>21</sup>

Whitehead and Deleuze—as does Butler—had this intuition from yet another subversive figure of the philosophical underground, Henri Bergson, whose commitment to the *élan vital* brought him to believe in the strangeness of unity as always being a *mouvement*, always being a *fugue*, always being “on the run,” fleeing structure and the rational embrace of the systematic octopus.<sup>22</sup> For the Deleuzian Bergson, “wholeness” is not a structural “set,” but rather expresses what *negates* structure for radical openness.<sup>23</sup> This “All-One” is a “moving whole”<sup>24</sup> of “relations of movement and rest.”<sup>25</sup> And Whitehead’s Bergson supports the

charge that the human intellect . . . tends to ignore the fluency, and to analyse the world in terms of static categories . . . [creating] a clear-cut philosophy [and] . . . result[ing in] . . . the subordination of fluency. This

subordination is to be found in . . . Plato's vision of heavenly perfection, in Aristotle's logical concepts, and in Descartes' mathematical mentality.<sup>26</sup>

For some time, we accepted that Whitehead never had such a pluralistic trait (although Deleuze has taken him as such) and that Deleuze never related to an ontology of wholeness (although Alain Badiou has demonstrated this).<sup>27</sup> We came to think of Whitehead as a *rationalist*, and as Deleuze an *anti-intellectualist*—an insult that Whitehead sensed to have been launched already against Bergson.<sup>28</sup> However, we should not forget that Whitehead was quite at ease with Bergson's "anti-rationalism" as based on the "ultimacy of fluency," but he tried to avoid "anti-intellectualism" (which Whitehead thought Bergson might have shared with Nietzsche)—the view that structures per se be only "erroneous fictions."<sup>29</sup> And we should not forget that Deleuze never thought of *every* structural unification as "erroneous," but rather only clear-cut organizations against which he set his rhizomatic connectivity of an "orgiastic" wholeness of a "chaotic world [in which] divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths."<sup>30</sup>

### *Pharmacology of Imperfection*

Here is a short history of Whitehead's refutation of "rationalism" in nine chapters:

1. With Bergson, Whitehead held a "spatialization" of the moving whole of the world to be an abstractive construction disregarding the *event* of becoming. Any clear-cut system is, if it is understood as "re-presentation" of reality, nothing but an example of "misplaced concreteness" taking abstractions (systems) as concrete (Life).<sup>31</sup> This is a "light-bearer" for Derrida's critique of metaphysical "presence."

2. Against Descartes, Whitehead held the bifurcation of nature in *extension* and *cognition* as well as its presupposed substantialism to be the condition for a "rationalism" that believes that all knowledge can be grounded in a *self-reflective act* of the mind, independent from any empirical, or better, organic or ecological connectivity.

3. Against Hume, Whitehead attacked the conviction that we can only *perceive* clear-cut ideas as "representations" of the unknown, hence, *universals*. Instead, he insisted that although we might "*conceive* in terms of universals," we "*feel* particular existents"<sup>32</sup> that, in turn, can *never* be understood to be merely examples of general patterns.<sup>33</sup>

4. Against Kant, Whitehead did not understand knowledge to be the product of the self-reflective structure of the mind and, as intellectual activity of the subject, a mere production from logic and mathematics. This paradigmatic “rationalism,” based on the Neoplatonic *nous*, does not need any world to prove itself as true.<sup>34</sup> For Whitehead, on the contrary, “Metaphysics never reaches the complete generality associated with logical necessity.”<sup>35</sup> No “rational representation” is devoid of being embedded in becoming.

5. Whitehead’s self-understanding of his “conceptual scheme,”<sup>36</sup> which is widely held to be the pinnacle of his rationalism, reveals that it is far from being self-explanatory. Not only is the number and division of kinds of categories elaborately deliberate, but Whitehead is well aware that if “we consider any scheme of philosophic categories as one complex assertion, and apply to it the logician’s alternative, true or false, the answer must be that the scheme is false.”<sup>37</sup>

6. Whitehead’s own most basic principle is self-defeating regarding its supposed rationalism: If the “ultimate [principle] behind all forms,” namely “creativity,” is “inexplicable by forms,”<sup>38</sup> no rationalism can produce any necessities that would not be true only in the context of Life. As a universal network of becoming relations<sup>39</sup> “[n]o reason, internal to [this] history can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated.”<sup>40</sup> With Deleuze it is always “contingent, excessive, and mystical essentially.”<sup>41</sup>

7. Whitehead not only acknowledges a fundamental “irrationality” of the flux of things, which he calls “principle of empiricism,”<sup>42</sup> but he doubted the sheer *possibility* of metaphysical knowledge in the sense of rationalist necessities: If, he says, the “metaphysical characteristics . . . —in the proper sense of ‘metaphysics’—should be those which apply to all actual entities,” then “it may be doubted whether such metaphysical concepts have ever been formulated in their strict purity—even taking into account the most general principles of logic and of mathematics.”<sup>43</sup>

8. With Plato, Whitehead mistrusted any system as just a betrayal of the “variousness of the universe, not to be fathomed by our intellects,” so that he follows Plato who “in his Seventh Epistle . . . expressly disclaims the possibility of an adequate philosophic system.”<sup>44</sup>

9. With Nietzsche’s conviction that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming,”<sup>45</sup> Whitehead followed a rule that he called “principle of process” indicating that “‘being’ is constituted by its ‘becoming.’”<sup>46</sup>

If there is a *trust* in “rationality” in Whitehead’s thought, it is a highly qualified attempt to seek the “essence of the universe” as a *relational complex of ever-becoming*<sup>47</sup> for which, to be truthful to it, he submitted himself to a highly paradoxical contrast of two opposites: on the one hand, that, in order to allow for most general (metaphysical) relationships, every appearance must be understood in terms of a connectedness of which it then is an example;<sup>48</sup> but, on the other hand, that *no* concrete reality can be reconstructed from these relations when they are taken to be universal abstractions of the concrete interrelations in their creative and unique togetherness in a singular happening.<sup>49</sup>

If rationalism is the urge for the possibility of, and the belief in, self-explanative arguments that would enlighten the universe beyond mystery, and to which to stand up against would be tantamount with irrational self-defeat and ridicule, Whitehead was *not* a rationalist.<sup>50</sup> On the contrary, in believing in the “rationalization of [the] mysticism” of a Creative Future of an Open Whole that cannot be “explained away,”<sup>51</sup> Whitehead was a *surrationalist*, meaning that he always trusted an infinite reality *beyond* any rationalistic simplifications. *Understanding* the “depths as yet unspoken”<sup>52</sup> is to approach it by—“hope”! In a testimony of his “surrationality,” Whitehead writes that, while we seek “to apprehend the rationality of things,” we might, due to the “imperfection of all metaphysical systems,”

lose hope at the exact point where we find ourselves. The preservation of such faith must depend on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that it should embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysics . . . gains assurance from religion and passes over into religion.<sup>53</sup>

Whitehead’s account for metaphysical conceptualization has always this *surrational* flavor of an “ultimate ideal,” but, at the same time, always is “but a hopeless quest.”<sup>54</sup> This is not a lack, however, but a deeper contact with the Eros of becoming and its essential *Imperfection*: “there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfections”; the beauty of the whole always exists only as “Discord.”<sup>55</sup> Surrationality appeals to this Discord and Imperfection not as defects of missed “totality,” but as a hope for infinite intensities to come in an unending process of the “Harmony of harmonies”<sup>56</sup>—or dare we say: “polyphony of polyphonies”?<sup>57</sup>

When Deleuze counter-conceptualizes his “transcendental empiricism,”<sup>58</sup> its *surrationality* despises all pre-given possibilities pre-forming actuality, but demands every happening to actualize virtuality in yet *undefined land*—the open space, the formless *khora*, a late echo of the Platonic “sieve”<sup>59</sup> that Whitehead recalls as the “fostermother of all becoming,”<sup>60</sup>

the Void that harbors the Eros of unpredictable novelty and incommensurable diversity.<sup>61</sup> Surrationality seeks this Eros, desires her coming and always longs for her satisfaction, which is multiplication, differentiation, plurivocity.<sup>62</sup>

