Secrets of Becoming

Negotiating Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler

Edited by

Roland Faber and Andrea M. Stephenson

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INTRODUCTION

Negotiating Becoming

Roland Faber

> Only becomings are secrets; the secret has a becoming.
>
> GILLES DELEUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI,
> *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*

Secrets of Becoming places into conversation modes of thought traditionally held apart. Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" (later transformed into what became known as *process thought*), Deleuze's "philosophy of difference" (also known as *nomadic thought*), and Judith Butler's "philosophy of gender" (normally identified as part of *feminist philosophy*) exhibit great diversity among themselves—too much for many to undertake the risk of envisioning an interesting conversation. The grand divergence in the questions with which these philosophies are interested, as well as the widely different fields of discourse in which these questions are situated, create the hiatus: metaphysics and gender theory, cosmology and cultural theory, religion and democracy, mathematics and psychoanalysis—Why should one try to bridge or connect them? And yet, isn't this strange "togetherness" of the multiple questions, divergent disciplines, and deep problems they raise precisely what might make their thoughts *negotiable* with one another?

Some thinkers—and this collection is witness to this fact—have found surprisingly genuine crossings and intersections between process, nomadic, and feminist thought, which they believe to be important enough to justify such a conversation, or even demand it. There is, in Deleuze's work, this odd affinity to remote philosophies, among them

Whitehead; there is this overlapping and mutually critical review of process and post-structuralist thought with feminist philosophy (e.g., with Irigaray, Kristeva, and in particular, with Deleuze). And besides an essential acquaintance with Nietzsche, a critical appreciation of Foucault and Derrida lingers in the background of most post-structuralist theories. The more one investigates the rhizomatic motions of these modes of thought (and practice), the more a landscape opens up in which these philosophies appear as inhabitants of a gathering, diffusively named post-structuralist—in a much wider field of populations, often referred to as postmodern—thought.

At first look, however, one will see immediately rifts in this landscape, fairly clearly dividing one field from the others. Moreover, philosophical geologists, or geophilosophers,[1] could question whether or not a valid map was being drawn at all. Isn't it true that the Champs-Élysées is in Paris and not in London? In other words: What does Whitehead, the Victorian co-author of the *Principia Mathematica* and infamous proponent of metaphysics, have to do with post-structuralist thought? And what does a French Catholic rebel of the 1968 movement have to do with the American-Jewish heritage of the Ashkenazi, for that matter? However, in all of these possible misconnections, we should not forget that their *event* of togetherness is unpredictable by timeframe, ideological occupation, and philosophical orientation. If *timeframe* is the problem, we should not forget how Nietzsche becomes part of the event (although he was much too early in time).[2] If *ideological warping* is the problem, let's remember his misuse in fascist thought (although much later). If *philosophical outlook* is the problem, we should not forget Deleuze's new engagement in metaphysical modes of thinking (despite, and in embracing, Nietzsche). All unpredictable crossings! At a closer look, the landscape becomes even more complicated. While both Deleuze and Butler might be referred to as post-structuralist thinkers, they will not match each other in their modes of thought or in their practices. One might become distressed all the more by the fact that both, while referring to a common ancestor, Michel Foucault (one writing a book on him, the other exhibiting his thought as a vital basis throughout her whole work), would agree neither on the reasons for engaging his thought, nor even on *what* to agree on.

For geophilosophers, this amounts to something like three Berlins divided by two Berlin Walls! But aren't they also connected by these walls? If we leave the "tree" of a bird's eye view to look from below, from the perspective of a "rhizome," we might discover their weird connections: that there is the nonnegotiable fact that Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler,

with all divergences and antipathies, as well as all their sympathies and affinities, distrust a common mindset, and that they use their skills to deconstruct it. They detect *substantialism* as their archenemy and consider its total dismissal as the only "solution" to their (different) sets of questions. In an affirmative formulation, there is the surprising fact that Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler understand their thought as being part of—or better, as being at the forefront of—a philosophy for which *Becoming* is eminent. Indeed, in the concept of "Becoming," they turn our understanding of the world upside down—with all the philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, and political consequences. "Becoming," however, does not play the role of a common denominator enabling us to abstract from their divergent texts, but has the very concerted function of creating an *active concept* of analysis, struggle, and operation.

In the course of this book, it is this emphasis on Becoming—its presuppositions, implications, and consequences—that interests us in the modes in which it appears to thoroughly permeate the philosophies of Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler. Moreover—somehow like an experiment in quantum tunneling and non-locality—we will begin to observe the unsuspected co-vibrations of Becoming that, in its irregular channels, connects the divided sectors of process, nomadic, and feminist philosophy when these thinkers perform together "the event of becoming" as it transforms everything it touches. We listen to their negotiations while asking: How is it to be in the process of becoming; in the process of becoming—?

Metanoetics of Becoming

Maybe the best way to characterize the common field of becoming for Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler is to understand their revolution in thought as based on (or at least initiated by) Nietzsche's call for *radical* becoming. The first essay, "Good and Evil, Good and Bad," in Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* contains what could be understood as the Manifesto of Becoming:

> A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive, will, action—indeed, it is nothing but these drives, willing, and actions in themselves—and it cannot appear as anything else except through the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it), which understands and misunderstands all action as conditioned by something which causes actions, by a "Subject." In fact, in just the same way as people separate lightning from its flash and take the latter as an action, as the effect of a

> subject, which is called lightning, so popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of that strength, as if behind the strong person there is an indifferent substrate, which is free to manifest strength or not. But there is no such substrate; there is no "being" behind the doing, acting, becoming. "The doer" is merely invented after the fact—the act is everything. People basically duplicate the event: when they see lightning, well, that is an action of an action: they set up the same event first as the cause and then again as its effect.[3]

The "subject" is an abstraction post facto of the becoming of forces that happen to manifest themselves "together." There is no "substrate" behind this activity of gathering, only the illusion of an effect disguised as the cause of the activity it originates. Indeed, the revolution, the *metanoia*, that which seems to be the basis, ground, and cause, is, in fact, the effect of its own becoming. *Being is the effect of becoming!* Put in Whiteheadian terms, this metanoetics[4] of becoming is formalized in his *principle of process*:

> That *how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its "being" is constituted by its "becoming." This is the "principle of process."[5]

If being is *constituted* by becoming, it is never a substrate that underlies the process, but it is always only the *consequence* of the process of becoming. This *metanoia* in fact is revolutionary: Everything that can be said *besides* becoming can be said only *with* becoming or (being an ingredient) *in the process* of becoming! First, nothing is, in a strict sense, pre-given. Everything pre-given (matters of fact) has had its own becoming—there are neither "initial conditions" nor "first causes" from which to start. Second, being cannot be claimed to be the ground of all beings, except as it is the expression of this process of "being in becoming" itself, which is neither self nor substrate, neither subject nor object. The latter—the ontological ground—is expressed by Whitehead's "creativity" as the abstraction of activity "which is actual in virtue of its accidents" and "only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments"[6]—indicating the non-substantial activity of *becoming* itself, which is only actual *with* becoming. The former—the instance of becoming, which Whitehead terms "actual entity"—can only be abstracted by abstracting *from* becoming. This amounts to Whitehead's *ontological principle*, which says "that actual entities are the only *reasons*; so that to search for a *reason* is to search for one or more actual entities."[7] Referring to "reasons" is not referring to

common grounds or higher realities or grounds or causes, but to becoming in its processes of becoming.

By conceptualizing becoming as "actual entities," two things happen: First, nothing that becomes, becomes forever, but it effectuates being. This "being," however, is becoming-past, a memory of becoming.

> In their becoming [becomings] are immediate and then vanish into the past. They are gone; they have perished; they are no more and have passed into not-being. Plato terms them things that are "always becoming and never really are."[8]

Second, in allowing for being to be the effect of becoming as its sedimentation, *something* can become. This "something," however, is nothing in itself, no substrate; it *is* only with new becoming *in* which it functions as its condition. Structures of becoming, therefore, are always in becoming but are also conditions of becoming in the sense that there is a paradoxical mutual rhythm between becoming and being. Yet, this is a *metanoetic* rhythm: not that of the being of a "subject" or "ground" or "cause" of a *What* that enfolds itself in a process of becoming, but that of a "superject" or "aim" or "effect" *attained* in the process of becoming and remaining *with* its renewal. The effect conversely "causes" ingredients of becoming to become the conditions (restrictions, structures, laws) for its renewal.

Deleuze's Nietzsche has discovered just that. In this rhythm, if there would be a being to be attained, it would have been reached already. Since time is infinite in both directions, past and future, "the present moment, as the passing moment, proves that it is not attained." Consequently, if the "infinity of the past time means that becoming cannot have started to become . . . it is not something that has become."[9] But *in* becoming, in the *instance* of a "present" becoming, every-*thing* is in coexistence of its *flux*, in the "state" of the solution of its sediments. Becoming is "incorporeal": it "is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates." Deleuze's reconstruction of being "in becoming" emphasizes its elements as "*heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed*"[10] whereby the sedimentations of the states of affairs and their histories are in the flux of the moment of becoming. "Philosophy is [about] becoming, not history; it is the coexistence of plains, not the succession of systems."[11] It is (about) the intersection of multiplicities beyond their structural identity. This leaves us with his notion of the event of becoming.

> In every event of becoming there are many heterogeneous, always simultaneous components, since each of them is a meanwhile, all within the meanwhile that makes them communicate through zones of indiscernability, of undecidability; they are variations, modulations, intermezzi, singularities, of a new infinite order. Each component of the event is *actualized or effectuated* in an instant, and the event in the time that passes between these instants, but nothing happens within *the virtuality* that has only meanwhiles as components and an event as composite becoming. Nothing happens here, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment.[12]

Being is *effectuated* in becoming and *per se* is only a multiplicity of components *in* becoming, permanently reconstructed in ever-new instants of becoming. Neither is there any Being as ground of Becoming nor is there any structure capturing this becoming-anew. As in Whitehead, structures dissolve into fluent components of instants of becoming. Hence, neither any "identity of a subject" nor any substrate underpins the process of reconstruction of structures in becoming, although, as in Whitehead, these structures are conditions of becoming. But, as in Whitehead, they are not causes (or principles, or grounds) that *activate* becoming but sediments that *are activated* and *are effected* by the very process of becoming they condition. No-thing "happens"—there is no substance that happens—but "in becoming" everything changes in the event of becoming-anew out of sediments that are always already effectuated by its effect.

As for Whitehead and Deleuze, the *metanoia* of becoming clears Butler's view of an *essentialism* that has haunted the genesis of philosophy and the Western worldview. With Nietzsche, she issues a reconstruction of structures of Being—which seem to be eternal Law and a Logos of permanence—generating a *genealogy* of their becoming in which their being-ground reveals their being-effect of repetition of power relations (which she adopts as "phallogocentrism"). For Butler, this genealogy of becoming has immediate implications for the body in becoming, body politics, and the culturally gendered understanding of the sexual difference.

> Clearly this project does not propose to lay out within traditional philosophical terms an *ontology* of gender whereby the meaning of being a woman or a man is elucidated within the terms of phenomenology. The

> presumption here is that the "being" of gender is *an effect*, an object of a genealogical investigation that maps out the political parameters of its construction in the mode of ontology. To claim that gender is constructed is not to assert its illusoriness or artificiality, where those terms are understood to reside within a binary that counterposes the "real" and the "authentic" as oppositional. As a genealogy of gender ontology, this inquiry seeks to understand the discursive production of the plausibility of that binary relation and to suggest certain cultural configurations of gender to take the place of "the real" and consolidate and augment their hegemony through that felicitous self-naturalization.[13]

Again, as in Deleuze and Whitehead, being is the effect of becoming; genealogy is the deconstruction of the "naturalization" of being's plausible patterns that are created in order to secure their hegemony (by their becoming "natural"). The phallogocentric reconstruction of seemingly naturally gendered "reality" uncovers the cultural mechanisms by which power relations take their self-evident prevalence (and oppressive regulations) to become *the* being, the substrate, the natural essence of its (the beings) own becoming. Conversely, however, "one is not born, but rather *becomes* a woman"; as any naturalized notion, "*woman* itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end."[14] In Butler's metanoetics of becoming (and with Nietzsche), "gender is always a doing. Though not a doing of a subject who might be said to preexist the deed."[15] *Subjects* are not *identities* out of which they (besides other operations also) become, but are results of their own becoming. In the process of such becoming, however, what becomes, becomes *subjected* to the *structures* that become—calling these structures their *being*.[16]

With this heritage from Nietzsche, for all three of our thinkers, *ontology* has to be *genealogically deconstructed* as based on its own becoming, which is always prior to being; that means it has to be critically unmasked of its culturally, socially, politically imposed mechanisms that disguise their becoming as pre-given being, as a *nature* "(out) of which" becoming only seems to appear as a surface effect of deep essence. On the contrary, for all three thinkers, all "nature" is *naturalized*; all structures are *constructed*; all patterns are stable only by *repetition*; all powers are only *internalized subjections* to the very effects of their own production. If this view is rightly called "post-structuralist," all three of our thinkers (regardless of the divergences regarding time, space, and characters of their own philosophical development) are in a superposition by which their thought is

expressed by "becoming." Insofar as this verb/infinitive changes *everything*, their thought is a *metanoetics* of becoming, shouting out loud: "All is Event!"

All Is Event!

In negotiating becoming, it soon becomes a question whether one legitimately may think of Whitehead as a "post-structuralist thinker" *at all*. Isn't Whitehead much more a hardcore *rationalist*? Isn't the post-structuralist impulse to deconstruct all of metaphysics a fairly obvious sign that Whitehead remains on the "other" side of the divide—the metaphysical antiquity—or even worse, remaining an undeconstructed (and easily deconstructible) rationalist of "pre-Kantian modes of thought"[17]? Moreover, the history of the reception of Whitehead seems to petrify this impression: Whitehead was defended *as* a metaphysician (in exactly the meaning of this tradition that post-structuralist thought was to deconstruct). When he was "used" to criticize *modernity*—thereby stylizing him as a "postmodern" thinker—the intention often was to reinstall lost modes of a non-materialist, post-scientific, and anti-Cartesian *holism*.[18] Whitehead was becoming a household name in "metaphysical literature" of an evolutionary spirituality of the cosmos,[19] a new form of spiritualism (or idealism), in the best case compared with Hegel's idealism of Absolute Spirit[20] (and buried in the pre-Marxian critique and reversal).[21] Whitehead was caught between continents and philosophies in Europe and America, in a sense, really becoming "the Other" of the philosophical landscape: neither a classical metaphysician nor a classical rationalist; neither a thorough empiricist nor a real pragmatist; neither an existentialist nor a phenomenologist; neither a Continental philosopher nor an analytic thinker.[22] In all of those circles, Whitehead's enthusiastic (although *also* "otherwise") reception in theology and religious thought—with ripples as far as Buddhist philosophy and Asian modes of thought—has hurt his reputation as a *thinker* one has to take seriously. His quarrel with Einstein's mathematics of General Relativity, which he seemingly (at least in the public debate) has lost, has not furthered any admiration in the scientific world; and the destruction of the grand opus of the *Principia Mathematica*—for which he, if at all, still is known to a wider audience—by Gödel's theorem definitely declared him part of *history* (of philosophy, of science) rather than part of ongoing discourses for which his *thinking* would arouse us today.

Within all of these dislocations of Whitehead, we find a steady stream of "process philosophy" relying on his "philosophy of organism,"[23] but engulfing his thought antithetically as "constructive postmodernism"—at odds with any undertaking to situate Whitehead in the post-structuralist movement (or, at least, as one of its forebearers). Moreover, in deep distrust of the Derridean "deconstruction" as a valuable description for Whitehead's thought, these forms of "constructive" process philosophy are understood as alternative paths of postmodernism besides/around post-structuralism.[24] Whitehead as a *constructive* postmodernist—together with Henri Bergson, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Charles Hartshorne—is seen as a stronghold of resistance against the alleged "debilitating relativism" of *deconstructive* postmodernism and as a *holistic* alternative that does not dismiss truth through relativist readings but seeks a new form of postmodern *unity* of thought and reality—a new form of *metaphysics of the whole world* in terms of Whitehead's conceptualization. By mistrusting the nomadic multiplicities of deconstructive and post-structuralist thought, which can never be united into a non-fragmented whole, this tendency furthers the prejudice that Whitehead is part of a movement of neo-rationalism, not at all postmodern, but reviving modernity in terms of pre-materialistic modes of thought and neo-foundationalism. In the midst of this controversy, however, it is the fresh reading of a post-rationalistic Whitehead in the very first collection of articles collected as *Process and Difference*[25] that has pointed us to an alternative, post-structuralist understanding of Whitehead and especially a vital Deleuzian connection.