The real enemy of surrationality is a rationalism that seeks the disappearance of diversity in its desire for totality. While the Eros of surrationality is the love for multiplicity, the Logos of rationalism presses for inescapability. While surrationality is “polyphilia”—the love of and for manifoldness—rationalism urges for an oppressive unification in the name of the self-same.<sup>63</sup> For Whitehead, there is no self-same system; there is only a “discordance of comprehensive philosophical systems” as “a factor essential for progress” without “triumphs of finality.”<sup>64</sup> And in the voice of Deleuze, we might rephrase: There is no *monadic*, pre-established harmony; there is only a “desert” of *nomadic* interconnections.<sup>65</sup> The proper realm of rationality is the *Void*—always *beyond* itself, always *surrational*, always becoming.<sup>66</sup>

The real enemy—*totalizing* rationalism—presents itself in the disguise of “persuasion,” but this is just the wolf musing as sheep, and as is its nature, it will finally *eat* the sheep!<sup>67</sup> The wolf tends to appear in the form of “necessary first principles,” which fittingly seem to “explain” the whole universe (away); or it disguises itself as “transcendental argument,” forcing us to accept necessities or be otherwise incoherent.<sup>68</sup> Because of obvious reasons, I have called it the “Transylvanian argument”—it sucks all Life out of any living whole.<sup>69</sup> Robert Nozick describes this “coercive philosophy” as a rationalist wolf asking Transylvanian questions:

Wouldn't it be better if philosophical arguments left the person no possible answer at all, reducing him to impotent silence? Even then we might sit there silently, smiling, Buddhalike. Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusions, he *dies*. How's that for a powerful argument? . . . A perfect philosophical argument would leave no choice.<sup>70</sup>

“Persuasion,” for Whitehead, *cannot* be disguised, it can only (want to) appear as—and *be*—a (philosophical) sheep, rigorously exercising the “duty of tolerance,” which is “our finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future, and to the complexity of accomplished fact which exceeds our stretch of insight.”<sup>71</sup> Indeed, for Whitehead, the “creation of the world—that is to say, the world of civilized order—is the victory of persuasion over force”<sup>72</sup> and *this* “persuasion” is a *rebellion* against rationalist reduction.

Whitehead's and Deleuze's surrationalism is their shared gift, their remedy against the poisoning rationalism: In Deleuze's words on Bergson:

For, if the living being is a whole and, therefore comparable to the whole of the universe, this is not because it is a microcosm as closed as the whole is assumed to be, but, on the contrary, because it is open upon a world, and the world, the universe, is itself the Open. . . . If one had to define the whole, it would be by Relation.<sup>73</sup>

When Charles Hartshorne calls this relational Whole “Surrelativism,” I sense “Surrationality.”<sup>74</sup> It is *that* “rationality” that is only given by a *relationality* that has no “beyond”—only the irrational.<sup>75</sup> But it is *always* “beyond” itself or the Self-Same or the Logos, always *only* embodied in the *event* of relationality. Relation *as* event—Whitehead calls it *prehension*—is “the Open”—in the *khoric place*.<sup>76</sup> Opening immanence *infinitely* cuts through chaos, surrationally erupting not in the “respectable, rational, or reasonable,” but rather in “dreams, pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess.”<sup>77</sup>

This surrationality is inscribed in Whitehead’s “ontological principle”—that the only *reason(s)* for events of becoming *is (are)* always *itself* an event of becoming.<sup>78</sup> *This* “rationality” is per se *surrational*—without origin or end; without foundation or totality; neither inscribed by a “fiat” of, nor being itself, an eternal *being*; ever hovering over the “aboriginal chaos”;<sup>79</sup> swimming in the Infinite, the Void.<sup>80</sup> Surrationality “circumscribes” order and its rationality as they are the inscription of/in creativity, harbored by beauty, and overturned by harmonies of the unspoken.<sup>81</sup> The surrational unleashes the beyond-within like the “flying dart, of which Lucretius speaks, hurled beyond the bonds of the world.”<sup>82</sup>

Nevertheless, there *is* “rationality.” But while for any rationalism Chaos and Life always triggers a deep *fear* of uncertainty, irrationality, and death, for the “surrational mind”—*dwelling* in Chaos, Life, and Uncertainty—it is a sheer *wonder* that the world allows for any rationality, reason, and Logos at all. The surrational mind never trusts rationality but fosters it for its marvels; nourishes it for its ability to fight irrational powers of destruction, manipulation, and reduction; and harbors it for its fragilities.<sup>83</sup> Surrationalism does not despise rationality, but—in her rich silence<sup>84</sup>—cares about it like “the foster-mother of all becoming”<sup>85</sup> for her child.<sup>86</sup>

### *Destiny’s Child*

Deleuze’s and Whitehead’s discoveries and explorations of the surrational can only cautiously be understood as “theories of liberation.”<sup>87</sup> While Butler’s earlier impulse to de-substantialize fixed identities and pre-given

structures to the extent that their performability becomes visible ponders the political will to liberate from a phallogocentric Law<sup>88</sup> that erases its own *khoric* substrate, Whitehead's, Deleuze's, and the later Butler's exploration of the nature of the *khoric* harboring of structure, reason and system (be it biological or philosophical) has more the flavor of acts of enlightenment: to *live with* their harmonies as discordant, polyphone, diverging and converging, limiting and delimiting, vibrant and tragic. The *khoric* externality of systems is permeated with the taste of *moira*, of *anangke*, necessity, destiny, and fate.

Butler's earlier account of rationality is nourished by the phallogocentric thesis of the instantiation of the Law—be it the Law of Substantialism, selling the effects of becoming *as* ground, or be it the Law of suppressed Eros, of the multiple layers of exclusion and negation of complex desires and fluent identities, expressed in the condemnation of homosexuality on top of the negation of the female. For Butler (in her magical fusion of Lacan and Foucault), exclusion creates reason as the regulating mechanism of the reign of the Phallus. Rationality, in this view, is always itself irrationally based on the negation of multiplicity. But since this pre-rational multiplicity cannot be *liberated*, because there is *no outside* to the Law, any surrational account of the rational would be nothing but another irrational (suppressive) instantiation of the Law itself.<sup>89</sup>

For the earlier Butler, because of her Foucaultian credo, the Law seems to be an *inescapable fate*—only to be attacked from within by irony, citation, and subversive masquerade.<sup>90</sup> Her (and for that matter Foucault's) all-pervasive Phallogos becomes the irrational Law of a new kind of necessity, "irrational rationalism" that hinders surrationality.<sup>91</sup> For Whitehead and Deleuze, on the other hand, Necessity is neither rational nor a prison of irrationality. The Law is never all-pervasive; there is always a *within-beyond*, a *khoric* or creative drive undermining any static dichotomy between cosmos and chaos. But then, destiny is not a sign of the Logos either, but of Eros. This Necessity is thought to be the condition for genuine novelty.

It is only in the newer work of Butler, especially in *Giving an Account of Oneself*, that she revisits the necessities of "Foucaultian Subjects"<sup>92</sup> to be bound by the Law in a more Whiteheadian (and Deleuzian) mode, that is, by understanding them not only as expressions of a repressive Law, but *in* the sedimentation that this Law instantiates, being the expression of the *inescapability* of the *social* constitution of subjectivity that is not *per se* repressive but necessarily binding. It is precisely in the *failure* to constitute a perfect self-presence of a socially begotten subject that the fate of the

Law in its repressiveness now begins also to appear as the ground of *virtue* (and, hence, an ethics of performativity), namely to live *with* this fate in such a way that the opaque subject constitutes a reservoir of *indeterminateness* that allows for novelty to appear in the midst of the unavoidable porosity of the social inheritances, the inconsistencies of which can only incompletely be “closed” as all-determining Law.<sup>93</sup>