Indeed, it was Deleuze with his counter-reading of Whitehead who cut through the predicaments of these displacements of his philosophy.[26] Despite the fact that Deleuze did not honor Whitehead with a whole book (as he did others), Whitehead is present persistently in Deleuze's work, and today we know (and are, in fact, discovering) how deeply the formation of Deleuze's thought was influenced by Whitehead, aside from the more obvious and related "usual suspects": Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson, and (less obvious, but nevertheless equally important "philosophical rivals") Nietzsche and Kant.[27] Obviously, against all odds, Deleuze, in the 1960s, when Whitehead was virtually removed from any philosophical discourses (where he remained for the next decades), thought of Whitehead's core metaphysical piece "*Process and Reality* [as] one of the greatest books of modern philosophy."[28] The reason for Deleuze's appreciation of Whitehead in *Difference and Repetition*—his very first major work written on his own behalf!—was not so obvious (to others) and remained rather silently

present during his own journey. It was sparked by Whitehead's *radically different* "categories," i.e., his "list of empirico-ideal notions," which for Deleuze "are really open and which betray an empirical and pluralist sense of Idea."[29] This "conception of a differential Idea" in which "the nomadic distribution carried out by phantastical notions as opposed to sedentary distributions of the categories" reverses the whole "problem of [vertical] Being" into "the problem of the manner in which being is distributed among beings" in "univocity"[30]; that is, in Whitehead, as in Deleuze, becoming cannot be "represented" (or released) by vertical Being, but "happens" only as groundless *Event* of becoming.[31]

It is precisely *this* reading of Whitehead that Deleuze elaborates in the midst of his discussion of Leibniz. In this book on Leibniz, *The Fold*, the center chapter asks the question: "What is an Event?"[32] and the answer given is, surprisingly, not given via Leibniz but via Whitehead. More hidden, it appears in a Deleuzian lecture on Whitehead in a series of lectures in 1987 given at the University of Vincennes-St Denis in France—again on "the event" (*tout est événement?*).[33] While the former reinterprets the basic ingredients of Whitehead's account of the event—namely "prehension" and its related moments—by a more systematic layout of a Whiteheadian landscape of concepts, the latter enfolds "the event" in a (kind of) "creation story" that stretches back to the primordial point of the initiation of "the event" and enfolds the birth and evolution of a universe of *vibrating relations*. The starting point for these adventures in thinking *cosmology*, however, may surprise: It is the rigorous claim that "*All* is Event!" More surprisingly, Deleuze rediscovers that Whitehead's basic conviction—as is his own—is *not* based on a rationalistic metaphysics but is rooted in an *empiricist* approach. In asking the question, what we can find in our *experience*, it seeks the "conditions of real experience"[34]—that which Deleuze calls "transcendental empiricism"[35] and Whitehead captures in his "critique of pure feeling"[36] in which, in a radical reversal of Kant, his "transcendental aesthetics" come first.

To explicate the radical implications of *how*, in Whitehead, "*cette espèce de cri retentisse à nouveau: tout est événement!*" ("this sort of cry echoes anew: all is event!"), Deleuze, in his 1987 lecture, chooses an example from our mesocosmic (human) experience: the Giza pyramids.

> Toute chose, dira Whitehead, est passage de la nature. En anglais c'est "passage of nature," passage de nature. Corrigeons un peu pour retrouver Leibniz: toute chose est passage de Dieu. C'est strictement pareil. Toute chose est passage de nature. La grande pyramide est un événement, est

> même un multiplicité infinie d'événements. En quoi consiste l'événement? A la lettre toute chose est une danse d'électrons, ou bien toute chose est une variation d'un champ électro-magnétique. Voilà que nous mettons un pieds très prudent dans la physique. Par exemple, l'événement qui est la vie de nature dans la grande pyramide, hier et aujourd'hui. Il faut peut-être pressentir qu'il n'y a pas une seule grande pyramide, mais qu'il y a peut-être deux grandes pyramides. C'est ce qu'il dit dans le texte. Mais n'allons pas trop vite . . . pour le moment c'est comme ça. Voilà. Il n'y a pas de choses, il n'y a que des événements, tout est évènement.[37]

> Everything, said Whitehead, is the passage of nature. In English, it is the "passage of nature," *passage de nature*. Let's correct ourselves a little to connect with Leibniz again: Everything is a passage of God. It is strictly similar. Everything is a passage of nature. The Great Pyramid is an event, it is even a multiplicity of infinite events. Of what does the event consist? Everything, literally, is a dance of electrons, or, rather, everything is a variation of an electromagnetic field. Here let us dip our toes, carefully, into the physical. For example, the event which is the life of nature in the Great Pyramid, yesterday and today. Perhaps it is necessary to be aware that it is not the only great pyramid, but that there are perhaps two great pyramids. It is this which he spoke of in the text. But let's not go too quickly here . . . for the moment it is like that. Here it is. There are no things, there are only events, all is event.

Not very aloof from Whitehead's own example in *Concept of Nature*, namely Cleopatra's Needle in London, Deleuze, in his lecture, explores the eventfulness of *everything* as being the expression of Becoming (the "passage of nature"). It is precisely in the multiplicity of events that the event carries its patterns, and it is in the multiplicity of events that Deleuze, with Whitehead, states a *metanoetics* of the event: that there are no things with (private) attributes but only divergences and convergences of series of events. Here, the musical analogue is close to both philosophers: These series of events are *polyphone harmonies of vibrations*. Again, in line with Whitehead's *Concept of Nature*,[38] Deleuze envisions the story of creation of the universe "out of chaos" as "Chaosmos," as the dis/harmonic movement of vibrations[39]—from divergent "intersections, foldings, and limits."[40]

> Je commence à répondre en disant que ce premier stade repose sur une analyse de la vibration. Finalement au fond de l'événement il y a des vibrations. Au fond des événements actuels il y a des vibrations. Le premier stade c'était le "many," des vibrations n'importe comment, des vibrations aléatoires. Pour ceux qui connaissent Bergson, peut-être que vous vous

> rappelez la splendide fin de Matière et Mémoire, le fond de la matière est vibration et vibration de vibrations. . . . Tout est vibration. Pourquoi la vibration met-elle déjà ce début d'ordre? . . . Voilà, une vibration qui se forme dans le "many," et dès ce moment là la diversité disjonctive commence à s'organiser en séries infinies sans limite. Il faut supposer que chaque vibration a des sous-multiples, a des harmoniques à l'infini, dans le pur cosmos. Le cosmos c'était le many, c'est à dire le chaos. C'était le chaos cosmos. . . . Deuxième stade de la genèse : les séries de caractères intrinsèques et extrinsèques, elles, convergent vers des limites. Cette fois-ci on a une idée de séries convergentes. . . . C'est beau. C'est d'une très très grande beauté.
>
> I begin to respond by saying this first period rests on an analysis of vibration. Ultimately, underlying the event, there are vibrations. Underlying all actual events, there are vibrations. The first stage was the "many," the how of the vibrations is not important, the vibrations are random. For those who know Bergson, perhaps you remember the splendid conclusion of *Matter and Memory*, the foundation of the matter is vibration and the vibration of vibrations. . . . All is vibration. Why is vibration already at the beginning of order? . . . So, there is one vibration which itself forms from the "many," and in this moment the disjunctive diversity begins to organize itself in infinite series without limit. It must be supposed that each vibration has submultiples, has harmonics ad infinitum, in the pure cosmos. The cosmos is the many, that is to say, chaos. It is the chaos of the cosmos. . . . The second stage of the genesis: the series of intrinsic and extrinsic qualities converge toward the limits. This time there is an idea of convergent series . . . it is beautiful. It is a very great beauty.

With the cry "All is event!" Deleuze identifies Whitehead as one of the few philosophers—among them Nietzsche, Leibniz, Bergson, and himself—to understand the relationship between experience and reality as one that is conditioned in such a way so as to be able to account for *novelty*. To ask for "the event" is not to seek "how to attain eternity, but in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is, of creation"?[41] Three times—Deleuze says in his 1987 lecture—has the "cry for the event" been echoed through the history of philosophy: with the Stoics (which he has tackled in *The Logic of Sense*), with Leibniz (which he developed in *The Fold*), and with Whitehead. Where the Stoics, in order to introduce the event, relied on a materialism of surface-effects[42] and Leibniz remained caught in a pre-harmonization of the "compossible,"[43] Whitehead radically broke with the latter while structurally integrating the former. The Event is dis/cordant;[44] it happens

in divergent and converging series of vibrations[45] where "bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities, and discord belong to the same motley world."[46] By this dis/cordant harmonics of "polyphony"[47] the universe "rhythmically" becomes "in a great pleasure, a musical Joy of contrasting its vibrations . . . without knowing their harmonies . . . to produce something new."[48]

Performance (That Matters)

One of the important implications of this Chaosmos of vibrations is that literally nothing is excluded, and everything can and should be restated as a series of dis/harmonic vibrations: whether it be an "object" like the pyramid with its change through time, the perceiving relationship of a "subject" in it "perceiving event" with this object, or the experience of the "subject" itself in being its own "object" of perception. In all cases, the event of becoming is the process by which nothing that happens is, in its subjective/objective moments, a predicate of an underlying substrate; rather, that which becomes repeats and alters patterns, structures, or modes of existence in order to *become* what it seems to be from the outset, but only *is* by re-instantiating such patterns in new events—be it the pyramid, the perceiving Self, or the transcendental Self of Apperception. Indeed, *this* deconstruction of the pinnacle of modern philosophy and modern society—the Cartesian *ego cogito* in the form of the Kantian transcendental unity of the Self—is the "convergent vibration," i.e., the *event* in which (cosmologically for Whitehead and Deleuze and culturally and politically in Butler) the Self emerges as their "togetherness." While it would not be true to say that Whitehead and Deleuze have not used their common *metanoia* of becoming in the context of social theory and practice—as can be seen in Whitehead's *Symbolism* and *Adventures of Ideas* and Deleuze's two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*—it is of all-encompassing importance in Butler's post-structuralist–feminist thought. But exactly *how* does, in Butler, the common *metanoia* of becoming become a category of political practice?

Butler's genealogy of gender ontology is, indeed, a deconstruction of a "metaphysics of substance, and how [it] does . . . inform thinking about the category of sex."[49] Without mentioning Whitehead once, it is clear from the outset that this deconstruction of substance thinking is exactly what Whitehead was introducing seventy years earlier and can be seen as an exciting application of his metanoetics of becoming to questions of the

reconstruction not only of sex and gender, but of the metaphysics *as such* that gives rise to it. Butler's deconstructive move, however, is *not* to be understood as debilitating relativism (of which Derrida was wrongly accused) but is precisely, in Whitehead's sense, a genealogy of the becoming of the *construction* of substantialism.[50] Butler's reflection on this process reads like an adaptation of Whitehead's method of *exposing of the process of the construction* of being by becoming, of things by events, of persons by societies.

> In the first instance, humanist conceptions of the subject tend to assume a substantive person who is the bearer of various essential and nonessential attributes. A humanist feminist position might understand gender as an *attribute* of a person who is characterized essentially as a pregendered substance or "core," called a person, denoting a universal capacity for reason, moral deliberation, or language. The universal conception of the person, however, is displaced as a point of departure for a social theory of gender by those historical and anthropological positions that understand gender as a relation among socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts. . . . As a shifting and contextual phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive being, but a relative point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations.[51]

The individual, the person, the subject—they all are already *convergences* of specific sets of relations (or vibrations) and patterns of their contextual or environmental social setting. Substantial unity is, in fact, the effect of these convergent sets of patterns of repetition that, for reasons still to be named, generate the impression (or illusion) of a solid *substrate* of their own effects, thereby playing the role of "causes" of their own generation. Especially in her newer work, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, Butler addresses this social construction of the subject in precisely this way: namely, that the "substantiality" (normativity) of the effect (the subject) becomes possible only through the *exclusion* of the diversity and inconsistency of the social traits that "define" the norms of repetition (Law). It is never "one," and it is precisely not "one" in the sense that a subject can never gather itself into the "presence" of its own account without performing permutations of its constitutional multiplicity.[52]

In one of the earliest formulations of the analysis of this reversal of substantivism, Whitehead, in his *Concept of Nature*—which Deleuze adopts as the basis of his analysis of convergent sets of vibrating relations—makes an astonishing genealogical claim: that when "we speak of nature as a complex of related entities, the 'complex' is fact as an entity

for thought, to whose bare individuality is ascribed the property of embracing in its complexity the natural entities."[53] While *in experience* the complex of related events in the flux of the "passage of nature"[54] is not hypostasized in any individuality, which is (silently) reversed into its own substrate, *in thought* a process of *abstraction* generates the "individuality" of a substantive entity and interprets the complex of relations as its property. While *in experience* the complex of relations is a set of "factors" in this inexhaustibly multifarious "fact" of nature that can never be substantialized, *in thought* it becomes an

> entity [that] has been separated from the factor which is the terminus of [experience]. It has become the substratum for that factor, and the factor has been degraded into an attribute of the entity. In this way a distinction has been imported into nature which is in truth no distinction at all. A natural entity is merely a factor of fact, considered in itself. Its disconnexion from the complex of fact is a mere abstraction. It is not the substratum of the factor, but the very factor itself as bared in thought. Thus, what is a mere procedure of mind . . . has been transmuted into a fundamental character of nature.[55]

This is an early formulation of Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"[56] that attacks substantialism as taking the *abstracted* unifications of patterns, characters, and forms to be the causes, reasons, principles, and grounds of the events, which, in their becoming, *generate* them in the first place. The "concrete," however, is not another substantive abstraction *underlying* the abstractions, but a "concrescence,"[57] a *becoming* (-concrete), a *converging* of vibrating sets of relations exhibiting social patterns. If we adopt Whitehead's conception of a "functional activity," i.e., of the becoming of sets of pattered vibrations by which "every actual thing is something by reason of its activity whereby its nature consists in its relevance to other things, and its individuality consists in its synthesis of other things so far as they are relevant to it,"[58] then for this social and environmental view of becoming there are no substances with properties, but only events with patterns.[59] The consequence is that

> With this conception of the world, in speaking of any actual individual, such as a human being, we must mean that man in one occasion of his experience. Such an occasion, or act, is complex and therefore capable of analysis into phases and other components. It is the most concrete actual entity, and the life of man from birth to death is a historic route of such occasions. These concrete moments are bound together into one society

> by a partial identity of form, and by the peculiarly full summation of its predecessors which each moment of the life-history gathers into itself.[60]

It is precisely this *social reconstruction* of substantive claims to articulate the preconditions of becoming in which Butler is interested.[61] Where Whitehead attacks *thought*, which is only an effect of social feelings, as the medium of substantialization (and hence as the medium of a substantive reversal), Butler's subversive deconstruction unmasks the *ego cogito* as the final effect (or abstraction) of a logocentric, i.e., phallogocentric, process of patriarchal abstraction from the contextual sets of patterns.[62] And where Whitehead deconstructs society as "self-sustaining," whereby it is "its own reason,"[63] Butler deconstructs this "reason" as a (phallogocentric) rationalization of exclusions that constitute oppressive unifications of power.[64] "Personal identity," then, is "assured through stabilizing concepts" that guarantee the "gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined." Its critique is not so much based on a reconstruction of the "question of what internal feature of a person established the continuity or self-identity of the person through time," but to "what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute identity."[65]

The problem of substantialism, in the early Butler, shifts from a more time-related, *diachronic* identity to a space-related, *synchronic* identity of social construction (although, as we will see, both cannot be abstracted from the other): *stabilization of identity is a social process of repetitive inheritance*—it is its *performance*.[66] In her later work, however, Butler explores precisely this *diachronic* construction of performance further by analyzing the *synchronic* construction as nothing but an *exclusory movement* of the diachronic multiplicity of the traits that feed into the present performance. And when the "narrative authority of the 'I' must give way to the perspective and temporality of the set of norms that contrast the singularity of my story,"[67] the "narrative 'I' effectively adds to the story every time it tries to speak."[68] The opaqueness of the present subject in its account of itself, that is, its inability to gather itself to a unit of presence, *is* its performance of the *shifting* rules it instantiates and negates at the same time.