In Deleuze’s surrational understanding, this amounts to an emphatic affirmation of Spinoza and Nietzsche—their rule of immanence and difference as rule of necessity.<sup>94</sup> While Hegel’s dialectic follows the logic of the Same, Spinoza’s substance and Nietzsche’s Eternal Return prioritize the Different.<sup>95</sup> Deleuze reinterprets the necessity of Spinoza’s substance “itself [to] be said *of* the modes and only *of* the modes . . . satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple.”<sup>96</sup> And Deleuze reinterprets the *amor fati* of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return, which is often held to indicate “the return of the Identical,” as novelty that “does not bring back ‘the same,’” but conversely “constitutes only the Same of that which becomes,” being “the becoming-identical of becoming itself.”<sup>97</sup> Without pre-given identity, “eternal return is the power of (formless) Being, [and] the simulacrum is the true character or form—the ‘being’—of that which is. When the identity of things dissolves, being escapes to attain univocity, and begins to revolve around the different.”<sup>98</sup> When becoming constitutes being, the Being of becoming is difference *in itself*. Its (eternal) return is the fate that is the condition for unprecedented novelty that creates the chaotic lattice of rhizomatic structures and systems.<sup>99</sup>

If the earlier Butler’s subject is already the product of the excluding Law and if the later Butler’s “opaque subject” only tentatively gains the ability to reinsert Novelty in its indeterminate constitution, it is because of her shift from Nietzsche to Foucault.<sup>100</sup> A clear indication of why Butler is not following Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return as return solely of Novelty<sup>101</sup> can be found in her acceptance of Foucault’s understanding of the constitution of the subject by the Law, which is not, as in Nietzsche, the outcome of “the force of punishment to be instrumental to the internalization” of the Law (which could be changed, at least, in principle) but by inscribed “codes of conduct” that “do not rely always on violence of prohibition and its internalizing effects”<sup>102</sup> but function as the constitution of the subject per se. Nevertheless, since we cannot, in our social constitution, give an account of ourselves, the ignorance of how “I” emerged, only present in an infinite “narrative reconstruction” of myself,

is a limit of self-knowledge that not only takes us “in a fictional direction”<sup>103</sup> (Lacan) but, in so doing, opens a door to a surrationality of the subject that might begin to mirror Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s account of novelty that does not overturn necessity, but is its expression.<sup>104</sup>

In Whitehead’s surrational understanding, the *kboric* nexus of becoming that harbors the (ingredient) patterns is—ontologically and epistemologically—governed by necessity of relationality, whereby “there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence.”<sup>105</sup> While rationality is given by relationality, this relationality, however, is understood as that of *prehensions*, of folds or waves of vector-intensities in ever-new compositions, ever new becomings of structures, an infinite process of a creatively “living Whole.”

Nevertheless, as in the later Butler, Whitehead’s *account* of this *kboric* nexus must necessarily be *fiction*. On the same level as the undisclosed subject in the later Butler, in its account of itself, it becomes ironic insofar as “in the moment of when we narrate we become speculative philosophers or fictional writers,”<sup>106</sup> Whitehead’s “speculative philosophy” is, indeed, a *surrational* “imaginative experiment”<sup>107</sup> of the universal as a “likely story”<sup>108</sup> of relational (or social) interplay “within a local plastic environment” that, rather than be a rational description is a “creative power, making possible its own approach to realization.”<sup>109</sup>

This *surrational* Necessity, in Whitehead, plays the dual role of expressing the harboring process of patterning the mother-nexus of aboriginal chaos while securing the novelty of an ever-pulsating, self-renewing, different-repeating universe.<sup>110</sup> In pondering over the irrational preexistence of a “given” and its character as “gift” of Necessity, Whitehead quotes A. E. Taylor’s summary of the *Timaeus*:

In the real world there is always, over and above “law,” a factor of the “simply given” or “brute fact,” not accounted for and to be accepted simply as given. It is the business of science never to acquiesce in the merely given, to seek to “explain” it as the consequence, in virtue of rational law, of some simpler initial “given.” But, however far science may carry this procedure, it is always forced to retain *some* element of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of things. It is the presence in nature of this element of the given, this surd or irrational as it has sometimes been called, which *Timaeus* appears to be personifying in his language about Necessity.<sup>111</sup>

But again, in Whitehead’s interpretation, this *pre-rational* element of Necessity is really *sur-rational*, because this “element of ‘givenness’ in

things implies some activity procuring limitation,” which Whitehead famously expresses with the word “decision,” not implying “conscious judgment,” but in its “root sense of a ‘cutting off,’” expressing

the relation of the actual thing, *for which* a decision is made, to an actual thing by *which* that decision is made. But “decision” cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutes the very meaning of actuality.<sup>112</sup>

It is activity *qua* decision *qua* limitation that, for Whitehead, consequently indicates a *necessary* element of the “metaphysical situation” that “provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason flows from it.”<sup>113</sup> In what is one of the clearest confessions of surrationality, Whitehead states that:

We have come to the limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation which does not spring from any metaphysical reason. There is a metaphysical need for a principle of determination, but there can be no metaphysical reason for what is determined. If there were such a reason, there would be no need for any further principle: for metaphysics would already have provided the determination. The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason.<sup>114</sup>

In Deleuzian terms, this surrational limitation is not the expression of a pre-fixed, structured Logos, which has to be fought—as in the earlier Butler—but its “*orgiastic* representation: it discovers within itself the limits of the organized; tumult, restlessness and passion underneath apparent calm. It rediscovers monstrosity.”<sup>115</sup> This limitation points to the “unique ‘total’ moment, simultaneously the moment of evanescence and production of difference, of disappearance and appearance.”<sup>116</sup> It is in this context that Deleuze’s comment that philosophy should be good “science fiction”<sup>117</sup> becomes substantiated as surrationality that, in the interplay of necessity and novelty, might not only mirror Whitehead’s “speculative philosophy” as “imagination” but maybe connects to Butler’s later account of the fictional account of the subject as a possible reservoir of novelty.

It is with a forthright Nietzschean move that Whitehead then traces the roots of rationality back to the Greek concept of fate, which, of course, in being the mother of rationality, is itself *not* rational, but *surrational* and the tragedy from which the Law flows.

The effect of Greek dramatic literature was many-sided. . . . The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists today are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides. Their vision of

fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science. Fate in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern thought . . . Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things. This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama. This remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate.<sup>118</sup>

In all three thinkers, finally, rationality and freedom seem to be related through necessity and novelty, i.e., both cannot be totalized. There is no all-reigning Law of a Logos, but there is no Liberation to Anarchy either (and even the liberation to equality is, as Butler has shown so convincingly, already the expression of the Law of suppression of inequalities out of, and comparisons from, the privileged perspective of a Rule of exclusion). Against the tantalization of reason (rationalism) and freedom (liberation), we face the hyper-rational (not reasoned) and hyper-free (not willed) *surr-reality* of necessity and novelty.<sup>119</sup>

### *Musicology of Discordance*

For rationalism, surrationality is indistinctly irrational; for Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler, on the other hand, rationalism is irrational.<sup>120</sup> But, while for the earlier Butler any surrational *affirmation* of rationality, reason, Logos, and system must itself already be the expression of the Irrational, i.e., of the suppression of desire (of presence) or execution of power,<sup>121</sup> for Whitehead and Deleuze, it is the paradoxical affirmation of the “Chaosmos.” Where do they diverge, and where maybe, with the later Butler, do they converge? Maybe the shortest way to state their hiatus is this: Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s surrationality is not a *negation of reason*, but a *rejection of negation*.

Indeed, in a rather hidden, but nevertheless revealing remark, Butler makes the point that she “opposed Deleuze,” because she found “no registration of the negative in his work”<sup>122</sup> and a rejection of *negation* as a creative (constructive) force in Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s affirmation of the Eternal Return. Based on Butler’s experience of her Jewish identity after the Holocaust—there is nothing to affirm!—she cannot resonate with Deleuze’s view on the positivity of negation, and her affinities fall in line with “the labor of the negative in the Hegelian sense,”

instead.<sup>123</sup> Considering Deleuze's and Whitehead's affirmation of "system"<sup>124</sup> and their rejection of Hegel as the basis for their understanding of system,<sup>125</sup> the divergence between Butler, on the one hand, and Whitehead/Deleuze, on the other, occurs exactly in their stance toward negation, especially in the guise of the Hegelian *dialectic* of negation.