For all three philosophers, the mark of "de-substantialization" is the dismissal of any *pre-formative unity*—be it as a substrate with *private properties*, be it as a subject with *natural identity*. Their pro/found (from *pro/fond*, "before the bottom," bottomless) non-essentialism interprets unity and identity always as a process of *their* becoming in which a multiplicity is unified but *never* gains static unity. The illusion of such unity arises from

the socially stabilizing mechanism of structural integrity that *establishes* itself as the reason for the process of unification in *erasing* the *story* of its own becoming, its genealogy. All three philosophers may tell different stories of their generation or, at least, will tell it differently, but they agree on the deconstruction of the One (in which guise ever) as based on Multiplicity. The regulative power of this unity, in which it becomes seemingly primordial, substantial, causal, natural—in opposition to consequent, predicative, effective, and cultural—hides in the language of the "original" of which everything is a mere copy. Deleuze discusses a denaturalization of the original in his account of *simulacra*,[69] Whitehead in his rejection of the Platonic theory of the World-Soul,[70] and Butler in the refutation of "the *idea* of the natural and original."[71] For all three, the important insight is that the productive process of becoming is a process of re-instantiation of what is not given before or without this repetitive process. For Deleuze, there is no return of the Same but only "repetition in the eternal return [that] is the for-itself of the difference."[72] There is no *resemblance* between idea and instantiation but only instantiations of difference in repetition. Hence, for Butler, there is no "hetero-sexual original" so that the "gay is to the straight not as copy is to the original, but rather, as copy is to copy."[73]

In their deconstruction, categories and fixed differentiations, used to orientate or to exercise power, become fluent (again); they become what Deleuze with Whitehead names conditions of *real* experience and (transcendental) conditions of *novelty*, instead being fixed conditions of all possible experiences and, hence, (transcendental) conditions of the eternal. Most importantly, for Butler, all fixed differences, e.g., the heterosexual difference, are not "natural" (based on an original) as opposed to "cultural" (contingently conditioned) but always are *stabilizing naturalizations* of prescriptive processes of the erasure of becoming by (powers of) being. With this insight, the metanoetics of becoming turns into politically subversive and creative practice. Here, Whitehead's "historic route of occasions" with its inherited "generic character"[74]—naturalized as "substantial form"[75]—and Deleuze's repetitive differentiation become Butler's practice of a "parodic repetition of 'the original.'"[76] The naturalized form is subversively actualized in explicitly actualizing its inheritance as genealogical *performance* of its discontinuity. Where gender is

> the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being[, a] political genealogy of gender ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of

> gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of gender.[77]

In order to "expose the contingent acts that create the appearance of a naturalistic necessity,"[78] Butler uses the acts of phallogocentric instantiation of substance and essence subversively against themselves: as performance of parody, masquerade, and drag.[79] Deconstructing substance as patterns of inheritance, as forms of repetitive becoming, is to understand the process of becoming *as* performance and the conscious *performing* of this performative character of becoming as subversive acts of practices of deconstruction.[80] Where "acts, gestures, and desires produce the effect of an internal core or substance," such "acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are *performative* in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are *fabrications* manufactured and sustained."[81] In "*imitating gender*," e.g., in drag, the imitation (simulacrum, copy of copies) "*implicitly reveals the imitative character of gender itself—as well as its contingency.*"[82] Because they are *effects of contingency*, however, they can be actualized in reversing the intention of reifying (i.e., naturalizing) so that they reveal themselves as "*corporeal style*, an "act," as it were, that is both intentional and performative, where "*performative*" suggests a dramatic and contingent constitution of meaning."[83] The "*appearance of substance*," then, "is precisely *that*, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment" that allows for subversive dramatization in which gender transformation becomes possible because there is no "substantial ground of identity" but only "arbitrary relation between such acts." Performance implies "the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formation, or a parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction."[84]

Disintegration (Grand In/humanism 1)

Where Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler meet in this way, i.e., in pro/found becoming, they perform a powerful critique of humanism.[85] Where Whitehead's "critique of abstractions" like the Same, the Subject, and (personal) Identity, Deleuze's affirmation of "Difference *in itself*"[86] prior to any resemblance of the Same, and Butler's performative deconstruction of (gendered) Identity intersect, instead of privileging human nature, experience, or status (in the cosmos, against nature), they seek the *becoming* of human being.[87] While Heidegger's *Dasein* is the "place" of the *Lichtung*

of Being (and nowhere else), while phenomenology is the interpretation of human experiences, while existentialism understands itself as humanism, and while analytic philosophy presupposes the question of epistemology by privileging human existence, the three philosophers—and with them much of process, structuralist, and post-structuralist thought—have gone far beyond.[88] In a way, they reside in a new "open space" as it was de/fined (i.e., de/limited) by Nietzsche's "cry" that God is dead and, in consequence, that *humanitas qua humanitas* is dead.[89] The "cry of the event" seems to echo this dual death and to define a vanishing point for humanism.

Indeed, the post-structuralist's "death of the subject"[90] lingers in the thought of Deleuze and Butler or, as in Whitehead, is its consequence: Foucault's reconstructions of the genealogy of modern subjectivity as social constructs of power;[91] Lyotard's end of modern metadiscourses (or meta-story) that legitimizes the human priority;[92] Althusser's end of history as a process of human subjects[93] or Baudrillard's end of the illusion of "the end" itself as subjective remainder;[94] Derrida's end of a "metaphysics of presence," which always comes as metaphysics of (human) subjectivity, of mastery and control over Being,[95] or Žižek's end of ideology, which creates the subject it controls.[96] And in Derrida's account of Heidegger's letter to Jean Beaufret, "On Humanism," the appeal to humanism—as based on modern subjectivity—leads directly to racism, totalitarianism, Nazism, and fascism.[97]

If we follow the metanoetics of becoming of Butler, Deleuze, and Whitehead, we will find plenty of proof of such a *grand in/humanism*: the disruption of human sovereignty, the social construction of subjectivity, the implicit or explicit criticism of a "metaphysics of presence," the deconstruction of subjective independence, the subjective formation out of logocentric and phallocentric control, and the important political implication of resistance against any kind of totalitarianism. But this "in/humanism" has to be circumscribed carefully as a genealogical critique of the *natural integrity* of the (human) Subject.[98]

In Butler's attack on the natural integrity of the subject, it is the self-erasing process of the "naturalization" of cultural regulations she unravels under the self-perpetuating self-substantiations of the Subject. And it is because of the *performativity* of subjectivity that Butler disregards even that feminist account of political action that "has nevertheless assumed that there is a 'doer' behind the deed"[99] and, thereby, assumes a given (even natural) unity of the category of "woman" for such actions, generating the illusion of a politics that could be based on the abstraction of a unified

"representation" of "women."[100] Such feminist accounts would still operate under the presumption of a humanism of the *ego cogito*, the sovereign subject with its independent Reason, which, in Butler's analysis, is just another name for the Phallus/Logos that reigns because of the *exclusion* of the female.

The mechanism, however, by which this disguised *givenness* of Being-a-Subject is implemented, is not easily overturned by the *knowledge* of its performativity and by strategically creating contextual-transformative *actions* that follow from unmasking its cultural contingency. In "following Foucault," Butler understands "power as forming the subject"[101] in such a way that there is never a power-free state or an utopian " 'before,' 'outside,' or 'beyond.' "[102] In revising the danger of an "occasional voluntarism" of her "view of performativity"[103] in her early *Gender Trouble*, she later—e.g., in *The Psychic Life of Power*—recognizes even more that the performative power of transformation is not self-styled in ever-new "self-inventions" of gender. On the contrary, it only works through the process of *self-negation*, which is always in danger of not liberating from the oppressive powers of society, but destroying the *very existence* of the society for which the transformation of human subjectivity was introduced in the first place. If the life of the psyche, for Butler, is essentially the *subjection* to the suppressive powers of a society that hides its own contingency of the play of powers behind Reason, Logos, and the Law, then the human subject is always the outcome of this subjection. If it is the power "that first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, [that] assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject's self-identity,"[104] then the subject in its performativity is itself "the effect of subordination."[105]

In *this* dialectic the subject-being is, at the same time, the *condition* of its own subjection to oppressive powers *and* its *effect*, creating the very self-identity from which (through its self-perpetuation) the powers of subjection gain their force.[106] This marks the grand in/humanism, as can be seen in Butler's conversations with Foucault, Lacan, and Žižek. Human subjectivity always is trapped in the paradox of its own existence—namely, to be based on the very powers that oppress it in creating it. Human culture, even in its form of subversive transformation, is only possible as the exclusion of its constituting factors in the hiding of its own becoming and in the perpetuation of its own continuity. There is something that *must be excluded* to allow for human existence—"the Real"—and it haunts and threatens to destroy it at the same time.[107]

In surprising ways, Deleuze and Whitehead enter this picture of the inhuman dialectic of power. Deleuze's analysis of a fluent medium of constructive powers that create subjects of human self-identity—but always only in its process of self-destruction—comes very much to the same conclusion. In *Anti-Oedipus*, this inhuman medium appears, e.g., as the *Capital*,[108] as the unproductive fluid of self-production, as the "full body without organs"[109] that, instead of arising with its productive organs/organisms, works in the mode of "inscription"[110] by which that which is produced but is itself "unproductive" is given a productive energy—*from which* the becomings seem to be granted their own *productive origin* of becoming. The "*full* body without organs" is "the Real" that has to be fulfilled and excluded at the same time. It creates and destroys its subjects by subjection and foreclosure.

Whitehead's social view of becoming, on the other hand, is readily predisposed to harbor the same implications. Although his performative view of series of becoming is mostly used to deconstruct "identity" as the substantial continuity of what is really vibrating patterns of repetitive perpetuation, his understanding of societies of occasions of repetition is precisely about the social influence that initiates the becoming of new repetitive events of such societies.[111] As with Butler's internalization of social norms and their rationalizing, regulatory power, which creates the human subjects in their identity, Whitehead's occasions rise out of their *internalized inheritance of social norms*.[112] Human societies then, which do not allow for a performative deconstruction of their modes of inheritance (of instinct and reflex), will create *conforming* (subjected) subjects as their expression.[113]

Even if the performative character of this process of becoming-society is realized, its recognition does not lead to any utopian liberation from social inheritance and repetition of oppressive norms. To the contrary, *because*, for Whitehead, subjects are not *constructive* of their own conditions (as he saw Kant assuming), but are *constructed* by the "objective data" when they "pass into subjective satisfaction,"[114] this leads him to a very disturbing conclusion: subjection—although in its contents arbitrarily inherited—is *necessary*, because "a persistent community of persistent organisms" can only perpetuate and, hence, exist as society over time, through "the environmental influence in the shape of instinct"[115]—the pressure of inheritance. On the other hand, any "major advances in civilization are processes which all but wreck the societies in which they occur."[116] The very process of stabilizing that creates the substantialized human subject allows it to exist and, at the same time, hinders its liberation

from subjection because its liberation would destroy its own basis of existence. Where "individual springs of action . . . escape from the obligations of social conformity" the "decay of secure instinctive response" has to be replaced by "various intricate forms of symbolic expression," creating new forms of "imperative . . . conformation."[117]

For Whitehead, too, there is no utopian outside to this trap: *Symbolism* mediates subjection as subject-forming. While the powers of inheritance allow for the perpetuation of a society (identity-formation, stabilization, naturalization), they always fall back on instinctive or reflexive internalizations of these powers, thereby creating human subjects in their substantiated form. To destroy, or to liberate from, these powers of subject-formation means to destroy the "common symbolism" that was "leading to common actions for usual purposes" so that such a "society can only save itself from dissolution by means of a reign of terror."[118]

In consequence, the grand in/humanism of all three thinkers, if it undermines a human ability to act on human identity, does so not by *destruction* but by laying free the *conditions* for reconstruction and political resistance against the inhumane consequences of humanism. The genealogical "method" does not destroy *what is* (the being of the subject), but it deconstructs it in *how* it *comes to be* (the becoming of subjection); it reveals the mechanisms the humanist subject *implies* to generate its being (substantiation) and the powers it exploits to *hide* its own becoming in order to reach and sustain a "perfect" integrity and a "total" integrality. The *disclosure* of becoming in the metanoetics of Butler, Deleuze, and Whitehead *itself* is a reserve for transforming being, subjectivity, and undeconstructed humanism. Their grand in/humanism is not the expression of the waste of human existence *as such* and the proclamation of post-human existence *per se* but the deconstruction of the destructive powers of undeconstructed subjectivity as long as its performative construction remains hidden. Performing its "disintegration," however, sets its mechanisms into the context of their own *contingency*, allowing us to act on its hidden demands for "natural" (necessary) perpetuation.

Transgression (Grand In/humanism 2)

> The fundamental gesture of poststructuralism is to deconstruct every substantial identity, to denounce behind its solid consistency an interplay of symbolic overdetermination—briefly, to dissolve the substantial identity into a network of non-substantial, differential relations.[119]

Following Žižek's account of the post-structuralist deconstruction of the human subject, we must ask whether this "method" is only to apply to cultural, social, and psychological reconstructions of in/humanism or whether it also must be said of its ontological constitution. If, with Butler, there is a mutual determination of both the cultural deconstruction of ontology as the mode of application of in/humanism and of the ontological implications of such a deconstruction *itself*,[120] we will understand that the grand in/humanism also appears as the deconstruction of *human privileges in the chaosmic environment* of which human subjectivity becomes just another expression. Although generally beyond Butler's interest, this environmental reconstruction of subjectivity within a chaosmic milieu is most important to Deleuze and Whitehead. If the Chaosmos, for both, is the (musical) play of (self)-constructing complexities of vibrating patterns that, at a certain point, allow also for human subjectivity to appear, this process of complexification is also the *performative* "ground" of human existence. In other words, the chaosmic dis/harmonies of construction *permeate* human subjectivity *totally* and without reserve. Human subjectivity is in environmental "continuity" with that which—seen from its interior substantiation—seems to be its excluded exterior: "women," "nature," the "perverse," the "other," the "ape," "matter," "stardust." And the reduction of the excluded exterior to "the Other" (of pure form, immaterial soul, social normality, heterosexual difference) is nothing but another form of the mechanism of the excluded "Real" (= grand in/humanism 1).

Alain Badiou's criticism of this post-structuralist (and process) account of the death of the human(ist) subject, however, postulates this move to be extremely unfortunate because it equals the loss of two human abilities that define *humanitas*. First, post-structuralist accounts of the human subject are unable to ascribe *unity* and *identity* to human action, which would allow for decisions to be accurate on a human level. Second, because of missing identity, post-structuralist accounts of the human subject are unable to establish (or regain) an ethical profile because that would presuppose or imply an *agent* of activity, *able* to act. Both inabilities together—so the accusation—are based on another insufficiency: namely, that the categories employed to conceptualize *especially* human subjectivity are merged with a *general* ontology, which then is exactly unable to differentiate human subjects from a general background.[121] In other words, deconstructive in/humanism cannot account for (or, even more, erase) the *uniqueness* of human subjectivity while its recognition is used to undermine it.[122] But isn't this criticism exactly *presupposing* a substantial human subject?