For Deleuze, dialectic negation is the implementation of the "original sin" of philosophy, from which all errors follow, namely the *negation of immanence*, the opening of the gap of *transcendence*.<sup>126</sup> But while others would interpret this affirmation of immanence (in the sense of Nietzsche's Eternal Return) as glorification of nihilism, for Deleuze, the affirmation of immanence is the affirmation of novelty: Only the *singular* becomes universal; only *novelty* returns.<sup>127</sup> Hegel's dialectic, however, *utilizes* (the gap of) negation, i.e., transcendence and disconnection, to *rationalize* the irrational—thereby rendering the surrational irrational. Hegel's dialectic, in Deleuze's eyes, becomes a *totalizing* move of the System (Spirit/Self) that includes the irrational as a *rational* moment and as a created *product* of own omnipotent reign.

Although, other than in Deleuze, there are important functions of negation in Whitehead,<sup>128</sup> Deleuze, in his important (and relatively unknown) lecture from March 10, 1987, on Whitehead, makes the bold and ultimately adequate claim that Whitehead's "cry for the event" (all is event!) begins with the *sheer affirmation of relation* and of inter-relationality as *the event of vibrations of relations*.<sup>129</sup> No negation in the mythos of creation undermines this universal affirmation of relationality, which Deleuze calls "the Open . . . by Relation"<sup>130</sup> and Whitehead the "necessity in universality," in which "what does not so communicate is unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown" so that only "this universality defined by 'communication' can suffice."<sup>131</sup> Deleuze is right: Everything begins with vibration! Everything in Whitehead's universe "seems to be wasting itself in the production of the vibrations."<sup>132</sup> The primordial relation that Whitehead calls *prehension* is nothing but a "vector-feeling," a "vector transmission of primitive feeling" in which "the primitive provision of width for contrast is secured by pulses of emotion, which in the coordinate division of occasions . . . appear as . . . vibrations."<sup>133</sup>

For the divergence of Whitehead (Deleuze) from Hegel (Butler), the event as building "Contrasts, or Modes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehension, or Patterned Entities"<sup>134</sup> is crucial. There is a point in which Whitehead describes this event as "nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea."<sup>135</sup> But the difference is that the triadic structure of the Hegelian Ideas, as mediated through negation, and negation of negation,

is an activity that produces its own process of negation (out of the One, the Self, the I), while Whitehead's triad—prehensions, initial aim, satisfaction—creates a *contrast out of opposites*, which are not dialectic negations of one another, but divergent, even incoherent moments in a process of compositional transformation, that is, a multiplicity that cannot be reduced to a mediated “One.”<sup>136</sup> For Whitehead, “‘becoming’ is the transformation of incoherence into coherence.”<sup>137</sup> Contrast originates from the *affirmation* of abysmal opposites; the heterogeneous hiatus of opposition and impossible difference is never bridged by any homogeneous dialectic. To the contrary, oppositions-turned-contrasts produce an infinite *différance*, “proceed[ing] from ‘contrasts’ to ‘contrasts of contrasts,’ and on indefinitely to higher grades of contrasts.”<sup>138</sup> It is not through negation, therefore, but “is due to the origination of reversions in the mental pole” that novel contrasts *as* “vibration and rhythm”<sup>139</sup> appear. As Deleuze observes, Whitehead's universe of affirmative reversions creates series of divergent and convergent vibes, folds, warps, and waves, interrelated in networks of chaotic polyphonies, discordant harmonies of the unending becoming of structures out of vibratory, contrasting novelty. The creation of systems of vibration is the “exemplification of composition.”<sup>140</sup>

As the “*function of Reason*” for Whitehead is always “*to promote the art of life*,”<sup>141</sup> for Deleuze, the Chaosmos is the sheer affirmation of structures *harbored and nourished* in the “Open” that is Relation in Chaos. Paradoxically, the more these vibrant structures complicate themselves, the more they begin to express the chaos out of which they emerged. Life is the “the production of a non-social nexus . . . in the interstices”<sup>142</sup> of structures that treasure this “entirely living nexus,” which “is not properly a society [in Whitehead's sense] at all, since ‘life’ cannot be a defining characteristic. It is the name for originality, and not for tradition.”<sup>143</sup> Although Life needs for its emergence a “complex inorganic system of interaction . . . built up for [its] protection,”<sup>144</sup> it is essentially the expression of “non-social nexus” that “answers to the notion of ‘chaos.’”<sup>145</sup>

While for Whitehead “life is a characteristic of ‘empty space’ and not of space ‘occupied’ by any corpuscular society,”<sup>146</sup> for Butler, as noted earlier, this empty space of chaos, which is pre-rational, is always already occupied by structured societies, the Law of suppression, desire, exclusion, and negativity.<sup>147</sup> Following Lacan and Foucault, for her, “the law might be understood to produce or generate”<sup>148</sup> the effect that is said to be its “before” or “outside.” While for Whitehead the chaotically vibrating discords are not dialectically, i.e., *rationally explained*, but *surrationaly transformed* into a convergent contrast that *affirms* the differences; and while

for Deleuze the event of the togetherness of these divergences is the “*inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed*,”<sup>149</sup> for Butler, the dialectic form of “occupation” includes already the excluded as part of its own activity: negation functions as *production of the excluded* so that its *rationalization* is in peril of repeating the seamless synthesis of the Idea. Consequently—and although even the early Butler is well aware of the profound problematic of any totalizing universalization (even that of patriarchy or phallogocentrism)<sup>150</sup>—with her dialectic of negation of any “prejudicial” imagination,<sup>151</sup> at least the early Butler is in danger of erecting the very totalizing rationalism in which a force of negativity is *rationalized* into the inescapability of the Law.

Regarding this Hegelian background, Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s Chaosmos lives from an entirely different account of diversity: the *mutual immanence* of *khora* and its harbored vibrating structures. Surrationality is nothing but the affirmation of this *mutual immanence* in which rationality, reason, structure, and system are co-created without negation. The only “system of all things”<sup>152</sup> is the *event* of their ever-new composition.<sup>153</sup> Born out of Chaos or Void or *Khora*, reason, structure, and system can never totally take over, but will—as its vibrant expression—always fall back onto (and conversely, harbor) this chaotic, *khoric*, surrational Life. In this surrational affirmation of a creative universe, “there is an ultimate which is [only] actual in virtue of its accidents.”<sup>154</sup> Logos never reigns absolutely, but is the child of creativity, which itself is—nothing (for it-Self).

The early Butler’s *homogeneous* rationalization of the irrational haunts her right to the core of her thought, the deconstruction of the Law. This materializes especially in Butler’s criticism of Julia Kristeva and her *khoric* undermining of rationality as based in the Symbolic Law.<sup>155</sup> While Kristeva contests “Lacan’s equation of the Symbolic with all linguistic meaning,”<sup>156</sup> for Butler, she falls prey to Foucault’s rule that there is no pre-discursive reality. Moreover, Kristeva “fails to understand the paternal mechanisms by which affectivity itself is generated,”<sup>157</sup> so that the “very law might well be the cause of the very desire it is said to repress.”<sup>158</sup> In stating that any utopian striving for an “outside” of the Law is not just fictitious, but even *produced* by the very Law that represses the commitment of its own deposition by the utopian alternatives, Butler immunizes the Law, which now braces to become the omnipotent ruler of its own conditions, imagined alternatives, and underlying contingencies.<sup>159</sup>

Seen from the perspective of Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s *heterogeneous* affirmation as the alternative to Hegelian dialectic of negation, Butler’s

move must appear as the totalizing mechanism of dialectic.<sup>160</sup> While Butler's reconstruction of the Law through de-substantialized performativity wants to challenge the phallogocentric omnipotence of the Logos, it now turns out to be another instantiation of the omnipotent Law insofar as it creates its exclusions and thereby integrates them as part of his rationality. Foucault's and Lacan's negation of the pre-discursive nature of the *kbora*, which is emphatically affirmed by Whitehead and Kristeva, generates another totalizing rationalism. Instead of this *unilateral* Law (of Self-Identity), which is the production of its own causes (as its effects), Whitehead's and Deleuze's surrational approach affirms the *mutual* immanence of system and *kbora*, whereby they can be said to be *effects of one another*.<sup>161</sup>