In the chaosmic world of Deleuze and Whitehead, there is neither a pre-stabilized harmony hinting at any human exteriority from (or superiority to) the process of becoming nor any exceptions to its continuous transformation but only "divergent series" of "endlessly tracing bifurcating paths."[123] This "becoming," in their eyes, "does not occur in the imagination, even when the imagination reaches the highest cosmic or dynamic level" of human subjects and societies. "Becomings . . . are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real."[124] They are the "stuff" human imagination is made of, and everything else for that matter. But since becoming "produces nothing other than itself,"[125] *everything is in the process of becoming*—"Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible."[126] For both, the Chaosmos is the becoming of becomings; it is "a process, and . . . the process is the becoming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures"[127] of their own becoming. Becoming is a matter of "alliance"[128] or "concrescence"—"the production of novel togetherness"[129]—of multiplicities of becomings, which "is the domain of *symbiosis* that brings into play being of totally different scales and kingdoms"[130] to create ever-new and ever-shifting convergences of becomings—no matter *what* we think it is.[131]

In Deleuze, this horizontal transgression of becoming radically amounts to a "non-difference" of domains: of inside and outside, of body and soul, of "I (*Moi*)" and the Other—all speak univocal—with the "one" voice of becoming![132] All becoming is but a transversal, vibrating shift pictured as "*plica ex plica*,"[133] as process of infinite "folding, unfolding, refolding."[134] With "folds" there is the fluency between intensities and extensities, subjects and objects, space and extension,[135] *chronos* and *aion*.[136] The fold creates an inside that is nothing but a folded outside and vice versa—the universe as origami.[137] Hence, Deleuze's fluent concepts between biology (rhizome) and physics (multiplicity),[138] mathematics (manifold)[139] and music (polyphony),[140] concept and event,[141] human cognition and vibrating fields of elementary particles, Mandelbrot[142] and Whitehead.[143] He embraces them all in order to address the *becoming multiplicities* that represent the cut through all levels and areas of division of the Chaosmos.[144]

> Thus packs, multiplicities, continually transform themselves into each other, cross over into each other. Werewolves become vampires when they die. This is not surprising, since becoming and multiplicity are the same thing. A multiplicity is not defined by its elements, nor by a center of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it

> has. . . . Since its variations and dimensions are immanent to it, *it amounts to the same thing to say that each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities, according to its thresholds and doors*.[145]

From technological to musical and maritime expressions, from mathematical to physical and aesthetical instantiations, multiplicities *are* what becomes,[146] without ever reaching being beyond becoming.[147] In their *mutability of becoming*, multiplicities form a univocity of voices beyond, before, and under any singled-out humanity, which, in its isolation, is just misplaced substance, a substantialized transcendent objectification of its vibrating pattern *as if* it were the transcendent cause of its becoming.[148]

The same *transgression* between subject and object, matter and form, inside and outside, intensity and extensity, time and space, as it appears in Deleuze, is at work in Whitehead.[149] Moreover, as Deleuze notes in his 1987 lecture, this reconstruction of every-thing as expressions of a vibrating Chaosmos of event-relations (prehensions) is precisely what makes Whitehead "*un grand philosophe, un philosophe de génie*" ("a great philosopher, a genius philosopher").[150] Like Deleuze's "fold," Whitehead's concept of "prehension" and the process of the "concrescence of prehensions" name exactly this fluent relation of inside and outside, subject and object, space and time, *in their becoming* because becomings "involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each other" by which they create a "particular fact of togetherness among actual entities [that] is called a 'nexus'" of which all "else is, for our experience, derivative abstraction."[151]

> A prehension reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity: it is referent to an external world, and in this sense will be said to have a "vector character"; it involves emotion, and purpose, and valuation, and causation.[152]

It is the transversal vector of the *How* of the relatedness of matter and form, efficacious and final causation, physics and mentality, cause and aim, body and soul, individuality and sociality, events and things, human subjectivity and stones, personal identity and the chaosmic environment, inheritance and novelty—all enveloped in a process of mutual transformation into one another. In Deleuze's appropriation, we could say that *prehension* is the *folding activity* of the Chaosmos *itself*.[153] And, as in Deleuze, the prehensive process expresses all elements and categories involved in being *actual* only *univocally*.

> "Actual entities"—also termed "actual occasions"—are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to

> find anything [28] more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.[154]

Indeed, both philosophers deconstruct human subjectivity as *domains* of becoming in a complex process of environments, all following and creating their own rules, thresholds and doorways, in which they differ only *gradually*, but not essentially, *diffusely* (moving into one another) and not definitely (creating independent realms). While they congregate on different levels and in different regions, the nexus/strings of symbiotic/concrescent multiplicities of this chaosmic landscape are in constant transformation into one another. No wonder that for Deleuze and Whitehead the folds of the soul and that of matter do not fall apart in different ontological realms; anti-dualistically, they are not expressions of substantial forms, but of nexuses/series of complex events of congregated multiplicities. They are not independent (either from other individual instantiations or any "other" of it), but only differently arranged. Their difference is not based on a universal sanctification of human *uniqueness* (in the universe)—sanctioned by God or the Absolute Spirit or the Final Aim of the Universe—but only the wonder of infinite permutations of *diversity*.[155]

In their reconstructing of human uniqueness as part and parcel of the chaosmic nexus of societies of events and of chaosmic strings of becoming multiplicities, both Whitehead and Deleuze are neither interested in a dualistic division of human subjectivity from a per se meaningless world (which they both attack) nor in an ethical reduction of human being to stones but in reformulating the *transcendental conditions* of the *becoming* of human subjectivity, identity and agency.[156] Substantiality of identity, endurance of agency, and the independent incurvature of self-reflection—all this *sameness* without difference "with its permanent characteristics is exactly the irrelevant answer to the problem which life presents. That problem is, How can there be originality?"[157] If it is about *novelty*, then the transformative continuity of human subjectivity, identity and agency is not associated with permanence anymore but with *intensity*. If Chaosmos has a "purpose," for Deleuze and Whitehead it lies in "the evocation of intensities. The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end."[158]

In "seeking intensity, and not preservation,"[159] "the answer [that] explains how the soul [i.e., identity and agency] need be no more original

than a stone" *reverses* Badiou's accusation: Whitehead's and Deleuze's grand in/humanism is *not* an integration of human agency and identity into a common ontology that results in their disappearance. On the contrary, Whitehead's and Deleuze's *genealogy of becoming-human* is a dissolution of a privileging (logocentric) distinction and a liberation of the becoming of multiplicity from its bondage to humanism with its undisclosed presuppositions of a *common ontology of substantialism*.[160] While this ontology is structured due to its inherent dualism and totalitarianism that leads to the disappearance of human uniqueness in chaosmic diversity, the genealogy of becoming acts upon chaosmically mediated novelty and intensity. This grand in/humanism is about *becoming multiple*,[161] *becoming minor*,[162] and *becoming discoercive* or "persuasive."[163] This is the in/humanism with which Deleuze and Whitehead fight *any form of totalitarianism* implicit in any undeconstructed humanism of (dualistically) distinct, pre-given human unity and causally effective agency.

Finally, their disintegralism is not unrelated to Butler's *performability*. In her account of the "liberating" effect of the performance of sexual difference, she draws on all forms of performed transgression of gender fixation through strategic essentialism, citation, parody, masquerade, and drag in order to release the *discontinuity* and *contingency* of the substantial fixations. In consequence of Whitehead and in line with Deleuze, Butler encourages us to perform "subversive body acts" that not only uncover the "contingent groundlessness" of any substantiations of human subjectivity, pre-given identity, and free-willed agency, but *enact* the "arbitrary relation between such acts"[164] in order to de-form their repetition in a variety of disintegrating ways.

Contingency (of the Law)

At this point, we face a tension inherent in both modes of in/humanism. While Butler is facing the problem of the *trap* of *exclusion* within the phallogocentric law, which has no outside, before, or beyond, Deleuze and Whitehead have to cope with the accusation of utopianism by tapping into resources *not bound* by the *substantializing* Law. Indeed, both sides may draw on different aspects of the process of substantiation because the "normative force of performativity—its power to establish what qualifies as 'being'—works not only through reiteration, but through exclusion as well."[165] They all may agree on the *genealogical* strategy to uncover *the eraser of becoming* in the being of the law, but they disagree on the *status* of

a Beyond that is not (just) part of the law. While Butler—in Lacan's and Foucault's lore—tends to understand the Beyond as a *negation* or *lack*, based on the concept of "exclusion";[166] Whitehead and Deleuze—with Derrida—tend to interpret it as an untapped *plenitude* of multiplicity of becoming-otherwise (only hindered by reiteration).

Yet, things are not that easy, and there is a hidden "transgression" between these views: Whitehead and Deleuze know of the mechanisms of "exclusion" of becoming that allows substantialism to prevail; Butler, on the other hand, undermines her Kafkaesque trap with the very "performability" of the Law that cannot totally erase its own becoming (out of which it is generated) but that in its "foreclosure" always draws on the chaotic element of "contingency" that it excludes. We could say it this way: While Butler is more apt to believe in the power of "cosmos" (*logos*/law/phallus) to *create* the *phantasmagoria* of a Beyond, Deleuze and Whitehead believe more in the powers of chaos always to *effectively* undermine the Law and give way to unpreformed novelty.

In light of the metanoetics of becoming to *deregulate* substance/*logos*/phallus *effectively*, the question is, is the law one of exclusion, negation, and lack, out of which it gains its "omnipotent" power to silence its contingency—which it then sells as a dangerous chaos—or is this law itself a contingent variation of (substantialized) harmonies of a chaotic background? And even if the law is the exclusion of its chaotic underside (its becoming, its contingency, its genealogy), is the Beyond its creature or its fate? And "what" is this Beyond anyway? Is it a name for the ever-excluded, the no-thing beyond any symbolism (of language, the text, the process of signification)? *Must* this Beyond, then, *remain* ever-unnamable (ever beyond the text)—as in Derrida's and Irigaray's account of Plato's *khora*[167]—or is it a *resource* for the metanoetics of becoming (disintegrating and transgressing)—as in Kristeva's account the *khora*?[168] And how do Butler, Deleuze, and Whitehead account for this Beyond of the law of symbolization? A basis for addressing this question may be that all three philosophers are engaged in a deregulation of the law by uncovering and acting upon its *radical contingency* underpinned by a hallmark of their "post-structuralism": namely, by the invocation of a *beyond* of structure. Deregulation is *to face* the fear of the Beyond, to *interfere* in the Symbolic with its Beyond, and to *cut lose* its chaotic multiplicity to appear as the law's "real" contingency.

For Butler, this *engagement* in the Beyond is bound to her Foucaultian heritage of the "discursive production of the subject,"[169] on which the

process of the subjection under the law is based because it creates subjective/substantive identity in the first place.[170] It is a highly unstable process that can never reach "perfect" identity due to the psychoanalytic conviction she shares with Lacan, that this identity is based on an *exclusion of the unbearable* that, nevertheless, always haunts and "defines" the Symbolic in its perpetuation and its danger to fall apart. In Lacan's words of the Third Lecture of *Les Psychoses*: "What is refused in the symbolic order returns in the real."[171] In the symbolic discourse, there is always an "imperative" at work that "requires and institutes a 'constitutive outside'—the unspeakable, the unviable, the nonnarrativizable that secures and, hence, fails to secure the very border of materiality." Identity is *impossible* because it is "the consequence of a set of exclusions which found the very subject whose identities [that it is] supposed to . . . represent."[172] This Beyond is "the Real," the excluded, the exclusion of that which creates (symbolic) "reality" (of signification) and, at the same time, guards the threshold to the symbolic order.[173] Butler agrees with Lacan and Žižek that "the 'subject' is produced in language through an act of foreclosure (*Verwerfung*). What is refused or repudiated in the formation of the subject continues to determine that subject."[174] She departs from Žižek, however, in her insistence on the *contingency* not only of the "Law of the Father" as a "universal principle"[175] but of the law that guards the *border* between the symbolic Law and the nonsymbolic Real.[176] In her view, it cannot be fixed; it is unstable and can only be accounted for as a Beyond that is *multiplicity*.

> To claim that there is an "outside" to the socially intelligible, and that this "outside" will always be that which negatively defines the social . . . *seems right, but to supply the character and content to a law that secures the border between the "inside" and the "outside" of symbolic intelligibility is to preempt the specific social and historic analysis that is required, to conflate into "one" law the effect of a convergence of many, and to preclude the very possibility of a future rearticulation of that boundary which is the central democratic project that Žižek, Laclau, and Mouffe promote*.[177]

Although Butler believes with Žižek that "the Real" is produced by the law of exclusion—even in its utopian dimension (its "promise")—Žižek symbolizes its *border* with the "Law of the Father" *with* a law that guards "the Real" from being symbolized. Ironically, in Butler's view, this border-guarding "law" represents a *culturally, invariantly universally necessary exclusion* that allows for human societies to rise in the first place—namely, the "threat of castration." It is understood as "producing the 'lack' against which all symbolization occurs. And yes, this very symbolization of the

law as the law of castration is not taken as a contingent ideological formulation."[178] In doing so, Žižek builds "the Real" not only on a *male-dominated exclusion* (castration), but on the *silent* exclusion of the female per se (which cannot be castrated and hence is not symbolized), whereby he also installs "the Real" as the basis for a new phallocentric gender hierarchy. In presupposing this border-guarding law to be universally non-negotiable, the "one" law excludes renegotiations and future inclusions.[179] This is the reason that she contests Žižek's repudiation of the post-structuralist account of a more *contingent* engagement of the Beyond.

> Žižek begins his critique of what he calls "poststructuralism" through the invocation of a certain kind of matter; a "rock" or a "kernel" that not only resists symbolization and discourse, but is precisely what poststructuralism, in his account, itself resists and endeavors to "dissolve."[180]

In other words, while Žižek seems to reintroduce the excluded "negation" as a "rock," i.e., as a "substance"[181] of universal persistence, Butler's insight is that a radical *contingency* of the law of the Symbolic can be postulated only as long as there is the possibility of a *multiplicity of fluent exclusions*! If Žižek is right to detect the post-structuralist tendency to "dissolve" any fixed, law-like border between the law and its Beyond, it is precisely *this* "dissolving" view of the Beyond as *multiple folds of transgression* between the Symbolic and the Real that binds Butler to the chaosmic fluency of the Beyond in Deleuze and Whitehead.

Nevertheless, in order to avoid the short circuit of conflating Butler with Deleuze and Whitehead, we have to name another form of the invocation of the Beyond of which Butler is critical: that of the *khora* as it is found in Derrida, Irigaray, and Kristeva. For Irigaray, Plato's (the father of philosophy's) *khora*—although beyond any category, any opposition (of sexes), hierarchy (of gender) and analogue—came to be seen as *the* "excluded Real," not as (guided by the) law of castration but as "a substitution for and displacement of the feminine."[182] The whole process of thought, then, was based on this exclusion of the *female;* exclusion of the female as the "unspeakable condition" that "can never be figured within the terms of philosophy proper"[183] but remains always haunted by it. For Butler, three augmentations of this claim have to be made. First, Irigaray herself realized that Plato situated the *khora* as a *limit beyond any symbolization*, the pure outside, so that even his commonly used analogues of "mother," "foster-mother," "receptivity" (awaiting fertilization), and (female) "space" (of fertilization)—stereotypes of female identification—must *not* be taken as symbolizations of the *khora* herself. She

remains beyond. She is a pure limit of negation, basically lacking any positive symbolization at all.[184] Second, it was Aristotle, and not Plato, as Butler notes, who used "matter" as a principle of embodiment, in a sense that again leads to the exclusion of the female/mater/matter as the passive formless, expecting the fertilizing (male) form. Plato, however, never used "matter" for the *khora* so as to make her the opposite of form/male and, at the same time the irrational "outside" of the *logos*/phallus.[185] That, however, makes *khora*, in Irigaray's and Butler's eyes, "sterile"[186] and unable to account for embodiment at all.[187] Third, Derrida's interpretation of the *khora* as "surname" of *différance* reinforces the two points: that the *khora* is (absolutely) beyond the Symbolic (discourse, the text) as a *limit*, and it cannot be identified with the excluded female.[188]

This is the basis for Butler's criticism of Kristeva's important interpretation of the *khora* as the nonsymbolic "semiotic."[189] Against Lacan, Kristeva knows of a realm of nonsymbolic, breaking through the *fixed* post-structuralist norm of the strict "discursivity" and "textuality" of all "reality" (beyond which there is only silence or the "the Real").[190] Breaking through the norm of a *strict* limit, which can be approached *only* negatively, she understands this semiotic realm as "that original libidinal multiplicity"[191] of the not-yet-united (suppressed) forces of desires and drives of the motherly body that gives birth to humanity.[192] And it *can* be approached by the disintegration of the *poetic* as it breaks into the symbolic realm of (excluding) consistency.[193] For Butler, this amounts to a violation of her three augmentations: a re-symbolization of the semiotic, an essentialism of the identification with the essence of the female, and a stretching of the strictly negative limit to a field of forces.[194] In a Whiteheadian and Deleuzian context, however, it is interesting that Kristeva's *khora* is *not* created by the symbolic law—it has "an ontological status prior to the paternal law"[195]—but conversely, the law is the expression of a lack: the loss of the free-flowing desires and the impossibility of fulfilling the desire to reunite with the primordial motherly body. Because this desire can *never* be fulfilled, it creates the realm of the Symbolic (language, culture, gender) as its substitute. But the "irrepressible heterogeneity of multiple sounds and meanings" that breaks through with the "plurivocity of poetic language"[196] for Kristeva, holds the boundary between the semiotic and the Symbolic *fluent* where "the semiotic disrupts its signifying process through elision, repetition, mere sound, and the multiplication of meaning through indefinitely signifying images and metaphors."[197]