With the treatment of Hegel in Butler's *Giving an Account of Oneself*, however, we might gather a different picture, one that is ostensive because it obviously becomes porous to the Whiteheadian/Deleuzian modes of affirmation, and, hence, of the affirmation of surrationality beyond the prevalence of negativity. Two elements make all the difference: First, now she takes Hegel's dialectic in a different direction (although one that in her own judgment also will fail), namely that of the *affirmation* of transparency (instead of its all-pervasive force of negativity).<sup>162</sup> This leads her to the second element: While denying the totalizing claim of Hegel's dialectic of transparency in favor of the opaqueness of subjectivity that in its social, bodily, and regulatory inscriptions can never become self-present and, hence, never become self-transparent, Butler now *affirms* the limitation of this opaqueness not as lack, but as virtue of responsible existence (and, hence as ground of an ethics).<sup>163</sup>

### *Meta-Khoric Magic?*

If there is a difference between Whitehead's and Deleuze's surrational account of mutual immanence—and there is indeed a profound one—then it is based on their divergence of what *constitutes* genuine necessity-as-novelty in the Chaosmos. While both thinkers derive the Chaosmos through “passive genesis”<sup>164</sup> or the “remorseless working of things,”<sup>165</sup> for Deleuze, this uncontrolled, pre-individual, and non-personal process is based in the vibrating self-organization of the *passive* virtual;<sup>166</sup> for Whitehead, however, it is based on the *activity of a field of decisions*, which is facilitated by a principle of intensity and harmony we do not find in Deleuze. This is where Whitehead famously suggests that the surrational necessity-as-novelty is primordially symbolized by a Divine dimension of the Chaosmos. Insofar as the “function of God is analogous to the

remorseless working of things in Greek and in Buddhist thought,"<sup>167</sup> the vibratory universe "is rooted in the nature of God"<sup>168</sup>—being "the organ of novelty" and "aiming at intensification."<sup>169</sup> This "God," however, is interpreted as the principle of limitation/concretion, the surrational element in the "metaphysical situation" whereby there is "ultimate limitation."<sup>170</sup> Hence, "no reason can be given" for this "ultimate irrationality," which is "the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality."<sup>171</sup>

To be sure, it would be false to claim that because of the "categorical space" Whitehead assigns to this Divine perspective, his "universe remains, in principle, only semi-open,"<sup>172</sup> while Deleuze's Chaosmos, in avoiding such a move, would be *truly* open. It can be demonstrated that through Deleuze's and Whitehead's common commitment to the mutual immanence of the *kboric* realm with its vibrations and polyphone harmonies of vibrations *both* philosophies arrive "at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = MONISM."<sup>173</sup>

First, both philosophers find the magic formula by de-substantializing Spinoza: Deleuze by removing the remaining independence of the (Divine) substance from their dependent modes<sup>174</sup> in *Difference and Repetition* and recreating this difference as an infinite multiplicity of planes of immanence intersecting in Chaos in *What is Philosophy?*;<sup>175</sup> Whitehead by deconstructing the "substantial activity" of *Science and the Modern World*<sup>176</sup> as "creativity" in *Process and Reality* and as *kbora* of *Adventures of Ideas*.<sup>177</sup>

Second, *none* of Whitehead's "formative elements"<sup>178</sup>—multiplicity of actualities (the World), multiplicity of eternal objects (Forms), creativity (*kbora*), and God—are excluded from being the *effect of their mutual immanence*:<sup>179</sup> the multiplicity of actualities has no pre-forming principle of activation,<sup>180</sup> and creativity is nothing beyond its instantiations and formlessness beyond all forms;<sup>181</sup> the multiplicity of forms has no ruling rationality<sup>182</sup> and God is not in command of these multiplicities, neither creating them nor restricting their diversity,<sup>183</sup> God itself being conceptualized as multiplicity.<sup>184</sup>

Third, Whitehead's Divine surrationality is the most subtle *effect* of this mutual immanence, which it, at the same time, instantiates.<sup>185</sup> In the same sense that "the characters of the relevant things in nature are the outcome of their interconnections, and their interconnections are the outcome of their characters"<sup>186</sup> is the Divine nature the *effect* of the *actual process* they permeate (as is true for the mutual immanence of the primordial and the consequent aspect of God's nature). Nowhere, hence, does the Divine

nature equate to a Divine individual or person<sup>187</sup> or subjective consciousness. Far from such a subjective “synthesis of unification,” which is never “without the form of the I, or the point of view of a Self,”<sup>188</sup> Whitehead *repudiated* God-as-Self as a “metaphysical sublimation” of oppressive states of affairs into a “general concept of the Deity” that closes totality in itself.<sup>189</sup> The primordial nature is a pre-individual harmony of the “infinite conceptual realization” of potentials; the consequent nature is a trans-subjective “unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the primordial conceptual fact,”<sup>190</sup> a post-individual multiplicity contrasting transformation of opposites, loss, and tragedy.<sup>191</sup> As primordial instantiation(s) and characterization(s) of *creativity*,<sup>192</sup> the Divine natures are affirmative, non-exclusive, and without any “private I (Eye)” or investigative, biased gaze. God is not a Super-Ego, but the most anti-subjectivist way to articulate cosmic intensity and harmony.<sup>193</sup>

Hence, in following the *strict* rule of mutual immanence Whitehead’s Divine dimension of the Chaosmos does *not* externally direct the universe, but *facilitates* its openness.<sup>194</sup> Hence, it does *not* act as “transcendence,” or “vertical Being,” as an “imperial state in the sky or on earth,” but implements “immanence.”<sup>195</sup> We could say that Deleuze’s surrational account of the mutual immanence of chaos-*khora* and patterns-vibrations is not in need of such a Divine perspective and, consequently, does not exhibit a philosophical and chaomic “space” for it. Whitehead’s surrational account of the mutual immanence of chaos-*khora*-creativity and pattern-vibrations, however, demands a principle of concretion-limitation-intensification-harmonization and, therefore, exhibits a philosophical and chaomic “space” for it.

Where does this “need” come from? Two reasons can be given for such a demand: First, against ultimate rationalism that imposes a “harmony of logic . . . upon the universe as an iron necessity,” Whitehead introduces the Divine surrationality as “aesthetic harmony” that “stands before it as a living ideal moulding the general flux in its broken progress towards finer, subtler issues.”<sup>196</sup> It is the *harvest of tragedy*, the expression of the “remorseless working of things” as contrast of discordance. Second, this *subversion* of the Law *saves the uniqueness of the multiplicity transformed*. Here, Whitehead directly transcends the *khora* as “medium of communication” or, as in Deleuze, as “sieve”<sup>197</sup> and “paradoxical element,”<sup>198</sup> the “Event in which all events communicate and are distributed.”<sup>199</sup> While the

Platonic Receptacle is void, abstract from all individual occasions, . . . [t]he Unity of Adventure includes among its components all individual realities,

each with the importance of the personal or social fact to which it belongs . . . , each claiming its due share of attention. This Appearance, thus enjoyed, is the final Beauty with which the Universe achieves its justification.<sup>200</sup>

The Divine perspective does not mold anything into a certain (closed) teleology; because its “purpose” is mere “intensity, and not preservation,”<sup>201</sup> its aim (or, rather, aimlessness) is formless, like the *kbora*. Where Deleuze envisions the “*quasi-cause assuring full autonomy to the effect*”<sup>202</sup> to be “an immanent principle of auto-unification,”<sup>203</sup> Whitehead establishes (beyond that, but uncontested!) another immanent principle of quasi-causal *importance* of the singular, which is not identical with auto-creation (subjectivity), but is an element of the disinterested harmonization of intensities (objective immortality). Beyond Deleuze’s still Heideggerian duality of the (ontological) difference of events and the Event, Whitehead opts for a *multiplicity of immanent principles*, none of which “resembles” (pre-forms, “realizes”) their actualizations. And because of *all* of their “mutual immanence,”<sup>204</sup> Whitehead’s meta-*kboric*, Divine principle, which is in *itself* a multiplicity (of “tragic Beauty,” “initial Eros,” “Supreme Adventure,” “Final Fact,” and “Harmony of harmonies”<sup>205</sup>), does *not* establish a pre-formative harmony guaranteeing a pre-ordained goal (as in Leibniz)<sup>206</sup>—which Whitehead understood merely as “an extreme example of the doctrine of imposition.”<sup>207</sup> As the *quasi causal effect* of the chaotic vibrations in their intercommunication, i.e., the effect of their stubborn importance beyond, and inexhaustible resistance against, any unification under the Law, it indicates a (disinterested, non-possessive, and non-subjective) Beauty that, for Whitehead, is the only “justification” of existence.

The point of divergence of the surrationality of Whitehead and Deleuze, therefore, is not that Whitehead reintroduces Being, and it is not that Deleuze despises of the teleology of quasi-causal effects, but it is about *how* these effects are constructed in their *transcendental* importance, i.e., *how* they are conditions of genuine novelty. For Deleuze, (teleological) effects are *virtualities*, a *passive* multiplicity-field of singularities that is *actualized* in events;<sup>208</sup> for Whitehead, however, these (teleological) effects are *valuations*, an *active* (though *receptive*) multiplicity-field of singularities that is created in *decisions* of events.<sup>209</sup> Although both notions of actualities/singularities must be understood as intersection and creation,<sup>210</sup> for Deleuze’s virtual-events their mutual immanence is more a question of *surrational folding* (by infinite speed); for Whitehead’s value-events, however, their mutual immanence is a matter of *surrational irruption*. We could

say it this way: Deleuze finds the process of auto-unification transcendently conditioned by *two* modes of “*passive* genesis”—of the events (pre-individual singularities) and the Event (communication) of which “nobody” is in control.<sup>211</sup> Whitehead finds them transcendently conditioned by *multiple* modes of *decisive* genesis—of events (decisive actualities), creativity (decisive activity), potentials (decisive disposition), *kbora* (decisive space), and God (decisive effect/quasi-cause)—of which nobody is in control either.<sup>212</sup>

Both philosophies are compositions of the polyphony of the Chaosmos, but both diverge in what exactly facilitates their compositional intensity. Regarding the “magic formula we all seek,” Deleuze might have been more the monist, always searching for a continuity of becoming, while Whitehead was, the later the more, a pluralist, always seeking the “becoming of continuity, but no[t the] continuity of becoming.”<sup>213</sup> This may be the reason that Deleuze championed “Spinoza [as] the Christ of philosophers”<sup>214</sup> of mutual immanence, while Whitehead could refer to “Christ as revelation”<sup>215</sup> of this very mutual immanence.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

12. Philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers emphasizes this “societal” level of Whitehead’s analysis in her quite Deleuzian reading of Whitehead. See Isabelle Stengers, *Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et sauvage création de concepts* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).

13. PR, p. 283.

14. See endnote 5.

15. PR, p. 102.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–103.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

22. Deleuze-Guattari’s mostly pejorative use of the term “organism”—referring to those transcendent organizational structures that restrictively impose themselves on the flows of the Body without Organs—stands in marked contrast to Whitehead’s positive, constructive use of this same term to describe the relational and ecological aspects of his philosophy (a “philosophy of organism”). As will become clearer below, I suggest that near-opposite meanings are invoked by these two uses of the term.

23. TP, p. 150.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

25. PR, pp. 107–108.

26. TP, p. 158.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

29. This commitment is inspired in part by the political ideas around ecology set forth by Bruno Latour in his *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

30. TP, p. 161.

31. Meister Eckhart, “Sermon 5b” in *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, trans. Edmond Colledge and Bernard McGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), p. 184.

## 8. SURRATIONALITY AND CHAOSMOS: FOR A MORE DELEUZIAN WHITEHEAD (WITH A BUTLERIAN INTERVENTION)

*Roland Faber*

1. Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 10.

2. See Luce Irigaray, *The Sex Which Is Not One* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
3. See GT, pp. 11–33.
4. See Keller, *Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 3–40.
5. “The world is no accomplice of our cognition. There is no pre-discursive provision that makes the world lean toward us” (Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse”—my own translation).
6. TP, p. 24.
7. See PR, p. 22.
8. TP, p. 84.
9. PR, p. 103.
10. See PR, p. 105.
11. TP, p. 25.
12. TF, p. 81.
13. PR, p. 21.
14. TF, p. 81.
15. PR, p. 350.
16. AI, p. 134.
17. WP, p. 35.
18. TF, p. 81.
19. GT, p. 69.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
22. See Constantine V. Boundas, “Deleuze–Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual,” in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 81–106.
23. See CI, p. 10.
24. WP, p. 35.
25. TP, p. 12.
26. PR, p. 209.
27. See Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 9–30; see also David Griffin, et al, *Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
28. PR, p. xii.
29. AI, p. 223.
30. TF, p. 81.
31. See PR, p. 209.
32. PR, p. 230 (second italics added).
33. See PR, p. 48.

34. See Ivor Leclerc, “Whitehead and the Dichotomy of Rationalism and Empiricism,” in *Whiteheads Metaphysik der Kreativität: Internationales Whitehead-Symposium Bad Homburg 1983*, ed. Friedrich Rapp and Reiner Wiehl (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1986), pp. 13–32.
35. Lyman T. Lundeen, *Risk and Rhetoric in Religion: Whitehead’s Theory of Language and the Discourse of Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), p. 93.
36. PR, pp. 20–27.
37. Ibid., p. 8.
38. Ibid., p. 20.
39. See PR, p. 4.
40. PR, p. 46.
41. DR, p. 57.
42. SMW, p. 178.
43. PR, p. 90.
44. AI, p. 52.
45. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 45.
46. PR, p. 23.
47. See PR, p. 4.
48. See PR, p. 3.
49. See PR, p. 48; see also Roland Faber, “‘O Bitches of Impossibility!’—Programmatic Dysfunction in the Chaosmos of Deleuze and Whitehead,” in *Deleuze, Whitehead, and Bergson: Rhizomatic Connections*, ed. Keith Robinson (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 200–219.
50. See Michel Weber, *Whitehead’s Pancreativism: The Basics* (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2006), pp. 65–182.
51. See MT, p. 174.
52. Ibid.
53. PR, p. 42.
54. SMW, p. 192.
55. AI, p. 257.
56. Ibid., p. 296.
57. TF, p. 82.
58. See John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), pp. 78–90.
59. WP, p. 42.
60. AI, p. 134.
61. Ibid., p. 295.
62. Here is a common tradition, in which Whitehead and Deleuze converse with Derrida; see Jacques Derrida, “Chora,” in *Choral Works: A Collaboration between Peter Eisenman and Jacques Derrida*, ed. Jeffrey Kipnis (New York, 1993).

63. See Roland Faber, “Bodies of the Void: Polyphilia and Theoplicity,” in *Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality*, ed. Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), pp. 200–223.

64. AI, p. 144.

65. See Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 47–54.

66. See DI, pp. 9–14.

67. See PR, p. 43.

68. See, e.g., the “hard core common sense” doctrines in David Griffin, *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 5–7.

69. See Roland Faber, “Wahrheit und Maschine: Wider das transsilvanische Argument von der Gewalt im Erkenntnisdiskurs,” *Labyrinth* 3 (2001) at <http://labyrinth.iaf.ac.at/2001/Faber.html>.

70. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*. 15th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 4.

71. AI, p. 52.

72. Ibid., p. 25.

73. CI, p. 10.

74. See Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 88.

75. See PR, p. 4.

76. See Stascha Rohmer, *Whiteheads Synthese von Kreativität und Rationalität: Reflexionen und Transformationen in Alfred North Whiteheads Philosophie der Natur*, Alber Thesen, vol. 13 (Freiburg: Alber, 2000), pp. 122–149.

77. WP, p. 41.

78. See PR, p. 24.

79. See PR, p. 95; see Genesis 1:2.

80. See AI, p. 211.

81. AI, pp. 295–296.

82. AI, p. 177; see also Roland Faber, “Whitehead at Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event,” in *Schleiermacher and Whitehead: Open Systems in Dialogue*, ed. Christine Helmer, Marjorie Suchocki, and John Quiring (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), pp. 39–72.

83. Faber, “Whitehead at Infinite Speed,” pp. 71–2. “Irrational” forces utilize structures for their interests; surrational critique, therefore, restores the importance of “structures” against this biased irrationalism.