This is a dilemma: On the one hand, Butler does not follow Žižek's fixation of the border between Symbolic and "the Real" because it violates

the radical contingency of the law and installs a new law guarding this border,[198] which again cannot be theorized without being "compelled to refuse or cover over that which it seeks to explain."[199] Therefore, it must *fluently be negotiated*! On the other hand, being beyond all Symbolic, "the Real" must remain a strict negative limit of symbolization because any signification would violate its function of constitutive exclusion on which the Symbolic is based. It cannot be understood even as "resistance against symbolization" because that would "institute a permanently unsatisfiable desire for an ever elusive referent."[200] Both interests contradict one another. Kristeva, however, in engaging the Beyond as *khora*, answers this dilemma differently. While she highlights the contingency of the Law and its border to the excluded with *the multiplicity of the semiotic*, she consequently envisions a "space" of negation instead of an absolute limit that, although it is still the excluded, now is a *force field of foreclosed desires*. It seems to be this direction of thought that not only divides Butler from Kristeva, but also unites Kristeva, more than Butler, with Deleuze and Whitehead. However, what divides Butler from both Deleuze and Whitehead is another important thesis: that the negativity of the excluded is to be interpreted as a *lack of fulfilled desire*—and not as a hidden *plenitude of intensities*.[201]

Pure Affirmation (Chaosmic Deregulation 1)

Deleuze's and Whitehead's interpretation of the realm of *khora* not only differs from Butler's account of a normative performativity of becoming—namely "being" as *negation* of becoming through reiteration and exclusion—but also from Kristeva's account in this *one* important point: It is *not* a lack. It is neither a negation nor a lack! Rather, it is the "space" of a *chaosmic multiplicity* that is always in the process of becoming, or better, *is* the *process of becoming*. For both Deleuze and Whitehead, the deregulation of the law has its resource in the unsurpassable, insuppressible, and primordial *immanence of the Chaotic* in the cosmos of order, which it always exceeds, feeds, and reverses *at the same time*. The "mechanisms" that fuse being out of becoming *and* that deregulate being into becoming are *conflicting* as in Butler, Lacan, Žižek, and Kristeva, but it is a *different* co-creative conflict. It is *not* the haunting of the excluded that forces into reiteration (and suspends it at the same time); it is *not* negation that builds identity and destroys it; it is *not* unfulfilled desire that establishes the Symbolic and undermines it at the same time; it is *not* the Law that creates its

outside and is endangered by it at the same time. It is this *performability of becoming* itself that in being radically contingent generates the illusion of "substance" by *repetition*—reiterating difference into a resemblance in the Same—*whereby* it performs an *exclusion* of its own contingency. It is through *the same affirmation* of this performative process that becoming sediments into being *and* deteriorates into becoming. The "movement[s] of the negative and of exclusion"[202] are nothing but secondary phenomena to this performativity if they are disclaimed at all.

It is not that Deleuze doesn't know of the "power of negativity" (which he has studied in Hegel), and it is not that Deleuze was not informed of psychoanalytic theories of repression, desire, and lack (as is obvious with his *Anti-Oedipus*);[203] rather, by following Bergson and Nietzsche, he *directly* attacks both of them as life-negating procedures.[204] The power of negation (and negation of negation), for Deleuze, is nothing but a recapitulation of the incurvature of the Same in itself against which he develops his strong instrument of Difference, difference as the *basis* for performative repetition.

> It is always differences which resemble one another, which are analogous, opposed or identical; difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing. Each difference passes through all the others. . . . That is why eternal return . . . relates to a world of differences implicated one in the other, to a complicated, properly chaotic world *without identity*. Joyce presented a *vicus of recirculation* as causing a *chaosmos* to turn; and Nietzsche had already said that chaos and eternal return were not two distinct things but a single and same *affirmation*.[205]

The "space" of passing vibrations through one another, i.e., the consistent planes of immanence that *mediate* such movements, is Deleuze's version of the *khora*—the Platonic sieve through which "consistency" always remains *contingent* and on the move.[206] She is not instantiating any "form"; she is the *field* of "divergent series" of "impersonal and pre-individual singularities,"[207] a *virtual* field of potential actualizations,[208] nothing abstract, rather a sheer *multiplicity of movements* into one another. It is a *plenitude of manifolds* folding, un-folding, de-folding. Nothing is missing, no negativity, no lack of anything, no suppressive and constitutive exclusion, instead—*pure affirmation of manifoldness*.[209]

One of Deleuze's most telling concepts for this process of chaosmic deregulation (as basis, implication, and critique of, as well as counter-activity against, any substantialism) is "the glorious body without organs"[210] he encounters with Nietzsche's Dionysus. Through the many

transformations this concept undergoes from *The Logic of Sense* to *A Thousand Plateaus*, the most remarkable in our context is his imaging of the body without organs (BwO) to be *the process of becoming itself* as an active process of transgressive deregulation of being.

> The BwO: it is already under way the moment the body has had enough of organs and wants to slough them off, or loses them. A long procession. The *hypochondriac body*. . . . The *paranoid body*. . . . The *schizo body*. . . . The *masochist body*. . . . Why such a dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonized, vitrified, sewn-up bodies, when the BwO as also full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance? . . . Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love, Experimentation. Where psychoanalysis says, "Stop, find your self again," we should say instead, "Let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled our self." Substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for interpretation. Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it. It's a question of life and death, youth and the old age, sadness and joy. It is where everything is played out.[211]

It is where we become immanent and cut the powers of multiplicity loose, where the chaotic element of connectivity can play out under, against, and in taking away, the substitution of chaosmic plenitude with law, *logos*, and cosmic order that we discover the process of becoming in its most pure and also most dangerous modes. In *affirming* this flow of transgressive immanence, we find fullness and emptiness at the same time: the fullness of the manifold, and the emptiness from any transcendent regulation that imposes an order on this multiplicity by negating its inconsistent diversity and disintegrative mobility.[212] The negation of the law is the anxiety (of losing being); the fixation of the law is the caretaker of security: reiterated is the repetition of the same/subject/substance; excluded is multiplicity in the name of the Same, and difference is muted in the name of identity.[213]

In affirming multiplicity and fluency, however, things are not ordered "in the desire to accommodate negativity,"[214] but they are "affirmed *through* their difference."[215] In refusing "to the spirit of the negative the right to speak in the name of philosophy," a "pluralism lined with multiple affirmation" and a body of "the joy of the diverse"[216] arises. *This* BwO is

not the place of a hidden lack and exclusion of unfulfilled desires; it becomes the *fullness of intensities*.

> A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate. . . . The BwO is a *field of immanence* of desires, the *plane of consistency* specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it).[217]

Instead of unfulfilled desires that feed the structure of lack and create the excluded "Real" as petrification of the very law—the "rock" of "the Real"—that the exclusion tries to justify, it is, indeed, precisely the (dangerous) "dissolution" of the boundary between the law and its excluded multiplicity of directionless desires (feared by Žižek) that makes the boundary fluent (not guided by any law). Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis of such procedures because it "even found new ways to inscribe in desire the negative law of the lack, the external rule of pleasure, and the transcendent ideal of phantasy."[218] The exclusion is that of intensities, in their own unguarded multiplicity, of flowing into one another. Conversely, in the BwO,

> everything is allowed: all that counts is for pleasure to be the flow of desire itself, Immanence, instead of a measure that interrupts it or delivers it to the three phantoms, namely, internal lack, higher transcendence, and apparent exteriority. If pleasure is not the norm of desire, it is not by virtue of a lack that is impossible to fulfill but, on the contrary, by virtue of its positivity, in other words, the plane of consistency it draws in the course of its process.[219]

Yet, *because* for Deleuze (as for Butler) one "can never reach the Body without Organs" because "it is a limit" (*other* than Butler), now it is really a *fluent* limit, not guarded by any "law of lack," and not entrapped in its own negativity (which excluded it from itself). The BwO is and always remains something "you are forever attaining."[220] Here, Deleuze differs from Kristeva's semiotic body, which never can and never should be "attained"—or only attained for the price of "psychosis"[221]—but always has to be substituted by the Symbolic.[222] The multiple desires (of the Mother) have to be sealed forever and can only break into the realm of the paternal law by poetically "destroying or eroding the Symbolic."[223]

If there remains "negativity" in Deleuze—as the phrasing "body *without* organs" suggests—it is more akin to Derrida's account of negativity as

medium of multiple desires to form freely without the skin of the organizing *logos*. It is a "negativity" that means "richness"[224] and indicates a "multiplicity of sexually marked voices," a "mobile of non-identified sexual marks whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of each 'individual,' whether it is classified as 'man' or 'woman.'"[225] This is the negativity of the BwO: to be *empty* and *therefore* "full" at the same time, but never in the sense of being "fulfilled" ("presented") as in the "metaphysics of presence"—in which we can only find the *full* BwO[226] or the body *with* organs.[227] It is this "negativity" that subverts the symbolic law with the *affirmation of multiplying intensities*. Still, the BwO remains a *limit*; it is dangerous to "fulfill" and its transgressions might deregulate into deteriorating dissolution. It remains the *khora*, the unattainable, the Beyond, but now it also has become the *medium of the fluency of the body*.

Mixtures (Chaosmic Deregulation 2)

There are striking resonances between Deleuze and Whitehead: Whitehead's account of the *khora* as the "medium of intercommunication";[228] his understanding of the process of becoming as flow of "intensities" and "feelings";[229] his trust in *affirmation*—"(positive) prehension"—as the basic expression of this process;[230] his insistence on the multiplicity of events in a chaotic nexus[231] with its shifting formations of laws;[232] his "groundless grounding" of the process on self-creativity as self-affirmation of becomings prior (but not outside) to any binding law of inheritance or repetition.[233]

Like Deleuze's "chaosmos"[234] with its fluent limit of performativity of becoming, Whitehead's "cosmological" account of becoming is based on the *limit* of the "the origin of the present cosmic epoch"—or any cosmic epoch (as the institution of a certain multiplicity of contingent laws)—which "is [to be] traced back to an aboriginal disorder."[235] The chaotic nexus[236] is not bound by any law, but only by contingent mutual prehensions.[237] Cosmic evolution, then, is the process by which complex societies are formed, "informed" by common laws (with mechanisms of external pressure and internal acceptance). Yet there is "no reason, so far as our knowledge is concerned, to conceive the actual world as purely orderly, or as purely chaotic."[238] In Whitehead's point of view, *the process of becoming is a mixture of chaos and law*.

This mixture of Chaosmos is always a "bewildering complexity"[239] of opposing movements. As in Butler, it is guided by processes of contingent

performability, creating norms of "being" issuing structured "societies" through *reiteration* (inheritance) and *exclusion* (simplification).[240] In this context, law appears as a "set of dominant societies in certain ordered interconnections" that furthers complexity as harbouring *intensity*, but there is also "an admixture of chaotic occasions which cannot be classified as belonging to any society."[241] These "non-social actual entities," however, while they "constitute" the "element of chaos,"[242] also answer—from the perspective of the Law—*triviality*.

> It follows from this doctrine that the character of an organism depends on that of its environment. But the character of an environment is the sum of the characters of the various societies of actual entities which jointly constitute that environment. . . . Apart from the reiteration gained from its societies, an environment does not provide the massiveness of emphasis capable of dismissing its contrary elements into negative prehensions. Any ideal of depth of satisfaction, arising from the combination of narrowness and width, can only be achieved through adequate order. In proportion to the chaos there is triviality.[243]

Yet for Whitehead, as for Deleuze, the same performability of becoming—*because* it is based on the groundless difference Whitehead names "creativity"[244]—*undermines*, *reverts*, *and disintegrates* the law by originating complexity and intensity. In this perspective—namely, that of the chaotic nexus *underpinning* any order as its contingent performability—it is the transgressive movement of "the non-social occasions" to converge into "entirely living nexus" that *constitutes* intensity through originality. Here, as in Deleuze, the chaotic nexus is the high limit expressing the *intense complexity of Life*, *which is based on originality*, *disintegration and transgression*, *rather than repetition*, *reiteration*, *and exclusion*.

> The complexity of nature is inexhaustible. So far we have argued that the nature of life is not to be sought by its identification with some society of occasions, which are living in virtue of the defining characteristic of that society. An "entirely living" nexus is, in respect to its life, not social. Each member of the nexus derives the necessities of its being from its prehensions of its complex social environment; by itself the nexus lacks the genetic power which belongs to "societies." But a living nexus, though non-social in virtue of its "life," may support a thread of personal order along some historical route of its members. Such an enduring entity is a "living person." It is not of the essence of life to be a living person. Indeed a living person requires that its immediate environment be a living, non-social nexus.[245]

Flowing freely through the bodies of law, these "outlaw" nexuses further complexity, not triviality (beyond and subversive to any fixed law); however, they also dangerously disintegrate any substantial subjections under the law, which now appear as "simplification in the successive phases of the concrescence."[246] Personal unity, the soul, the unified subject, consciousness, mind, and reason—all appear to be "the outcome of a complex process of massive simplification which is characteristic of higher grades of actual entities,"[247] against which the chaotic nexus "limits . . . such unified control," allowing for "dissociation of personality, multiple personalities in successive alternations, and even multiple personalities in joint possession."[248]

It is this specific approach to the *mixture* of chaos and cosmos that differentiates Whitehead from Butler and Deleuze. Chaosmic deregulation in Whitehead is created by the *paradoxical interplay of intensity and triviality* as played out in the mutually limiting and delimiting moments of the performative process of becoming: complexification as subjection to law *and* complexification as liberating the chaotic nexus in the evolution of Law; simplification as trivialization through the chaotic nexus *and* simplification as highly structured avoidance of the chaotic interplay.

> By this transmission the mental originality of the living occasions receives a character and a depth. In this way originality is both "canalized"—to use Bergson's word—and intensified. Its range is widened within limits. Apart from canalization, depth of originality would spell disaster for the animal body. With it, personal mentality can be evolved, so as to combine its individual originality with the safety of the material organism on which it depends. Thus life turns back into society: it binds originality within bounds, and gains the massiveness due to reiterated character.[249]

While the law, for Whitehead, becomes a necessity for the development of the complexity of the bodily evolution, societies, and cultures, it is, at the same time, the limitation, reiteration, and exclusion of the multiplicity of intensities it harbors and supports. And while the chaotic nexus is the expression of the limit of absolute intensity, without the canalization of repetition, inheritance, reiteration, exclusion, and suppression of its chaotic non-regulative emptiness, it will deteriorate into pure triviality.

This *mixture* is the reason that Whitehead, against Deleuze and with Butler, has a "positive" function for *negation* (although not dialectical) and *lack* (although not of desires), which is situated precisely on the "suture" between becoming and being, the law and the Beyond, event and substance. It is their complication, their mutual disturbance, their paradox.