84. See RM, p. 67.

85. AI, p. 150.

86. See AI, p. 246.

87. See N 167–182. See also Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook, ed., *Deleuze and Feminist Theory* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), and Sheila Davaney, ed., *Feminism and Process Thought* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1981).
88. See CT, pp. 177–9.
89. See GT, p. 38.
90. See BTM, pp. 121–142. For a good overview of this process of subjectification, see Annika Thiem, *Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 21–50.
91. See BTM, pp. 187–222. This holds true also for her later investigation of censorship as the condition of the constitution of subjects of language; see ES, p. 140.
92. GA, pp. 22–26.
93. It is difficult to follow a thinker in her structural repetitions when this thinker is still in development. With Butler, I sense an increasing sensitivity for, and approximation with, Whitehead in these matters. Social construction is the basis for Whitehead's understanding of novelty, not its enemy. Butler's newer approach seems to indicate the same kind of move: that the opaqueness of the subject that does not allow one to give an account of oneself without becoming fictitious, is, at the same time, in this function the well for performativity as novelty. Here, the *khoric* space that she has struggled with in relation to Kristeva and Irigaray reappears in Butler.
94. See Tamsin Lorraine, *Irigaray & Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 142–164.
95. See NP, pp. 162–164.
96. DR, p. 40.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
99. See Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
100. This shift appears in the early GT, ch. 1, as well as in the current GA, ch. 1—that is, it seems to be a constant in her work.
101. See DI, p. 124.
102. GA, p. 16.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
104. That performativity as the interplay of necessity and novelty is not a “game” but has its tragic implications of fate is demonstrated by Butler's reference to the case of David Reimer and other cases of gender-performativity; see UG, and Judith Butler, “Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Allegories of Transsexuality,” *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 7, no. 4 (2001): pp. 621–36.

105. PR, p. 4.
106. GA, p. 78.
107. PR, p. 5.
108. AI, p. 106.
109. Ibid., p. 42.
110. See PR, p. 95.
111. PR, p. 42.
112. Ibid., p. 43.
113. SMW, p. 178.
114. Ibid.
115. DR, p. 42.
116. DR, p. 42; see also Roland Faber, “‘The Infinite Movement of Evanescence’—The Pythagorean Puzzle in Plato, Deleuze, and Whitehead,” *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy* 21 (2000): pp. 171–199.
117. DR, p. XXI.
118. SMW, pp. 10–11.
119. For a most interesting introduction of the problem of liberation and the relation of freedom to destiny, see Jean Baudrillard, *Impossible Exchange* (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 51–89.
120. See Roland Faber, “Whitehead at Infinite Speed,” pp. 39–72.
121. See BTM, pp. 27–56.
122. UG, p. 198.
123. UG, p. 195.
124. See PR, p. 110; N, p. 149.
125. See G. Kline, “Begriff und Konkreszenz: über einige Gemeinsamkeiten in den Ontologien Hegels und Whiteheads,” in *Whitehead und der Deutsche Idealismus*, ed. George Lucas and Antoon Braeckman (Bern: Peter Lang, 1990), pp. 145–161; see also C. Macherey, “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolfs?” in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 114–138.
126. See WP, pp. 45–49; This goes beyond and, at the same time, is nothing but the criticism, as it is normally stated, that dialectic is not radical enough because it remains within the concept of the Same. The Same, however, is the transcendence per resemblance; see Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. 8.
127. See DI, pp. 117–127.
128. Especially in the form of “negative prehensions” of exclusion of actualities and eternal object to become an affirmed part of a new actuality. Nevertheless, both reinstate affirmation as a basic move: first, by understanding “positive prehension” as a basic move of repetition in the occasion, the repetition of the subjective form; and second, by leaving direct or indirect traces of the “cut away” actualities and eternal objects—the former always leaving

traces of their exclusion; the latter always leaving a whole in the systematic vibration of eternal objects in their “relational essence.”

129. “Le premier stade c’était le “many,” des vibrations n’importe comment, des vibrations aléatoires. Pour ceux qui connaissent Bergson, peut-être que vous vous rappelez la splendide fin de Matière et Mémoire, le fond de la matière est vibration et vibration de vibrations” (CV).

130. CI, p. 10.

131. PR, p. 4.

132. Ibid., p. 79.

133. Ibid., p. 163.

134. Ibid., p. 22.

135. Ibid., p. 167.

136. For the discussion on Whitehead and Hegel, see George Lucas, *Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

137. PR, p. 25; see also Roland Faber, “Trinity, Analogy and Coherence,” in *Trinity in Process: A Relational Theology of God*, ed. Joseph Bracken and Marjorie Suchocki (New York: Continuum, 1997), pp. 147–171.

138. PR, p. 22.

139. Ibid., p. 279.

140. Ibid., p. 147.

141. FR, p. 4.

142. PR, p. 105.

143. Ibid., p. 104.

144. Ibid., p. 103.

145. Ibid., p. 72.

146. Ibid., p. 105.

147. See GA, ch.1.

148. GT, p. 96.

149. WP, p. 21.

150. See GT, p. 6–7.

151. See Ibid., p. 46.

152. PR, p. 36.

153. On “mutual immanence” in Whitehead, see Roland Faber, *Prozestheologie: Zu ihrer Würdigung und kritischen Erneuerung* (Mainz: Grünewald, 2000), pp. 264–294.

154. PR, p. 7.

155. See Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 25–31.

156. GT, p. 104.

157. Ibid., p. 116.

158. Ibid., p. 115.
159. Ibid., pp. 38–39, 46, 48–49, 94–95.
160. For the term “heterogeneous” in relation to Whitehead, see Gregory Vlastos, “Organic Categories in Hegel and Whitehead,” in *Alfred North Whitehead. Essays in His Philosophy*, ed. George Kline (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 159.
161. For the application to the important “reciprocal determination” of the Virtual and the Actual in Deleuze and Value and Actuality in Whitehead, see Roland Faber, “De-Ontologizing God: Levinas, Deleuze, and Whitehead,” in *Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernism*, ed. Catherine Keller and Anne Daniell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 209–234, and James Williams, *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze: Encounters and Influences* (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2005), pp. 77–100.
162. GA, pp. 26–30.
163. Ibid., ch. 3. It is interesting that Butler’s later approach to the inescapable “lateness” of the subject that cannot become self-transparent without becoming abstract or fictitious not only mirrors Derrida’s critique of (a metaphysics of) “Presence,” but also Whitehead’s differentiation into two modes of perception, of which “presentational immediacy” not only is always “too late” but abstract and fictitious in its self-construction. See S, *passim*.
164. LS, p. 116.
165. SMW, pp. 10–11.
166. See IM, pp. 25–32.
167. PR, p. 244.
168. Ibid.
169. PR, p. 67.
170. See Roland Faber, *God as Poet of the World: Exploring Process Theologies* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 132–140.
171. SMW, p. 178.
172. Tim Clark, “A Whiteheadian Chaosmos? Process Philosophy from a Deleuzian Perspective,” in *Process and Difference*, ed. Keller and Daniell, p. 202.
173. TP, p. 20; see also “Bitches,” in *Process and Difference*, ed. Keller and Daniell, p. 123.
174. See DR, p. 40.
175. See WP, p. 42.
176. See SMW, p. 107.
177. See AI, p. 150; Faber, *God as Poet*, pp. 141–144.
178. See RM, pp. 89–90.
179. See AI, p. 134.

180. See PR, p. 21.
181. Ibid.
182. See PR, p. 46.
183. See SMW, p. 179.
184. See PR, p. 348.
185. This is nicely demonstrated by Steven Shaviro; see “Deleuze’s Encounter with Whitehead” ([www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/DeleuzeWhitehead.pdf](http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/DeleuzeWhitehead.pdf)).
186. AI, p. 113.
187. See RM, p. 62.
188. LS, p. 102.
189. AI, p. 168. Against the proposed resemblance of God with the Self-I, see Jeff Bell, *Philosophy at the Edges of Chaos: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Difference* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 190.
190. PR, p. 346.
191. See PR, p. 349; see also Elizabeth Kraus, *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead’s Process and Reality* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), pp. 168–184.
192. See PR, p. 225.
193. See PR, p. 105. If there is any consciousness in God, as there is in Whitehead’s understanding of the mutual immanence of God’s natures, it is not an individual Self-Consciousness, but rather the most objective mode of non-individualistic and pre-personal (or even hyper-personal) intensity/creativity, only comparable to Deleuze’s “pure (non-subjective) consciousness” of his late text “Immanence—A Life”; see IM, pp. 29–30. As in Whitehead, it is a perfect statement of what in Whitehead includes the virtuality of the eternal objects in God’s primordial nature and the actualizations in God’s consequent nature.
194. See Roland Faber, “The Infinite Movement of Evanescence,” pp. 188–191. Especially in his two articles from 1941, “Immortality” and “Mathematics and the Good,” Whitehead not only shows the most radical reconstructions of all of his ultimates in terms of one another, but almost a dissolution.
195. WP, p. 43; this has to be said against simplifications. See Keith Pearson, “Pure Reverse: Deleuze, Philosophy, and Immanence,” in *Deleuze and Religion*, ed. Mary Bryden (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 141–155.
196. SMW, p. 18.
197. WP, p. 42.
198. LS, p. 95.
199. LS, p. 56.
200. AI, p. 295.