Negation is important to allow becomings to become *what* they are (the becoming of *something*); they allow for *different* traces of differentiation; they generate structures of inheritance; they account for the *evolution* of life-forms to develop at all. In a "negative prehension," the concrescent occasion of becoming *excludes* what it cannot integrate in order to survive as finite symbiosis.[250] In its definiteness, it is a *lack* of a higher power of integration.[251] While for itself this exclusion instantiates different forms of negation of higher modes of integration—mutual hindrance, aesthetic destruction, anesthesia[252]—the *effect* of such an excluding negation and lack of symbiosis is a *positive* one.[253] It remains haunting the integrity of the event and the nexus in which it is vibrating.[254]

While it is only in the later Butler that the non-presence of a subject to itself is not just based on the *lack* of exclusion but becomes the expression of an *abundance* of performative self-account,[255] for Whitehead the basic drive of higher symbiosis was never negation or lack, but always the *power of intensities* in their multiplicity to attain recognition beyond themselves, i.e., in the *novelty* of a new event of concrescence.[256] The higher such symbiotic concrescence in its *less repressive* "distribution of intensities,"[257] the more unrestricted the ability to withstand the reduction of opposition into simplification.[258] The more heterogeneous the ability to encompass (envelope) difference, opposition, and incoherence, the higher the *intensity* of the process and the more complex the *harmony* of the nexus in which it vibrates.[259] In its most unrestrained assemblage, the event of becoming becomes an event of an "entirely living nexus,"[260] i.e., a "non-social nexus" that "answers to the notion of 'chaos,'"[261] its life being "the capture of intensity."[262] Indeed, it is the *affirmation of becoming multiplicities* that is the whole aesthetic self-justification of the process of becoming itself: *the intensity of immanent self-creativity in nexus of discordant harmonies*.[263]

With Deleuze, then, Whitehead trusts the power of affirmation. Like the BwO, Whitehead's "entirely living nexus" represents the disintegration, transgression, and dangerously intense performance of a nexus of events that is *based* on the *chaotic nexus* (which is the Chaosmos itself) that is primordial to, but always only immanent in, all cosmic orders. In contrast to Deleuze, however, Whitehead allows societies (the reign of the law) also to *harbor* and *protect* chaotic offspring.[264] With Deleuze, Whitehead understands vibrations, i.e., "pulses of emotion,"[265] to be the basic expressions of the affirmation of intensity and harmony. In opposition to Deleuze, he views negation to be an *integral* part of the fabric of vibrations.[266] With Deleuze, although polemically, Whitehead could be understood to entertain negation as a necessary ingredient in the development

of the law—the " 'affirmation-negation' contrast"[267] as a basis for the performative constitution of any higher forms of subjectivity (as, e.g., for human consciousness) and, hence, for the subjection under the law. But against Deleuze, Whitehead's primary meaning of negation is not lack or exclusion of unbearable intensity for the reiteration of the Same, but "alteration" in becoming, i.e., *affirmation of novelty* in the process.[268] Becoming is a process of decisions taken to *affirm intensifying alternatives* rather than functioning as a reductive simplification of complex diversities.[269]

It has been suggested that there is a high affinity between Whitehead's layout of the process of becoming and Kristeva's semiotic realm of "prepaternal causality."[270] Indeed, it is a "rhythmic presymbolic process," "which cries out for interchange with Whitehead's odd doctrine of 'causal feelings' "[271] both of which are "located" at the pre-symbolic limit herself—the *khora*. And because of the mixture of law and Beyond in Whitehead and his account of his contrast of affirmation and negation, the resemblance might be even more striking than it is for Deleuze.[272] Indeed, Whitehead's *whole* deconstruction of the history of philosophy is to lay free the *exclusion* of the pre-symbolic realm of becoming—which he terms "causal efficacy"—under the guise of the controlling "metaphysics of presence"—he terms "presentational immediacy."[273]

> But we must—to avoid "solipsism of the present moment"—include in direct perception something more than presentational immediacy. For the organic theory, the most primitive perception is "feeling the body as functioning." This is a feeling of the world in the past; it is the inheritance of the world as a complex of feeling; namely, it is the feeling of derived feelings. The later, sophisticated perception is "feeling the contemporary world." Even this presentational immediacy begins with sense-presentation of the contemporary body. The body, however, is only a peculiarly intimate bit of the world. Just as Descartes said, "this body is mine"; so he should have said, "this actual world is mine." My process of "being myself" is my origination from my possession of the world.[274]

Whitehead was on his way to discovering one of the most cherished insights of post-structuralism—that the substantialism of the law is based on *one exclusion*: that of the multiplicity of becoming in its diversity, vibrating divergence, concrescing symbioses, and fluent performability. Here, Whitehead's claim is very much in accordance with Derrida's deconstruction of fulfilled presence (and its inherent logocentrism) and the "traces" of the multiplicity beyond, with Butler's performability and its heavy baggage of reiteration, with Irigaray's primordial exclusion of the female, with

Kristeva's poetic disturbance of the Symbolic by the unregulated drives and desires of the mother, and with Deleuze's BwO in its deregulated transgression. Yet, Whitehead's account of the pre-symbolic realm differs from all of them due to his *specific* account for *the mixture of Chaosmos*.

> The bonds of causal efficacy arise from without us. They disclose the character of the world from which we issue, an inescapable condition round which we shape ourselves. The bonds of presentational immediacy arise from within us, and are subject to intensifications and inhibitions and diversions according as we accept their challenge or reject it.[275]

Whitehead's presentational immediacy resonates with Derrida's "metaphysical presence" regarding the inherent logocentrism: in presentational immediacy, a contingent togetherness of elements is sedimented as necessary law (as fulfilled presence of the *logos*). But while presentational immediacy allows us to discover "necessary" structures of mathematical, logical, or ontological order, they are, in fact, *contingent* forms of projections on the world[276] in order to control the multiplicities of causal efficacy.[277] Paradoxically, however, i.e., according to his *mixture* of the Chaosmos, Whitehead understands the appearance of presentational immediacy as an important *evolutionary accomplishment*, allowing for *freedom* from the bounds of inheritance of causal efficacy,[278] rooted in the process of becoming as the process of *creative self-production* itself.[279] Then, again, the price for higher intensity is also higher simplification, i.e., exclusion of divergent multiplicity.

As with Butler, "causal efficacy" is Whitehead's concept for the performability of becoming insofar as it initiates "being" (by performing reiteration) and overthrows it (deregulation). It expresses the basic relation of prehension as the "conformation"[280] of the (past) world to any new event of togetherness, i.e., to be a transfer of energy that energizes and bounds to reiteration.[281] It is *contingent*, i.e., it has no pre-given, transcendent structure it executes and is, therefore, "incapable of rationalization."[282] But, as a realm of heavy feelings of causality, compulsion, and reiteration, causal efficacy—contrary to Butler and Derrida—*needs* the *deliberate presentations* of presentational immediacy to free its performance from its causal "fate."[283] It is in a paradoxical dialectic of necessity and freedom, in which the law—in its deconstruction—seems to have become a medium for the *deregulation* of reiteration and exclusion.

With Irigaray and Kristeva, the *excluded* causal efficacy is the realm of instincts, desires, and drives that can be approached only when we lose control of presentational immediacy,[284] in which case it appears "insistent,

is vague, haunting, unmanageable."[285] But against Kristeva, and with Deleuze, it is not lacking anything; it needs no transcendent rule. It deregulates into the acts of a BwO when we "find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures."[286]

The most intriguing element of Whitehead's account of the pre-symbolic, however, that differentiates him from all of these approaches, has not been named yet. His theory of the pre-Symbolic and the Symbolic, as elaborated in his *Symbolism*, postulates neither a *negative limit* against which the Symbolic is the mourning of the excluded semiotic, nor *one* realm of "subversive multiplicity of drives"[287] against which the Symbolic is *another* realm. While the former would be a self-exclusion of the limit as unspeakable Beyond and the latter would imply a problematic dualism of realms with a fluent (overlapping) border "between" them, Whitehead understands *both* causal efficacy and presentational immediacy as *mutually immanent aspects of the pre-Symbolic*—the Symbolic has not been even named yet! And this Symbolic is *not a realm at all*, but nothing other than *the fluent relation between the two pre-symbolic aspects of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy*;[288] Symbolism is the "symbolic reference"[289] of, and the "symbolic transference"[290] between, causal efficacy and presentational immediacy.

> It is the thesis of this work that human symbolism has its origin in the symbolic interplay between two distinct modes of direct perception of the external world. There are, in this way, two sources of information about the external world, closely connected but distinct. These modes do not repeat each other; and there is a real diversity of information. Where one is vague, the other is precise: where one is important, the other is trivial. But the two schemes of presentation have structural elements in common, which identify them as schemes of presentation of the same world. There are however gaps in the determination of the correspondence between the two morphologies. The schemes only partially intersect, and their true fusion is left indeterminate. The symbolic reference leads to a transference of emotion, purpose, and belief, which cannot be justified by an intellectual comparison of the direct information derived from the two schemes and their elements of intersection. The justification, such as it is, must be sought in a pragmatic appeal to the future.[291]

This constellation may allow for a distinctly Whiteheadian niche in the post-structuralist landscape of becoming. Against the presumption that the process of becoming *itself* is pre-symbolic—in its non-regulated forces ("the semiotic")—and becomes symbolic in its regulation-performing sediments ("the law"), for Whitehead, "logocentrism" is not itself the essence

of symbolism, but has its "roots" in one mode of "direct recognition"[292] of the world of becoming (presentational immediacy). The process of "normativization"—be it reiteration or exclusion—can never be isolated from the pre-symbolic process; rather the struggle between regulation and deregulation is of its essence. The symbolic, then, is not a "realm," but a *relation*. The Symbolic *is* the ever-fluent border and transfer *between* the aspects of the pre-Symbolic. *It traverses, and is produced by, the pre-symbolic difference.*[293]

> I shall also endeavour to illustrate the doctrine that all human symbolism, however superficial it may seem, is ultimately to be reduced to trains of this fundamental symbolic reference, trains which finally connect percepts in alternative modes of direct recognition.[294]

If, however, the Symbolic arises from a *pro/found difference in the semiotic* and establishes itself *as* transgression, it is nothing we have to *resist* with "the Real" (as Žižek suggests) and nothing we have to *subvert* with the *khora* (as Kristeva suggests)—Butler, rightly, has criticized both approaches!—but, with Deleuze, it is something we have to *attain* in making it *fluent*. It is "in its flux" of the pre-symbolic difference that "a symbol"[295] will open for the multiplicity of intensities, disintegrate the substantiations of the pre-symbolic performance of "conformation," and deregulate the self-erasing projections of the contingency of pre-symbolic "presentations." In affirming a *fluent symbolic body*, the pre-symbolic difference will contingently attain the greatest possible multiplicity of intensities by *infinitely becoming dis/harmonious*. But as in Deleuze, the attainment of this fluent Body of Intensity is *impossible*! Yet, trying is not futile, either! It is the essence of being *in the process of becoming*—a *metanoia*, reverting exclusion and reiteration, deregulating *being*.

Impossible Event?

At this point in negotiating Becoming with Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler, with all their divergences and occasional coalitions, one element remains to be named that strictly seems to divide Whitehead from the post-structuralist approaches of Butler and Deleuze—Whitehead's invocation of a concept of "God" in the process of becoming. It is, indeed, *the* scandal of his metanoetics of becoming that—in the eyes of many—leaves his philosophy on the *other* side of the Nietzschean divide, the modern

side, and positions Deleuze and Butler on this side, the "truly" postmodern, "truly" naturalist, "truly" pluralist side.[296] Isn't it the death of God that initiates the death of the subject? Isn't it the deconstruction of the divine that opens the infinite sea of becoming in the first place? Isn't it the invocation of transcendence that *hinders* true becoming from unfolding?[297] If there is a Beyond, isn't it named already: "the Real," the semiotic, the *khora*? And isn't this Beyond the exclusion on which we build our cultural integrities, instead of being its "savior"?

The relations of our three philosophers to religion, God, and, expressions of the Divine are equally complicated. We could ask to what extent an "exclusion" of Deleuze's Catholic education has influenced his account of *immanence* of which he firmly says that whenever "there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence."[298] We know of Butler's complex relationship to her Jewish inheritance[299] with her sympathy to "the particular conviction of postwar Ashkenazi Jews"—mediated through the Shoah "that had destroyed the belief in God"—"that God had died or had himself [*sic*] been annihilated in the course of the twentieth century."[300] Whitehead, on the other hand, always struggled with the "naive trend of Semitic monotheism, Jewish and [Islamic] . . . towards the notion of Law imposed by the fiat of the One God."[301] He was reluctant to accept the idea of a personal God[302] and was horrified by the "concept of a definite personal individual entity"[303] in the heavens and especially by its Christian version.[304] Whitehead's relationship to religion was not naïve; rather, he was disillusioned by the "the horrors produced by bigotry"[305] and often saw religion as "the last refuge of human savagery."[306]

Nevertheless, Whitehead—of all the others—introduced the concept of God in his world of becoming.[307] There are at least three ways to approach this odd fact after all that has been said about becoming, or rather, three questions to be asked: *Where* is the "place" for the Divine in Whitehead's Chaosmos? *How* does Whitehead's notion of God fit into the post-structuralist sensitivities of the Chaosmos? And *why* does Whitehead's "God" not fall under the ban of the Divine in Butler's and Deleuze's account of becoming? I will begin with the last question.

Deleuze exclaims: "*to be done with the judgment of God!*"[308] The context is the exploration of the BwO, out of which to construct a transcendence really is to destroy the immanent multiplicity and to transubstantiate it into a lack of aim that has to be remedied from outside—the great organizer.[309] This God becomes the expression of substantiation *per se*, the "*Omnitudo realitatis*, from which all secondary realities are derived by a

process of division."[310] No wonder Deleuze's discussion of Whitehead appears in the context of Leibniz's God of pre-stabilized harmony who "calculates and chooses," thereby instantiating "a negative use of divergence of disjunction—one of exclusion," whereby God *replaces* the "pure event" in which "divergence and disjunction are . . . affirmed as such"[311] by a totality of decisions taken *for* all monads.[312] But the pure event,

> which traverses the divergent as such, this aleatory point which circulates throughout singularities, and emits them as pre-individual and impersonal, does not allow God to subsist. It does not tolerate the subsistence of God as an original individuality, nor the self of a Person, nor the world as an element of the self and as God's product. The divergence of the affirmed series forms a "chaosmos" and no longer a world; the aleatory point which traverses them forms a counter-self, and no longer a self; the disjunction posed as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle for a diabolic principle.[313]

While Deleuze thinks that "Leibniz was unable to grasp, hindered as he was by theological exigencies,"[314] this pure event, surprisingly, Deleuze realizes that Whitehead's God is *not* the transcendent One beyond, suppressing and directing the multiplicity of the world of becoming, taking away its affirmative process of difference and divergence.[315] On the contrary, in Whitehead's "Chaosmos,"

> even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest compossible. [God] becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes through them. The play of the world has changed in a unique way, because now it has become the play that diverges.[316]

Obviously, Whitehead's God is *not* the pinnacle of the monotheistic law, which Butler deconstructs as the final One in which the whole process of exclusions of becoming finds its unchangeable ground and justification. It is in her criticism of *any* kind of transcendent unification (even of the monolithic "'paternal Law' in Lacan, as well as the monological mastery of phallogocentrism in Irigaray") that she thinks they all "bear the mark of a monotheistic singularity that is perhaps less unitary and culturally universal than the guided structuralist assumption"[317] totalizes. It is in this regard that Whitehead aggressively attacks the assumption of any transcendent One beyond the "mutual immanence" of all elements in the Chaosmos,[318] because, for this "monotheism,"

> the nature of God was exempted from all the metaphysical categories which applied to the individual things in this temporal world. The concept of him

> was a sublimation from its barbaric origin. He stood in the same relation to the whole World as early Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject populations. . . . In the final metaphysical sublimation, he became the one absolute, omnipotent, omniscient source of all being, for his own existence requiring no relations to anything beyond himself.[319]

Thereby, Whitehead's God does also not fall into the trap of the Law in the form of the "guilt" Butler is subscribing to the invention of the Divine in the form of Benjamin's "divine violence"[320] that intervenes from *beyond* the Law. While for Whitehead, this beyond in his caricature appears as the pure power of the despot. Although this pure power is meant as the shock of guilt from beyond the Law, it is, in fact, nothing but the "purification of guilt." In other words, based on the introduction of God as the isolator of guilt *beyond* the Law, for Butler this Divine act is already an illusionary effect of the Law that "inflicts a suffering that is, through law, attributed to the subject as his or her own responsibility."[321] In the context of Butler's account of Divine violence, Whitehead's classical theistic description of Divine is the sublimation of the Law, of which even the image of the despot is an effect and for which "transcendence" is not a way to escape.

How then does Whitehead's "God" resonate with the post-structuralist presuppositions of multiplicity, divergence, and immanence? In short, God is not the *origin* of the process of becoming—because "process is ultimate"—but is its "primordial, non-temporal accident."[322] God is conceptualized as "creature of creativity"[323] or even as the "primordial superject of creativity."[324] In understanding God as "the 'superject' rather than the 'substance' or the 'subject,' "[325] the process of becoming is not reflected in the One/Subject (*ego cogito ergo sum*) but is the *effect* of the process of becoming; not the pre-given unity of the subject but the "emergent unity of the superject."[326] If God is not vertical Being—"the fixed individuality of an infinite Being (the notorious immutability of God)"[327]—but an *accident* of Becoming, God is also not the expression of the series of reifications and exclusions held to be responsible for the illusion of Being.[328] If, indeed, there is no doer behind the deed, even for the becoming that is God, God should be understood as a *primordial consequence*[329] of the process of prehensive relationality and concrescing symbiosis and, hence, in a sense as *the limit that is pure becoming itself*.

The concept of the *limit of pure becoming*—like that of the "pure event"[330]—would be the *infinitely attained BwO*. In order to fulfil the post-structuralist sensitivities of the metanoetics of becoming, this BwO would

be a body of *pure intensity* (its free fluency) and *infinite dis/harmony* (of fluent divergences and convergences). It would be the *limit* of what can never be attained: the body of *pure affirmation*. In fact, this is without a doubt precisely Whitehead's concept of God: being the "absolute standard of such intensity" ("which is neither great nor small") and which, because it is *the* limit of becoming, "arises out of no actual world";[331] being the "Harmonies of harmonies";[332] "tragic Beauty"[333] with all the tensions that arise out of the *absolute affirmation of the whole process of becoming* whereby God is "limited by no actuality which [God] presupposes" but rather is infinitely "devoid of all negative prehensions."[334] In other words, there are no restrictions, exclusions, negations, or suppressions in God by which God instantiates "guilt" as the basis for responsibility.[335] God is the affirmation of (even) "the tragic intensity of feeling"[336] in their divergences, the "understanding of tragedy, and at the same time its preservation."[337] God is *the limit* of the Event of Becoming, the *impossible* Event "in which we understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is."[338]

Finally, where is the "place" for the Divine in Whitehead's Chaosmos? While it is often assumed that Whitehead introduces God at least "somehow" in restating Leibniz's pre-stabilized harmony—implying negation, exclusion, and reduction to be the activity of God[339]—this is wrong.[340] Conversely, if it is true that for Whitehead "God is the organ of novelty, aiming at intensification,"[341] the *meaning* that is assumed to be "introduced" in the process by God *cannot* be any transcendent law.[342] As for Deleuze, the transcendent law of the vertical Being is but the erection of substantivism "fashion[ing] God in the image of an imperial ruler, . . . in the image of a personification of moral energy, [and] in the image of an ultimate philosophical principle."[343] On the contrary, God must be the *infinite process of intensification itself*.

The limit of pure becoming is not fixed, but is, itself, the process of the becoming (out) of (and for) these intensities.[344] This is the reason that, for Whitehead, the "immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible."[345] It does *not* mean that God is (preordained) order against chaos, but it means that the limit of the process of becoming is not Chaos *itself* (in its triviality of "non-difference"), but—*as* its limit—is *pure intensity*. "Thus God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities. The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end."[346] This is the "foundational process of creativity"—"seeking intensity, and not preservation"—in which God as its primordial accident

> is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. [God] cares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concerns derivation from its ancestry. [God's] aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being. His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.[347]

It is this *limit* of intensity by which the process of becoming never reaches Being but instead "is thus passing with a slowness, inconceivable in our measures of time, to new creative conditions, amid which the physical world, as we at present know it, will be represented by a ripple barely to be distinguished from nonentity"[348] In a sense, this limit, although not quite as the Ashkenazi would believe, always can be approached only in its "*vanishing*" *into immanence*. In one of the most radical formulations, Whitehead states that

> there is nothing in the Universe other than instances of this passage and components of these instances. . . . Then the word Creativity expresses the notion that each event is a process issuing in novelty. Also if guarded in the phrases Immanent Creativity, or Self-Creativity, it avoids the implication of a transcendent Creator. But the mere word Creativity suggests Creator, so that the whole doctrine acquires an air of paradox, or of pantheism. Still it does convey the origination of novelty.[349]

If, for Deleuze "all BwO's pay homage to Spinoza,"[350] with Whitehead's Body of Pure Becoming, the "substratum of Deistic infinitude"[351] is gone, and Spinoza's "immanence is not immanence to substance" anymore, but "substance and modes are in immanence."[352] Indeed, Whitehead—as does Deleuze—understands his philosophy to be "closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought," although his "morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process" so that "Spinoza's 'modes' now become the sheer actualities"[353] of which "creativity" becomes the ultimate and God its primordial accident. This shift is crucial for the understanding of the "function" of the Divine in Whitehead's Chaosmos:

> In monistic philosophies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is also equivalently termed "The Absolute." In such monistic schemes, the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final, "eminent" reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought. One side makes process ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.[354]

In this *ultimate* Chaosmos "the function of God"—as *limit* of becoming—might be more "analogous to the remorseless working of things in Greek

and in Buddhist thought."[355] Nowhere else does this become more obvious than in two texts arguably understood as the philosophical "testaments" of both philosophers: Whitehead's "Immortality" (1941) and Deleuze's "Immanence: A Life" (1995). Here, Deleuze's empty BwO appears as the limit of pure becoming: as the realm of the virtual or of the pure event. Yet, isn't this "pre-reflective impersonal consciousness . . . without a self"—which is the pure "flow of absolute consciousness" that allows for "the passage from one to the other as becoming"[356]—like the primordial aspect of Whitehead's God?[357] And isn't this "absolute immanence"[358] of the pure body of intensities—which "is itself virtual" with all "the events that populate it [as] virtualities"[359]—like the consequent aspect of Whitehead's God?[360] And isn't mutual determination—where "events or singularities give to the plane all their virtuality, just as the plane of immanence gives virtual events their full reality"[361]—like Whitehead's mutual creativity of the multiplicity of events with God's immanence?[362]

In Whitehead's text, "Values" resonate with the "Virtuals" of Deleuze. These Values are situated in a "World of Value" in mutual immanence with the "World of Active Creativity."[363] This virtual "World of Value exhibits" the notion of God *insofar* as the "existence of God is founded in Value" as the "essential [not actual] unification of the Universe"[364]—the actual unifications being the events in their self-creativity. As in Deleuze, they are subjectively unpossessed (without a self), but are situated in an impersonal unconsciousness of God.[365] Within the "totality of the universe,"[366] however, both Worlds are but "abstractions from the Universe." It is a Chaosmos, not tainted by God, but an infinite process of the mutual immanence of "coordinated value" with "the multiplicity of finite acts"[367]—"God" indicating the *limit* of the *most intense dis/harmony of the Chaosmos*.[368] It seems that, while there remains a certain divine trace of immanence in Deleuze, Whitehead's "God" names the impossible event, the limit of pure becoming, that leaves traces in the immanence of the process of becoming . . .

Maybe this book evokes such an impossible event: the togetherness of Whitehead, Deleuze and Butler, the togetherness of negativity and affirmation, of chaos and Law, of difference and process, social construction and metaphysical deconstruction of universality, of humanity and beyond humanism, of suffering and becoming. Maybe the chaosmos is a complexity in which the voices of these three thinkers will be the difference, the multiplicity, and the affirmation of its secret, the secret that has its becoming and in which all becomings are secrets.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION: NEGOTIATING BECOMING

Roland Faber

1. See WP, p. 85.
2. More hidden for Whitehead, but see J. Thomas Howe, *Faithful to the Earth: Nietzsche and Whitehead on God and the Meaning of Human Life* (Lanham, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 45.
4. I borrow this term from the Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime, *Philosophy as Metanoetics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
5. PR, p. 23.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 24.
8. AI, p. 237.
9. NP, p. 47.
10. WP, p. 21.
11. Ibid., p. 59.
12. Ibid., p. 158.
13. GT, p. 43.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 33.
16. See BC, p. 287.
17. PR, p. xi.
18. See David Ray Griffin, *Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for Its Contemporary Relevance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).
19. See Ken Wilber, *Integral Spirituality: A Startling New Role for Religion in the Modern and Postmodern World* (Boston: Shambala, 2006).
20. See G. Lucas, *Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
21. See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogation* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991).

22. See George Lucas, *The Rehabilitation of Whitehead: An Analytic and Historical Assessment of Process Philosophy*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

23. PR, p. 7.

24. See David Ray Griffin et al, *Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

25. See Catherine Keller and Anne Daniell, eds., *Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).

26. It is interesting that not only Deleuze did not believe in the death of philosophy—in remaining a post-structuralist thinker—and even being interested in systematic thought and metaphysics (see N, p. 136), but that this seems to be an expression of broader movement, as can be seen in the later works of J. Baudrillard, M. Serres or B. Latour.

27. See J. Williams, *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze: Encounters and Influences* (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2005).

28. DR, pp. 284–285.

29. Ibid., p. 284.

30. Ibid., p. 285.

31. See Roland Faber, "Whitehead at Infinite Speed: Deconstructing System as Event," in *Schleiermacher and Whitehead: Open Systems in Dialogue*, ed. C. Helmer, M. Suchocki, and J. Quiring (Berlin: de Gruyter 2004), pp. 39–72.

32. See TF, pp. 76–82.

33. See CV.

34. DR, p. 285.

35. IM, p. 25.

36. PR, p. 113.

37. See CN, pp. 165–172.

38. See CN, pp. 79–81.

39. See TF, p. 134.

40. See LS, p. 111.

41. TF, p. 79.

42. CV. See LS, pp. 4–11.

43. See TF, pp. 59–75.

44. See AI, p. 263.

45. See LS, p. 174.

46. TF, p. 81.

47. Ibid., p. 134.

48. Ibid., p. 79.

49. GT, p. 14.
50. See GT, p. 12.
51. GT, pp. 14–15.
52. See GA, ch. 1.
53. CN, p. 13.
54. Ibid., p. 17.
55. Ibid., p. 16.
56. SMW, p. 51.
57. PR, p. 26.
58. S, p. 26.
59. See PR, pp. 83–129.
60. S, p. 27.
61. See GA, pp. 30–40.
62. See GT, p. 15.
63. PR, p. 89.
64. See GT, p. 69. In an interesting sense, we could say that Whitehead's cosmological analysis relates to Butler's, culturally critical critique like mathematics to physics: His "deconstructive" power seems to be based in a more universal (generally relational) analysis (that he terms "metaphysics") that, if we find the right point of experimental and experiential application, begin to speak and offer new resources—although as long as this is not seen, it cannot be used. This is precisely what Whitehead was demanding of this "metaphysics"—that it be able to be applied and modified by its application in experiences and experiments (see PR, pp. 3–5).
65. GT, p. 23.
66. While Deleuze goes even further in this shift to "spatial" expressions of the event, Butler always seems to include the diachronic perspective of performance as important to her deconstruction of substantial identity. Whitehead, on the other hand, is classically perceived to have given the temporal expression of performance higher significance (epochal theory of time). Yet, Deleuze has a complex theory of time. See LS, pp. 276–279, which Whitehead counters with his spatial expressions of events (coordinate analysis of events).
67. Ibid., 37.
68. Ibid., 39.
69. See DR, pp. 66–69.
70. See AI, p. 168.
71. GT, p. 41.
72. DR, p. 125.
73. GT, p. 41.
74. PR, p. 109.

75. PR, p. 220.
76. GT, p. 41.
77. GT, pp. 43–44.
78. GT, p. 44.
79. See BC, p. 282.
80. See Annika Thiem, *Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 78–9.
81. GT, p. 173.
82. GT, p. 175.
83. GT, p. 177.
84. GT, p. 179 (italics added).
85. For the importance of the two World Wars as actor in the downfall of humanism, see Stephanie Moses, "From Rosenzweig to Levinas: Philosophy of War," in *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 231.
86. DR, p. 128.
87. What has stunned many commentators in Whitehead is the fact that in analyzing human experience, in the end what has disappeared is the specific human existence, human subjectivity, and the extraordinary place it is given in the world (of experiences, of things, of Being). But this is a misperception of Whitehead's interest. When he analyses "experience," he never engages "introspection" by privileging human experience. On the contrary, he wanted to deconstruct this human privilege in experience—as can be seen in his notion of "prehension" that takes the conscious (human) aspect of "apprehension" away (see SMW, p. 69) and his widely misunderstood "emotional language" when he talks about a cosmology of experience, feeling, intensities, and so on (see AI, p. 186).
88. See G. Gutting, *French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 234–257.
89. See M. Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 385: "Rather than the death of God—or, rather, in the wake of that death and in profound correlation with it—what Nietzsche's thought heralds is the end of his murderer."
90. See J. Heartfield, *The "Death of the Subject" Explained* (Sheffield: Hallam University Press, 2002).
91. See M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995); *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York: Vintage, 1988).
92. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. xxiv.

93. Louis Althusser, *The Future Lasts a Long Time* (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 218.

94. See Jean Baudrillard, *The Illusion of the End* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

95. See J. Derrida, *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991) p. 65.

96. S. Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 1994).

97. See J. Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 40. While Heidegger in his letter recognized "humanism" to presuppose the old metaphysics he wanted to convert in his fundamental ontology, Derrida draws the even more radical conclusion that its substantialism/subjectivism leads to human catastrophe.

98. While this is more obvious for Butler and Deleuze, being based in the post-structuralist movement, which was growing out of a historical antithesis to phenomenology and its privileging not only of human experience but of "experience" as such—understood as introspection—thereby deconstructing it as formed by pre-individual structures, Whitehead's non-privileging still seems to be based on "experience." Moreover, we could understand *Process and Reality* as an analysis of experience because, "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness" (PR, p. 167), but he was never interested in "introspection" because the "requisite evidence cannot be gained by mere acts of direct introspection conducted at one epoch by a few clear-sighted individuals" (AI, p. 164). His interest in the most general *structures* of experience (see PR, pp. 3–4) puts him—especially in the way he understand them as subject-forming—in the structuralist context, and in not believing that *the* structure can ever be found because "we cannot produce that final adjustment of well-defined generalities which constitute a complete metaphysics" (AI, p. 145), he might be named a forbearer of "post-structuralism." His rigorous opposition to the "dogmatic fallacy" of metaphysics and his complicated interest in "truth and interest" makes him naturally a near-ancestor of Deleuze.

99. GT, p. 33.

100. See GT, p. 3.

101. PLP, p. 2.

102. GT, p. 40.

103. GT, p. xxv.

104. PLP, p. 3.

105. PLP, p. 10.

106. See BC, p. 285.

107. See BTM, pp. 187–222. See also Slavoj S. Žižek, "The Matrix: Or, The Two Sides of Perversion," in *The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, William Irwin (Chicago: Open Court, 2003), pp. 240–266.

108. See AO, p. 10.
109. AO, p. 8.
110. AO, p. 13.
111. See AI, pp. 201–205.
112. See PR, pp. 34–35.
113. See S, pp. 66–75.
114. PR, p. 88.
115. S, p. 79.
116. S, p. 88.
117. S, p. 66.
118. S, p. 76.
119. S. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), p. 73.
120. See GT, p. 43.
121. See A. Badiou, *Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy* (New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 3–4.
122. This is a long standing criticism of Whitehead—from the perspective of a "modern" philosophy, phenomenology, existentialism, or Neothomism—which all the more strengthens the thesis of an intimate relation of Whitehead's impulse to think with that of post-structuralist flavor.
123. TF, p. 81.
124. TP, p. 238.
125. Ibid.
126. TP, p. 232.
127. PR, p. 22.
128. TP, p. 238.
129. PR, p. 21.
130. TP, p. 238.
131. See PR, p. 7.
132. See DR, p. 36.
133. TF, p. 13.
134. TF, p. 137.
135. See TF, p. 20.
136. See LS, p. 144.
137. N, p. 158.
138. See TP, pp. 3–25.
139. See TF, pp. 4–5.
140. See TF, p. 135.
141. See WP, pp. 15–34.
142. See TF, p. 16.
143. See TF, p. 79.
144. The misunderstanding of A. Sokol and J. Bricmont, *Intellectual Impostures* (London: Profile Books, 1998) and the whole discussion on the "science

wars" in accusing, e.g., Deleuze of scientific imposture (misuse of scientific concepts) relies on the *presupposition* of Sokol's view of scientific *independence*, which is exactly a *substantiating isolation* presupposing and executing the substantial subject (of the scientist) as being in control of the reality investigated and not being a part of it. The fluent conceptualization in Deleuze, however, is not to dissolve science—far from that! (see WP, pp. 1–12)—but to perform a non-substantive philosophical discourse, which is always the *event* of conceptualization.

145. TP, p. 249.

146. See TP, pp. 474–500.

147. See TP, pp. 232–309.

148. See DR, pp. 35–42.

149. See M. Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression," in *Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984, vol. 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (New York: The New Press, 1997–99), pp. 69–87.

150. CV.

151. PR, p. 20.

152. 1PR, p. 19.

153. See TF, pp. 76–82.

154. PR, p. 18.

155. This seems to be more obvious for Deleuze than for Whitehead, for whom there is a God and a teleological element (the initial aim from God). But in Whitehead both elements do not amount to any eschatological closure or ontologically unilateral transcendence. The universe is more open than one might expect; certainly more open than any cyclical universe of the Absolute (as in Hegel).

156. See J. Bradley "Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead," *Process Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): pp. 155–191.