201. PR, p. 105.  
 202. LS, p. 95.  
 203. LS, p. 102.  
 204. AI, p. 134.  
 205. See AI, pp. 295–296.  
 206. See Christoph Kann, *Fußnoten zu Platon: Philosophiegeschichte bei A. N. Whitehead*. Paradeigmata, vol. 23 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), p. 210.  
 207. AI, p. 133.  
 208. See IM, pp. 29–30.  
 209. See Imm., pp. 90; see also Faber, “De-Ontologizing,” pp. 219–220, and Faber, “Bodies of the Void.” In *Apophatic Bodies*, ed. Boesel and Keller, pp. 217–223.  
 210. Although Deleuze’s account would also have to be understood as creation, and not as mere organization; see Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. 18.  
 211. See LS, p. 116.  
 212. In Faber, “Evanescence,” and “De-Ontologizing,” I have opted to understand this Divine principle as *in/difference* (neither being able to be conceptualized *as* difference, nor *in* difference, nor *beyond* difference (for that matter), but beyond the *duality* of the ontological difference and the *duality* of the “magic formula,” indicating *in/different insistence on difference*.  
 213. PR, p. 35; see also Keith Robinson, “The New Whitehead? An Ontology of the Virtual in Whitehead’s Metaphysics,” *Symposium* 10, no. 1 (2006): pp. 69–80.  
 214. WP, p. 60.  
 215. AI, p. 169.

#### 9. DIVINE POSSIBILITIES: BECOMING AN ORDER WITHOUT LAW

*Alan R. Van Wyk*

1. A recent collection of articles appearing under the heading of Political Theology—*Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006)—for example, contains thirty-four entries, almost exclusively from philosophers and political theorists.
2. Judith Butler, “Precarious Life” in PL, pp. 128–151; CC, pp. 201–219.
3. Isabelle Stengers, *Penser avec Whitehead; Une libre et sauvage création de concepts* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), p. 13.
4. PR, p. 207; SMW, p. 173.
5. PR, p. 105.
6. In BTM, an already religiously inflected rendering of assumption becomes the key critical concept through which Butler is able to both counter any supposed misreading of her earlier work and advance performativity

beyond a mere performance. Assumption comes to designate the functional logic by which the law creates sexed subjects through “citational practices instituted within a juridical domain—a domain of constitutive restraints. The embodying of sex would be a kind of ‘citing’ of the law, but neither the sex nor the law can be said to preexist their various embodying and citings.” BTM, especially ch. 3: “Phantasmic Identification and the Assumption of Sex.”

7. PL, xiii.

8. PL, p. 135.

9. PL, p. 135.

10. PL, p. 137.

11. CC, p. 205.

12. CC, p. 212.

13. CC, p. 204.

14. CC, p. 209.

15. There has always been, within Butler’s work, a critique of the theological. As Adam Kotsko has recently shown, this has not been directly against theology itself, but rather against the “avowedly secular thinkers who take up positions that seem to Butler to function theologically” (Adam Kotsko, “The Failed Divine Performative: Reading Judith Butler’s Critique of Theology with Anselm’s *On the Fall of the Devil*.” *Journal of Religion* 88, no. 2 (April 2008): p. 210). Within this critique, the theological designates for Butler, in part, a conceptualization of power modeled on sovereign divine power. With this, the theological designates the fixing of the relation between temporality and causation, whereby power itself operates with a linear temporality matched by a single causation, both grounded in and through a prior subject that is subsequently bound to its own lawful or unlawful acting. The theological becomes a way of designating the religious binding of subjects in and to the law of their own subjugation. A binding that itself is occluded and disappears in its very operation.

16. PL, p. 138.

17. CC, p. 214.

18. CC, p. 217.

19. CC, p. 216.

20. CC, pp. 216–217.

21. CC, p. 219.

22. For a further exploration of Butler’s continued conversation with Giorgio Agamben concerning sacred life, see Elena Loizidou, *Judith Butler: Ethics, Law, Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2007), especially “Double Law.”

23. PL, p. 135.

24. CC, p. 210.
25. CC, p. 219.
26. See Lewis S. Ford, *Transforming Process Theism*, SUNY Series in Philosophy, foreword by Robert Cumming Neville (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), especially Part 1.
27. Ford, *Transforming Process Theism*, p. 44.
28. PR, p. 207. In *Science and the Modern World*, this proposal is made with reference to Aristotle, whose “consideration of this metaphysical question [of God] was entirely dispassionate; and he was the last European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions” (SMW, p. 173).
29. PR, p. 343.
30. PR, p. 342.
31. PR, p. 88.
32. PR, p. 7.
33. PR, p. 88.
34. PR, p. 105.
35. PR, p. 83.
36. See Judith A. Jones, *Intensity: An Essay in Whiteheadian Ontology* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998).
37. PR, p. 65.
38. SMW, p. 174; PR, p. 244.
39. PR, p. 31.
40. PR, p. 40.
41. Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics* (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, forthcoming). See especially “God, or the body without organs.”
42. PR, p. 40.
43. SMW, p. 178.
44. CC, pp. 201–202.
45. PR, p. 244.
46. PR, p. 43.
47. CC, p. 208.
48. PR, p. 43.
49. PR, p. 244.
50. PR, p. 83.
51. PR, p. 43.
52. PR, p. 88.
53. PR, p. 343.

54. PR, p. 225.

55. In this sense, Catherine Keller's *Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (New York: Routledge, 2003) is the prolegomena for any possible secular political theology.

56. PR, p. 21.

57. PR, p. 84.

58. For Whitehead, "order" in its primary designation refers to that which is ordered for an individual actual occasion. All social order is, for Whitehead, derivative from this primary meaning of order (PR, p. 89).

59. In its metaphysical sense, a society is, for Whitehead, "a nexus of actual entities which are 'ordered' among themselves" (PR, p. 89). This ordering is a shared ordering, being based not on an imposition of order, but rather on an eliciting of an complex of eternal objects which is the societies defining characteristic (PR, p. 92).

60. PR, p. 108.

61. PR, p. 105.

62. AC. See especially "Promiscuous Obedience."

63. CC, p. 218.

64. CC, p. 219.

65. As Butler parenthetically notes, "(The messiah is that which will never appear in time.)" CC, p. 218.

66. PR, p. 214.

67. PR, p. 104.

68. PR, p. 105.

69. AI.

#### 10. "GOD IS A LOBSTER": WHITEHEAD'S RECEPTACLE

##### MEETS THE DELEUZIAN SIEVE

*Sigridur Gudmarsdottir*

1. Roland Faber, "De-Ontologizing God: Levinas, Deleuze, and Whitehead," in *Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernisms*, ed. Catherine Keller and Anne Daniell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 210.

2. The terms univocal and equivocal come from Aristotelian philosophy; see Aristotle, *Categories* I.1a. Also see section 2 of Aristotle, *Categories* I. on *univocity of being* (*via univoca*). *Equivocity of being* (*via negativa*) means that there is radical difference between Being and beings—human words and knowledge are not capable of revealing Being. *Eminence of being* (*via eminentiae*) stresses that words can denote Being, but in a sublime way.

3. Possible affinities between Deleuze's univocal ontology and mystical, neoplatonic thought has been argued by both philosopher Alain Badiou and