157. PR, p. 104.

158. PR, p. 105.

159. Ibid.

160. In this sense, the cosmological approach is also a radical consequence of the grand in/humanism 1. Against the privileging of *consciousness* as the primordial source for meaning—as in Descartes' (*ego cogito*), Kant's (transcendental subject) and Sartre's (being-for-itself)—it is not reconstructed in its unconscious structures. Moreover, against the privileging of the psychological approach to humanism, consciousness is deconstructed in a *social* context, that is, that it privileges the Western social construct of a psyche over against the "savage" mind—as Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 247–248, has demonstrated against Sartre. Even further, with Bruno Latour, *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the*

Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 204), the privileging of *human* societies over nature is deconstructed in favor of a community of becoming-social. This is where Whitehead's concept of society radically goes beyond the binominals of society/nature, value/fact, culture/technology, body/soul, psyche/society, humans/non-humans into a "democracy of fellow creatures" (PR, p. 50)—with their own regional differences beyond any privilege (see PR, pp. 83–129).

161. See TP, p. 24.
162. See TP, pp. 228–231.
163. See AI, pp. 69–87.
164. GT, p. 179.
165. BTM, p. 188.
166. See BTM, p. 277n2.
167. See BTM, p. 41.
168. See GT, p. 106.
169. PLP, p. 5.
170. See PLP, pp. 2–3.
171. BTM, p. 204.
172. BTM, p. 188.
173. See Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 112.
174. BTM, p. 190.
175. GT, p. 6.
176. See BTM, p. 195.
177. BTM, pp. 206–207.
178. BTM, p. 196.
179. See BTM, pp. 206–207.
180. BTM, p. 198.
181. Ibid.
182. See L. Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 168–179.
183. BTM, p. 37.
184. See BTM, p. 41.
185. See BTM, p. 40.
186. BTM, p. 43.
187. See BTM, p. 41.
188. See BTM, p. 39.
189. GT, p. 102.
190. See Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
191. GT, p. 102.

192. See GT, pp. 101–118. See also Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

193. See GT, p. 105.

194. See BTM, pp. 41–42.

195. GT, p. 115.

196. GT, p. 104.

197. GT, pp. 104–105.

198. See BTM, p. 195.

199. BTM, p. 195.

200. BTM, p. 207.

201. As Butler notes, Rosi Braidotti has made the case that Butler lives off a "theology of lack" instead of a plenitude of affections. However, Butler's defense is interesting because she relates this "positivity" of affections to Braidotti's "materialist" interpretation of Deleuze, and her inclination to follow Hegel's "negativity" instead as an indication that she might be a "bad materialist." See UG, pp. 195–198. In fact, the Spinozism of all of them—Braidotti, Butler, and Deleuze—doesn't strike me as materialist at all. The impression might be connected to the fact that Deleuze rejects psychoanalysis, while Butler includes the psychic in the social construction as irreducible to it (against Foucault but with Lacan), as does Braidotti, as Butler assumes with Braidotti's reading of Irigaray. For Deleuze, however, it is about the "Idea" of multiplicity as one of affirmation instead of a negative dialectic (see DR, pp. 26–27).

202. LS, p. 172.

203. In Rosi Braidotti's interpretation, her "materialist" (Spinozist) reading of the terms "affectivity, intensity and speed" are affirmative while "psychoanalysis expresses a very negative set of forces: it is the morality of the confession, the priestly or 'pastoral' guidance so dear to Foucault, but distasteful to Deleuze's post-humanist secular mind-set"; Rosi Braidotti, *Metamorphosis: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 98.

204. See LS, pp. 172–173. See also M. Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). pp. 1–25.

205. DR, p. 57.

206. See WP, pp. 35–60.

207. LS, p. 175.

208. See WP, pp. 156–157.

209. See LS, p. 279.

210. LS, p. 129.

211. TP, pp. 150–151.
212. See AO, pp. 8–13.
213. See LS, p. 172.
214. LS, p. 173.
215. LS, p. 172.
216. LS, p. 279.
217. TP, pp. 153–154.
218. TP, p. 155
219. TP, pp. 156–157.
220. TP, p. 150.
221. GT, p. 110.
222. In this sense, for Kristeva, the exclusion (suppression) of the semiotic is a necessity that creates language and human culture; it is, as in Žižek, the "Real" as the excluded "obscene underside" of all discursivity that can be broken down only by violating the incest taboo (see GT, p. 110). See also Slavoj Žižek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates* (London: Verso, 2002).
223. GT, p. 105.
224. See J. Derrida, "Geschlecht. Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference," in *Research in Phenomenology* 13 (1983): p. 72.
225. Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies* (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 78.
226. See AO, p. 8.
227. See TP, p. 150.
228. AI, p. 134.
229. PR, p. 23.
230. See PR, p. 23.
231. See PR, p. 95.
232. See AI, p. 113.
233. See PR, pp. 20–21.
234. LS, p. 176.
235. PR, p. 95.
236. See PR, p. 72.
237. See PR, p. 4.
238. PR, p. 110.
239. PR, p. 98.
240. See BTM, p. 188.
241. PR, pp. 205–206.
242. PR, p. 110.
243. Ibid.
244. PR 20–1.

245. PR, pp. 106–107.

246. PR, p. 224. In opposition to Kristeva, Whitehead does not exclude the multiplicity of libidinal desires in order to create societies, but understands them as necessary elements of a complexity that allows for human subjectivity and human societies to occur—but for the price of an always-lingering chaos of destruction.

247. PR, p. 314.

248. PR, p. 107.

249. Ibid.

250. See PR, p. 41.

251. See AI, p. 259.

252. See AI, p. 256.

253. It is here that Butler's "non-materialism" of the psyche is connected to Whitehead's proposition that "Consciousness is the feeling of negation" (PR, p. 162) and that "negative judgment is the peak of mentality" (PR, p. 5). In fact, negativity, as in Hegel, is not a matter of materialism as in Braidotti, but of intensity. In this connection, Butler is correct to assume that Braidotti does not get rid of negativity, that is, as in Whitehead, of "suffering as suffering, but that, methodologically, she would seek to identify these sites of fracture and mobility as conditions for new possibility" (UG, p. 195).

254. See PR, p. 26.

255. See GA, ch. 2.

256. See AI, p. 198.

257. AI, p. 259.

258. Here, Whitehead's concept of "contrast" does not reduce oppositions under a unification, a One, a reduction of multiplicity to identity, but, as in Deleuze, leads to a new "distribution of intensities," which are what Deleuze calls the "nomadic distribution" (LS, p. 102) that only happens if difference is not seen already as difference of identities or with identity as ideal—both based on a process of "auto-unification" or "self-creativity."

259. See AI, p. 276.

260. PR, p. 103.

261. PR, p. 72.

262. PR, p. 105.

263. See AI, p. 295.

264. See PR, p. 103.

265. PR, p. 163.

266. See PR, p. 279.

267. PR, p. 23.

268. See PR, p. 26.

269. See AI, p. 261.

270. GT, p. 117.

271. Keller and Daniell, ed., *Process and Difference*, p. 16.

272. Deleuze's quasi-causality (see LS, p. 176) of the pre-symbolic realm of intensities is not so much causal efficacy as a surface effect of causality, much like the form of Whitehead's *final* causality. "The 'lure for feeling' is the final cause guiding the concrescence of feelings" (PR, p. 185). Yet for both it is the effect that generates it own causes.

273. Many commentators describe Whitehead's discovery, which he also calls "prehension," his single most important philosophical contribution. See E. Kraus, *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's* Process and Reality (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).

274. PR, p. 81.

275. S, p. 58.

276. See S, pp. 13–16.

277. See S, p. 56.

278. See S, p. 23.

279. See, S, p. 21. Here, Whitehead's *mixture* as complexity is related to Deleuze's process of folding (explication/implication). See Latour, p. 191: "We shall always go from the mixed to the still more mixed, from the complicated to the still more complicated, from the explicit to the implicit." Although Deleuze differentiates between evolution and becoming (see TP, p. 238), the assemblage of folds/vibrations, as explained in his 1987 lecture on Whitehead, implicates a symbiosis that would amount to the emergence of "presentational immediacy" in Whitehead.

280. S, p. 35.

281. See AI, pp. 184–186.

282. PR, p. 46.

283. S, p. 44. For Butler's "fate of law," see CC, p. 215.

284. See S, p. 66.

285. S, p. 43.

286. PR, p. 50. In this definitely non-Lacanian approach, Whitehead and Deleuze rather strongly resonate with Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Discourse, figure* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971). His understanding of a pre-Oedipal realm of desires is, in a sense, an interesting parallel idea: It is not produced by the Oedipal Symbolic, and it opens a possibility to think through and beyond the psychological impact of more radical, political implications.

287. GT, p. 112.

288. See S, p. 18.

289. S, p. 7.

290. S, p. 56.

291. S, pp. 30–31.

292. S, p. 10.

293. In this sense, the Symbolic is a *relation* of a pre-Symbolic difference that becomes *in* symbolic relation signifier and signified, but is, per se, neither (neither meaning nor sign; see S, p. 10). This would open interesting new questions on *what constitutes a sign*—in relation to Ferdinand de Saussure, Lacan, and Roland Barthes. In any case, the pre-symbolic aspects are not realms without "interpretation"—there is no such thing as facts without interpretation (see PR, pp. 14–15)—but somehow constituted by their difference as *potentiality* of semiotic relations (see S, p. 6). In fact, for Whitehead, they are never existing in themselves and are always already *in symbolic transfer*, i.e., in semiotic interference so that we could even say that they are "products" of the semiotic activity in the sense that the symbolism is a mode of self-production, which is the becoming of events (see S, pp. 8–10). Whitehead's odd formulation of the "infallibility" (S, p. 6) of the pre-Symbolic aspects of "direct recognition" is not to install a pre-symbolic truth, but to say that that the problem of truth only arises with the symbolic transfer (see S, pp. 6–7; pp. 19–21).

294. S, p. 7.

295. S, p. 63.

296. See LS, pp. 278–279. This accusation haunts Whitehead's reception since the beginning, not bound to, but especially akin to, all non-Idealistic philosophies, post-Hegelian or otherwise. It is always the stumbling bock of any appropriation of Whitehead in any contemporary philosophical discourse.

297. See F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (London: Vintage, 1974), §§ 108, 125, 343.

298. WP, p. 43. See also M. Bryden, ed., *Deleuze and Religion* (London: Routledge, 2001).

299. See PL, pp. 101–127, and also her newer work on Walter Benjamin, CC, p. 201–219.

300. BC, p. 278.

301. AI, p. 121.

302. See RM, p. 66.

303. RM, p. 68.

304. See RM, pp. 74–75.

305. RM, p. 76.

306. RM, p. 37.

307. See SMW, pp. 178–179. The history of "process theology" is in itself a pluralist multiplicity of approaches, based mostly on Whitehead's explorations, especially in *Religion in the Making* and *Process and Reality*, and should not be conflated with a (fortunate or unfortunate) spiritualization of Whitehead's philosophy. It has developed in remarkably different directions in

exploring the "function" of the Divine in the Chaosmos *through* Whitehead's cosmology. See Roland Faber, *God as Poet of the World: Exploring Process Theologies* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). Variable also in its motives and interests, the variety ranges from a "philosophical theology"—J. Cobb, *A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007)—to a Christian theology—see M. Suchocki, *God—Christ—Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1995); from a Buddhist philosophy—Steven Odin, *Process Metaphysics and Hua-Yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration vs. Interpenetration* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988)—to a pluralist philosophy of religion—David Ray Griffin, ed., *Deep Religious Pluralism* (Louisville, Ky.: WJK, 2005); and even, in taking up post-structuralist augmentations, to a veritable post-structuralist account of a theology of becoming—Catherine Keller, *Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (New York: Routledge, 3003).

308. TP, p. 150.

309. See LS, p. 172. The Whiteheadian "initial aim" from God to issue any process of concrescence has a resemblance to this Leibnizian pre-established organization, but, in fact, should not be confused with it because it is not about order but intensity (see PR, p. 244).

310. AO, p. 13.

311. LS, p. 172.

312. See TF, p. 73.

313. LS, p. 176.

314. LS, p. 172.

315. See LS, pp. 278–279.

316. TF, p. 81.

317. GT, p. 38.

318. See AI, p. 168.

319. AI, p. 169.

320. See CC, pp. 210–11.

321. Ibid., p. 215.

322. PR, p. 7. Non-temporality or "eternity" is not a problem here because it is precisely a mark of the *Aeonic* tome of the Event in Deleuze, which is also "an incorporeal, unlimited, and empty form of time" and "eternal" in the sense of the "eternal return" (LS, p. 62).

323. PR, p. 31.

324. Ibid., p. 32.

325. Ibid., p. 84.

326. PR, p. 45. In more technical terms: While it may be doubted that Whitehead understood God's "primordial nature" (realm of the potential) as

an effect of the world, he held the "consequent nature" (realm of actualities) to be such an effect (see PR, p. 32), in the context of the *superjectivity*—God being the primordial accident of creativity—we may question whether or not all these aspects of God rest on creativity and are its "effect," in the same sense in which Deleuze knows of the realm of the effects as quasi-causes of the process (see LS, pp. 169–170).

327. LS, p. 107. This prefigures Butler's criticism of the Law and Nietzsche's view that it is nothing but the exclusion of becoming for Being.

328. See LS, p. 279.

329. See PR, p. 88.

330. LS, p. 172.

331. PR, p. 47.

332. AI, p. 296.

333. Ibid., p. 295.

334. PR, p. 348. Whitehead's God does not reflect Butler's power beyond the Law as the redeemer of guilt that is still an effect of that Law; see CC, pp. 214–5.

335. See PR, pp. 346–347.

336. AI, p. 106.

337. AI, p. 286.

338. PR, p. 350. How this *limit* relates to Lacan's and Žižek's "Real" still is an open question. While all understand it as limit, Whitehead's limit (of the BwO) is *not* the excluded but indicates *non-exclusion*. *As* non-excluded, it is in itself the *impossible* event. From a Whiteheadian perspective, however, it would be interesting to ask the question whether the limit, which, in a sense, is an "exclusion" as no event can realize it—except the limit itself, the impossible event—is God. God, then, remains the only event that has no "Real" as limit and therefore is the internal reversion of "the Real." In this sense, God is not "the Real" and not part of it; God is not the projection of the unspeakably excluded, but the limit of the attainment of the unspeakable as pure intensity—which, of course, is "excluded" in any event.

339. See LS, p. 172. See Jeff Bell, *Philosophy at the Edges of Chaos: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Difference* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 190–192.

340. See AI, pp. 133–134. Whitehead's naming of God as the "principle of limitation" (see SMW, p. 178) is *not* a proof to the contrary because it does not function to install order but intensity; besides, it functions as the principle of *irrationality* in which it is itself the *limit* of any rational order: not in negation, but in *affirmation* of the event!

341. PR, p. 67.

342. See AI, p. 113.

343. PR, pp. 342–343.

344. God as *limit* of the BwO is an *infinitely attaining* body, never reaching fulfillment of a full BwO or a "presented" B *with* O.

345. PR, p. 111.

346. PR, p. 105.

347. Ibid.

348. RM, p. 160.

349. AI, p. 236.

350. TP, p. 154.

351. MG, p. 106.

352. IM, p. 26.

353. PR, p. 7.

354. Ibid.

355. PR, p. 244. See also Masao Abe, "Mahayana Buddhism and Whitehead," in Abe, *Zen and Western Thought* (Honolulu, 1985), pp. 152–170.

356. IM, p. 25.

357. See PR, p. 30.

358. IM, p. 27.

359. Ibid., p. 31.

360. See PR, p. 345.

361. IM, p. 26.

362. See PR, pp. 349–351.

363. Imm., p. 90.

364. Ibid.

365. See PR, p. 345.

366. Imm., p. 80.

367. Ibid., p. 82.

368. See R. Faber, "'The Infinite Movement of Evanescence'—The Pythagorean Puzzle in Plato, Deleuze, and Whitehead," *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy* 21 (2000): pp. 171–199 and R. Faber, "De-Ontologizing God: Levinas, Deleuze, and Whitehead," in C. Keller and A. Daniell, eds., *Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 209–234.

1. WHITEHEAD, POST-STRUCTURALISM, AND REALISM
Keith Robinson

1. Much of this "early" reaction to Derrida seems based on an at times willful misreading of his work, readings that Derrida always vigorously disputed. For a striking example of the latter, see Derrida's *Limited Inc.* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

2. Giorgio Agamben uses the "immanence-transcendence" distinction to characterize different tendencies in continental thought in *Potentialities:*